dissenting.
The only issue presented in this ease is whether the plaintiffs raised a genuine issue of material fact, thereby precluding summary judgment for the defendant. Because the plaintiffs’ affidavits clearly raise a fact issue whether Boys Club’s admitted misrepresentations produced or proximately caused the plaintiffs’ injuries, I dissent.
Proximate cause requires both cause-in-fact and foreseeability. Travis v. City of Mesquite, 830 S.W.2d 94, 98 (Tex.1992). An act or omission is a cause-in-fact if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, without which the harm would not occur. Id.
Before allowing the boys to go with Mul-lens on a camping trip which was not sponsored by Boys Club, Mrs. Coe specifically asked Allen, the Education Director at Mesquite Boys Club, about Mullens. Mrs. Coe told Allen that Mullens wanted to take the boys on the camping trip and asked her what she thought about it. Allen agreed in her deposition testimony that Mrs. Coe “specifically asked” what Allen knew about Mullens. Allen responded that Mullens “seemed to be okay and they had no complaints,” but failed to disclose the facts as she knew them: Mul-lens was at Boys Club to fulfill community service hours by order of a criminal court because of his conviction for DWI.
Mrs. Coe’s affidavit unequivocally states that had she known that Mullens was convicted of a crime, she would not have allowed her grandchildren to go anywhere alone with him:
If the Boys Club had disclosed that Boyd Ray Mullens had been convicted of a crime and was working at the Boys Club in order to fulfill required community service horn’s, I would not have permitted [the boys] to go anywhere alone with [Mullens]. I did not know that [Mullens] had been convicted of a crime until after [he] was arrested in August, 1988.... If there ever was a time that I was concerned or had doubts about Mr. Mullens, those doubts disappeared when I learned that the Boys Club had represented that they thoroughly investigated the workers to have direct contact with the children.
Boys Club admitted that, unlike the procedure it normally follows with all employees and volunteers, it did not check any of Mul-lens’ references, did not review his police record, was not even aware of what he had been convicted, and did not in any way investigate his application even though it knew the only reason he was there was to complete part of a criminal sentence. This evidence specifically raises fact issues whether Boys Club’s misrepresentations were the proximate cause of the injuries suffered by the children, that is, whether the parents and guardians of the three boys would have allowed contact with Mullens had they known of his criminal conviction.
Although the majority opinion omits any discussion of it, I believe the pleadings regarding Boys Club’s failure to disclose the relevant facts about Mullens are sufficient to establish a claim for negligent misrepresentation under Restatemeot (Seoond) of TORTS § 311 (1977). This is a simple negligence case to which section 311 should be applied. Section 311 of the Restatement provides as follows:
*483§ 311. Negligent Misrepresentation Involving Risk of Physical Harm
(1) One who negligently gives false information to another is subject to liability for physical harm caused by action taken by the other in reasonable reliance upon such information, where such harm results
(a) to the other, or
(b) to such third persons as the actor should expect to be put in peril by the action taken.
(2) Such negligence may consist of failure to exercise reasonable care
(a) in ascertaining the accuracy of the information, or
(b) in the matter in which it is communicated.
Comment b further provides that this section “finds particular application where it is a part of the actor’s business or profession to give information upon which the safety of the recipient or a third person depends.”
One Texas court of appeals has favorably cited section 311, EDCO Prod., Inc. v. Hernandez, 794 S.W.2d 69 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1990, writ denied), and the following jurisdictions have adopted or followed it: Heard v. City of New York, 82 N.Y.2d 66, 603 N.Y.S.2d 414, 623 N.E.2d 541 (1993); Birmingham v. Fodor’s Travel Publications, 73 Haw. 359, 833 P.2d 70 (1992); Moore v. Commonwealth, 846 S.W.2d 715 (Ky.Ct.App.1992, review denied); Thompson v. Hardy Chevrolet-Pontiac-Buick, Inc., 203 Ga.App. 499, 417 S.E.2d 358 (1992); Garcia v. Superior Court, 50 Cal.3d 728, 268 Cal.Rptr. 779, 789 P.2d 960 (1990); Board of Educ. v. A, C & S, Inc., 137 Ill.2d 428, 137 Ill.Dec. 635, 546 N.E.2d 580 (1989); Village of Cross Keys, Inc. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 315 Md. 741, 556 A.2d 1126 (1989); Bloskas v. Murray, 646 P.2d 907 (1982); Hall v. Ford Enters., Ltd., 445 A.2d 610 (D.C.1982); English v. Lehigh County Auth., 286 Pa.Super. 312, 428 A.2d 1343 (Ct.1981).
Neither has Boys Club disproved that its misrepresentations were the producing cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Producing cause encompasses different policy considerations and limitations than does proximate cause, but it includes a cause-in-fact analysis. See Union Pump v. Allbritton, 898 S.W.2d 773, 782-84 (Tex.1995) (Cornyn, J., concurring); The Prudential Ins. Co. v. Jefferson Assocs., Ltd., 896 S.W.2d 156, 160 (Tex.1995). Although I agree that C.J. Doe was not a consumer under the DTP A, the court of appeals recognized, and Boys Club admits, that the other plaintiffs were consumers under the Act.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovants,1 we must take as true the plaintiffs’ statements that they would not have permitted the children to accompany Mullens if they had known of his criminal record and we must indulge the inference that if they had known Boys Club did absolutely no investigation into Mullens’ background they would likewise not have permitted the boys to have extended contact with him away from Club-supervised events.
Upon reviewing the summary judgment evidence, the conclusion is inescapable that Boys Club has not established as a matter of law that its affirmative misrepresentations to the plaintiffs was not the producing or proximate cause of the events made the basis of this lawsuit. Whether the Coes’ and Doe’s decision to allow Mullens to have contact with the children was influenced by Boys Club’s affirmative misrepresentations is a disputed issue of material fact.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand this cause for trial.
. See Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex.1985); Hittner & Liberato, Summary Judgments in Texas, 35 S.Tex.L.Rev. 9, 57 (1994).