¶ 31. (concurring). I fully join in the Majority opinion, except its discussion of Wis. Stat. Rule 904.04(2), which, in my view, has nothing to do with this appeal.
¶ 32. Wisconsin Stat. Rule 904.04 reads:
(1) CHARACTER evidence GENERALLY. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of the person's character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that the person acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(a) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of the accused's character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
*419(b) Character of victim. Except as provided in s. 972.11(2), evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor;
(c) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in ss. 906.07, 906.08 and 906.09.
(2) OtheR CRIMES, WRONGS, OR acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. This subsection does not exclude the evidence when offered for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
Thus, the rule permits, via subsection (2), the admission of evidence relating to "character" if its primary purpose is to prove something other than propensity. One of these other primary purposes is to prove the "identity" of the defendant as the person who committed the crime or crimes charged. See, e.g., State v. Speer, 176 Wis. 2d 1101, 1117, 501 N.W.2d 429, 434 (1993) ("To be admissible for the purpose of identity, similarities must exist between the 'other act' and the offense for which the defendant is being tried."); State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 786-787, 576 N.W.2d 30, 38-39 (1998) ("The stronger the similarity between the other acts and the charged offense, the greater will be the probability that the like result was not repeated by mere chance or coincidence. In other words, '[I]f a like occurrence takes place enough times, it can no longer be attributed to mere coincidence. Innocent intent will *420become improbable.'") (quoted source and footnote omitted).
¶ 33. When a defendant seeks to introduce other-acts evidence to show that someone else committed the charged crime or crimes, the pattern must show a sufficient similarity "between the other act evidence and the charged crime," so that the evidence tends to substantiate the defendant's contention, although when offered by the defendant rather than the State it need not rise to the level of establishing an " 'imprint' or 'signature.'" State v. Scheidell, 227 Wis. 2d 285, 304-305, 307, 595 N.W.2d 661, 671, 672 (1999) (applying "relevance" criterion discussed by Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 785-787, 576 N.W.2d at 38-39). As the Majority recognizes in ¶ 28, however, "[t]his is not a situation where someone accused of a crime makes a general claim that someone else must have done it." (Emphasis added.) Indeed, as the Majority shows, the various crimes, including the one that victimized Daniel Hartwig, were not so similar to permit their joinder because the evidence of one or more would not be cross-admissible under Wis. Stat. Rule 904.04(2). See Francis v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 554, 559-561, 273 N.W.2d 310, 313-314 (1979) (similarity in modus operandi permits joinder because "[t]he evidence of each crime would be admissible at separate trials for each crime").
¶ 34. Thus, the "identity" aspect of Wis. Stat. Rule 904.04(2) and the Sullivan three-step approach do not come into play.
Rather, here we have a burglary victim who twice misidentified Davis as the person he saw in his apartment. This fact provided Davis with the opportunity to attempt to prove that someone else, someone who looks a great deal like Davis, was burglarizing and robbing homes within the same general time frame.
*421Majority, ¶ 28 (emphasis added). I agree. Davis was entitled to have the jury learn that there was someone who looked so much like him that Hartwig believed that person was Davis, even though that was impossible. This is not, however, a Rule 904.04(2) case.