dissenting.
On original submission we held that the trial court erred in admitting a “faxed” certified copy of a Cameron County judgment. We found that the facsimile transmission (fax) did not satisfy the authentication requirements of Tex.R.Crim.Evid. 902 and 1005. We initially read these rules to require the contents of a public record to be proved by an original certified copy, certified in accordance with rule 902.
Motion for Rehearing
We are confronted with an extraordinarily persuasive motion for rehearing filed by the Prosecutor Assistance Division of the Office of the Attorney General.1 The. issue is whether a faxed certified copy of a judgment is sufficiently authenticated to be admissible. The lead opinion finds that the faxed certified copy was admissible as a duplicate certified copy pursuant to TbxR.CRIM.Evid. 901(a), 901(b)(7), 1001(4), and 1003. The concurring opinion finds that the faxed certified copy was also sufficiently authenticated as an original certified copy pursuant to Tex. R.CRIM.Evid. 902, 1001(3) and 1002.
I recognize the strength of the State’s argument that it makes little sense to admit the same document sent through the mail, but not admit it when sent via fax. My concern with the position of the concurring opinion is that it blurs the distinction between original and copy. My concern with both the lead and concurring opinions is that they lower the standard for admissibility of copies of public records.
A. Duplicates of Public Records
There is a general rule which allows duplicates to be admissible to the same extent as *941originals, unless a question is raised as to the authenticity of the original or where it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original. Tex.R.CRIM.Evid. 1003 (admissibility of duplicates). For public records, however, a specific rule provides for the contents to be proved “by copy, certified as correct in accordance with Rule 902 or testified to be correct by a witness who has compared it with the original.” Tex.R.CRIM.Evid. 1005. This specific rule for public records is the reason why I disagree with the lead opinion that a duplicate of a certified copy is sufficient.
An exception to the specific rule allows other evidence of the contents of a public record to be given if a copy which complies with the foregoing (certified according to rule 902 or by witness comparison with the original) cannot be obtained by the exercise of reasonable diligence. Id.
The manner in which these rules are set out demonstrates that public records are intended to be treated differently from other documents. An original is never required to prove the contents of public records, but a particular hierarchy of secondary evidence is established. 33 S. Goode, O. WellboRN & M. Shaelot, Guide to the Texas Rules of Evidence: Civil and CRIMINAL § 1005.1 at 666-67 (Texas Practice 1988). That hierarchy starts with a copy certified in accordance with rule 902 (self-authentication), includes a copy compared by a live witness with the original, and ends, only if the other alternatives cannot be employed by the exercise of due diligence, by allowing other evidence of the contents to be given. Id. at 667.
B. Original
I believe the State’s suggestion that the rules now allow a copy to be an original misses the mark. Tex.R.CRIM.Evid. 1001(3) defines “original” for purposes of article X:
An “oHginal” of a writing or recording is the writing or recording itself or any counterpart intended to have the same effect by a person executing or issuing it. An “original” of a photograph includes the negative or any print therefrom. If data are stored in a computer or similar device, any printout or other output readable by sight, shown to reflect the data accurately, is an “original.”
(Emphasis added.) When applied to the judgment in this case, I would find that there was only one original of the writing itself, i.e., the judgment entered in the records of the court. “A judgment is the written declaration of the court signed by the trial judge and entered of record showing the conviction or acquittal of the defendant.” Tex.Code CRIM.P.Ann. art. 42.01, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
I would further find that there is no “counterpart intended to have the same effect by a person executing or issuing it.” A trial court does not execute or issue multiple copies of a judgment, each of which is intended to show the conviction or acquittal of the defendant. A judgment is not like a contract or lease, multiple copies of which the parties sign so that each party can have an “original.” I would confine the meaning of the term “counterpart intended to have the same effect” to the latter situation. See 33 S. Goode, O. WellboRN & M. ShaRlot, § 1001.4, at 650. Therefore, I would not hold that a faxed certified copy of a judgment is an original certified copy of a judgment.
C. Certified Copy
The most common method of introducing public records is by certified copy pursuant to Tex.R.CRIM.Evid. 902(1), (4). There is a requirement that a certified copy bear a seal of the government agency issuing it. Id. I cannot agree that a copy of a certified copy, even a fax of a certified copy, constitutes a sufficiently self-authenticated public record to be admissible under rules 902 and 1005. Thus, I cannot agree with State v. Smith, 66 Wash.App. 825, 832 P.2d 1366 (1992) that a fax of a seal is sufficient to establish self-authentication of a certified copy of a public record. If a faxed certified copy is sufficient, why not a xerox copy of a certified copy, as long as the seal on it was darkened before *942copying so as to ostensibly show an intent of the clerk that it be an “original” certified copy?
D. Alternative Methods
In the absence of an “original” certified copy, rule 1005 contemplates a copy compared by a witness with the original document. Only when a person exercising reasonable diligence is unable to obtain a certified copy, or a witness to compare a copy to the original, may alternative methods of proving the contents of the original document be utilized. Tex.R.CRIM.Evid. 1005. Because the method used here was not one of the two specifically mentioned modes, I would hold the State to the burden of showing that it exercised reasonable diligence and was unable to produce a certified copy or a witness to compare a copy with the original.
In this case the faxed certified copy was sent on June 8,1994. The trial was not held until June 13, 1994. Under these circumstances, when appellant objected to the authentication of the faxed certified copy of the judgment, I would find that the State had a burden of showing reasonable diligence in trying to secure the preferred copies. In the absence of any showing of reasonable diligence, I would hold that the trial court erred in admitting the duplicate certified copy transmitted by fax.2
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
OLIVER-PARROTT, C.J., and O’CONNOR and ANDELL, JJ., join in this dissent.
. Because appellant’s counsel is now the elected District Attorney of Brazoria County, counsel re-cused himself and an attorney from the Attorney General’s office was appointed Criminal District Attorney Pro Tem.
. It could be argued that the trial objection was confined to lack of authentication (invoking only article IX of the rules), as opposed to lack of best evidence (invoking article X). See Reed v. State, 811 S.W.2d 582, 585 n. 11 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (recognizing three challenges to admissibility of a public record: (1) hearsay; (2) authentication;, and (3) best evidence). However, by specific reference to rule 902, which is the pertinent portion of rule 1005, the objection appears sufficient to have alerted the trial court to appellant’s complaint.