dissenting.
The crux of the issue is whether an allegation of “physical changes” to the brain is sufficient to allege a compensable “injury,” which in turn requires “violence to the physical structure of the body.” I would hold that it is not sufficient.
Because the right of recovery of workers’ compensation benefits is purely statutory, see Oham v. Aaron Corp., 222 Neb. 28, 382 N.W.2d 12 (1986), I begin by quoting the language of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-151(4) (Reissue 2004) as follows:
Injury and personal injuries mean only violence to the physical structure of the body and such disease or infection as naturally results therefrom. The terms include disablement *588resulting from occupational disease arising out of and in the course of the employment in which the employee was engaged and which was contracted in such employment. The terms include an aggravation of a preexisting occupational disease, the employer being liable only for the degree of aggravation of the preexisting occupational disease. The terms do not include disability or death due to natural causes but occurring while the employee is at work and do not include an injury, disability, or death that is the result of a natural progression of any preexisting condition.
The appellees’ argument recognizes that the act of suicide cannot constitute the “violence to the physical structure of the body” necessary to establish an “injury” within the meaning of the statute. Once there has been a compensable “injury,” i.e., once the “violence to the physical structure of the body” has occurred, then it becomes possible that the subsequent act of suicide is a consequence naturally flowing from the injury. To supply the required allegation of “injury,” the appellees depend upon the allegation of “physical changes” to Zach’s brain.
In Sorensen v. City of Omaha, 230 Neb. 286, 430 N.W.2d 696 (1988), the Nebraska Supreme Court, in interpreting the statutory definition of “injury,” adhered to the meaning attributed in Bekelski v. Neal Co., 141 Neb. 657, 4 N.W.2d 741 (1942), to that language. The Supreme Court stated that the statutory language
“indicates a clear distinction between physical and bodily injury on the one hand and mental, nervous and psychiatric injury unaccompanied by violence to the physical structure of the body on the other. The plain import of the words used eliminates from the operation of the law disabilities resulting from mental disturbances, nervousness and psychiatric ailments when violence to the physical structure of the body cannot be established.”
Sorensen v. City of Omaha, 230 Neb. at 289-90, 430 N.W.2d at 698 (quoting Bekelski, supra). See, also, 3 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law §§ 56.04D and 56.06D[4] (2005) (stating that under § 48-151(2) and (4), claimant must suffer accident that causes violence to physical structure of body before mental impairment or disability may be compensable).
*589The Sorensen court also recognized that in Johnston v. State, 219 Neb. 457, 364 N.W.2d 1 (1985), the court implicitly reaffirmed the principles set out in Bekelski. In Johnston, the physical trauma and mental stimulus induced a physical injury, namely “minimal superficial erosions of the lower esophagus and minimal superficial erosion of the duodenal bulb.” 219 Neb. at 459, 364 N.W.2d at 3.
I agree with the majority that we review de novo the trial court’s grant of a motion to dismiss, accepting all the allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Wells Fargo Fin. Accept., 269 Neb. 595, 694 N.W.2d 625 (2005). In the instant case, the appellees allege only “physical changes” to Zach’s brain. Even where one draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the appellees and construes the language liberally in the appellees’ favor, see Spear T Ranch v. Knaub, 269 Neb. 177, 691 N.W.2d 116 (2005), I do not agree that this allegation asserts “violence to the physical structure of the body.”
Both the majority of this court and the Workers’ Compensation Court review panel seem to have principally relied upon Tarvin v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 238 Neb. 851, 472 N.W.2d 727 (1991). There is, however, a critical difference between the procedural posture in Tarvin and the situation in the instant case. In Tarvin, upon rehearing, the Workers’ Compensation Court found that the employee failed to prove compensability of his condition and dismissed the action. The Nebraska Supreme Court, citing the standard of review then applicable to findings of fact made by the Workers’ Compensation Court after rehearing — giving such findings the same force and effect as a jury verdict in a civil case and not setting aside such findings unless they are clearly wrong — affirmed the dismissal. Although the employee in Tarvin argued that he had suffered a biochemical alteration of his brain, the Supreme Court noted medical evidence that the stress from the employment produced no chemical alteration and that the employee’s mental condition and resultant disability were attributable solely to the employee’s condition before employment. The Supreme Court simply held that the Workers’ Compensation Court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous; the Tarvin court did not state or hold that a biochemical *590alteration of the brain constitutes violence to the physical structure of the body. It was not necessary for the court to consider that proposition in order to resolve the case, and the decision in Tarvin is not binding precedent in that regard. See Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. Dailey, 268 Neb. 733, 687 N.W.2d 689 (2004) (case is not authority for any point not necessary to be passed on to decide case).
The reasoning of the majority of this court, as well as the reasoning of the compensation court review panel, seems to me to ignore the significance of the word “violence” in the statutory definition of “injury.” Since the decision of the Supreme Court in Sorensen v. City of Omaha, 230 Neb. 286, 430 N.W.2d 696 (1988), the Legislature has not substantively amended the definition of “injury” in the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act. When judicial interpretation of a statute has not evoked a legislative amendment, it is presumed that the Legislature has acquiesced in the court’s interpretation. Dawes v. Wittrock Sandblasting & Painting, 266 Neb. 526, 667 N.W.2d 167 (2003), disapproved on other grounds, Kimminau v. Uribe Refuse Serv., 270 Neb. 682, 707 N.W.2d 229 (2005). The reasoning of the Sorensen court, reiterating and confirming the interpretation from Bekelski v. Neal Co., 141 Neb. 657, 4 N.W.2d 741 (1942), requires more than “physical changes.” The physical structure of every human body is constantly changing. By adopting the definition of injury requiring “violence to the physical structure of the body,” the Legislature required more than mere physical change to establish a compensable injury.
Because I disagree that the bare allegation of “physical changes” to Zach’s brain is sufficient to set forth a claim of a compensable “injury,” I respectfully dissent.