ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
In their motion for rehearing, appellants point out that they appeared solely as the independent executors of Coral’s estate, and they were “neither named nor served as parties.” They argue that as “non-parties,” neither of them could be the subject of interrogatories or requests for production under the express provisions of Rules 167 and 168 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, and that the estate could not be sanctioned for the conduct of non-parties, ie., the executors. We write to clarify our earlier opinion.
It is established that the estate of a decedent is not a legal entity and may not sue or be sued. Price v. Estate of Anderson, 522 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tex.1975). As a result, a suit on behalf of an estate must be brought by the estate’s personal representative(s), and a suit seeking to establish the decedent’s liability on a claim must be instituted against the estate’s personal representative(s). Id.; Sarny Holdings, Ltd. v. Letsos, 896 S.W.2d 274, 276 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied). It follows that an estate cannot be served with or propound discovery. An estate can only do so through its personal representatives — those who have personal knowledge of and access to relevant information in such proceedings anyway. Indeed, the style on all the pleadings in this case is “Estate of Coral Elizabeth Riggins,” but the persons upon whom service can be had are listed as “Respondent, WILLIAM LEE RIGGINS, Co-Independent Executor of the ESTATE OF CORAL ELIZABETH RIGGINS” and “HARRY EDWARD RIG-GINS, Co-Independent Executor of the ESTATE OF CORAL ELIZABETH RIG-GINS.”
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 167 provides that “[a]ny party may serve on any other party a REQUEST” for discovery and production of documents and things for inspection, copying or photographing. Rule 168 provides that “[a]ny party may serve *22upon any other party written interrogatories to be answered by the party served_” Appellants argue that “only the estate was a party subject to discovery,” but they fail to cite any authority that articulates how an estate can be sanctioned for abuse of that discovery, absent assessment of sanctions against its representatives. Both William and Harry were parties to the suit to set aside the order probating Coral’s will, and were properly served with interrogatories and requests for production, and properly sanctioned when their responses were either untimely or incomplete.
As we mentioned in our original opinion, section 240 of the Probate Code provides that if there is more than one executor of an estate at the same time, “the acts of one of them as such executor or administrator shall be as valid as if all had acted jointly....” Tex. Prob.Code Ann. § 240 (Vernon 1980). The interrogatories propounded by the contestant were addressed to “WILLIAM LEE RIGGINS and HARRY EDWARD RIG-GINS, Individually and as Co-Independent Executors of the ESTATE OF CORAL ELIZABETH RIGGINS” and were served on the “Proponents’ attorney.” However, William and Harry were sued only as executors, and were required to answer only as executors. The first page also included a statement that “[tjhese interrogatories shall be answered separately and fully in writing under oath and signed by both Proponents.” Thus, the responses filed on January 17, 1995, signed and sworn to only by Harry, constituted a sufficient response on behalf of the estate, but William, by failing to file signed and sworn answers, failed to comply with Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 167 and 168 which require any party served with requests for production and interrogatories to respond to them. Further, the estate, which by definition can only act through its representatives William and Harry, failed to produce certain requested documents and did not request or obtain a protective order excusing the failure.
There appears to be a conflict between the rules of discovery, which provide that any party served with interrogatories must answer them, and section 240 of the Probate Code, which provides that an act by one executor “shall be valid as if all had acted jointly.” We note that section 240 has never been cited as authority in a discovery case such as this where there are joint executors, only one of whom “timely” answered the discovery requests propounded upon them.
We further note that to follow appellants’ argument that Harry’s answers were sufficient and were the same answers William would have given means there was no harm in striking William as a witness, as his testimony, as representative of the estate, would have duplicated Harry’s testimony. Interrogatories may only be used against the party who answered them. Tex.R. Civ. P. 168.
In their motion for rehearing, appellants also claim we have repeated “the error committed by the court of appeals” in Hamill v. Level, 900 S.W.2d 457 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1995), rev’d per curiam, Hamill v. Level, 917 S.W.2d 15 (Tex.1996). In reversing the appellate court in Hamill, the supreme court held that the imposition of a “death penalty” sanction was excessive. In Hamill, there was a continuing course of conduct in which Hamill failed to respond to interrogatories and requests for production. After a motion to compel and Hamill’s broken promise to answer by a certain date, Level filed a motion to dismiss. On the day for the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Hamill served his responses on Level; nevertheless, the trial court dismissed Hamill’s claims with prejudice. The court held that “the sanction of dismissal with prejudice conflicts with Trans-American and its progeny because the sanction imposed in this case is more severe than necessary to satisfy its legitimate purpose and the sanctioned conduct does not justify the presumption that Hamill’s claims are meritless.” Id. at 16 (emphasis added). Hamill can be distinguished from the instant case in two ways: 1) such a complete preclusion of presentation of the merits did not occur in the instant case, and 2) the sanction imposed in the instant case satisfies its legitimate purpose, and the sanctioned conduct justifies the presumption that William’s and Harry’s claims were meritless.
*23At the hearing on the first motion for sanctions, Annie Lou’s attorneys explained that William and Harry were “attacking the underlying relationship” between Coral and her daughter Annie Lou. In return, Annie Lou sought information about Coral’s relationship with her sons. Annie Lou’s attorneys stated they had inadvertently discovered that certain sums of money were given to William and Harry “about the time the will was changed,” but they were unable to determine “what moneys Mrs. Riggins spent, through her bank statements nor what money the boys took in through their bank statements” because of the failure to properly respond to discovery. In response, the trial judge stated, “It’s obvious you’re not going to have the stuff you need in time to analyze it by the 13th (the trial date).” The trial judge then stated:
[I]f they took the tax returns when they were at least constructively aware that they were needed, that’s some evidence, but the cases are pretty strong that say unless the parties are a significant part of the bad faith or the disregard, conscious disregard for orders or requests, then it’s an abuse of discretion to strike everything, if it’s primarily the fault of counsel, and he’s taken his share of the fault.
So I’m reluctant to completely strike, just because of the ease law and because there is no sense in doing this thing twice and costing both sides more money up on appeal if they end up turning this thing around.
Later on in the hearing, after asking proponents’ attorney Alan Bransgrove what witnesses he would actually call at trial, the trial court commented, “[i]t seems to me somewhat unfair, Mr. Bransgrove, to allow you to present your case fully and yet you to have not produced the items — .” Again, in response, Bransgrove replied that the people who were “totally critical” to his case were William, Harry and Vanessa Buzzard.
We remain convinced that the trial court considered the imposition of lesser sanctions before striking all witnesses but the parties, and that the sanction imposed in this case “fit the crime.” We have also considered appellants’ request for an en banc hearing on their motion for rehearing and their request that our original opinion be published. After considering the motion for an en banc hearing, we find that such a hearing is not necessary because of extraordinary circumstances or to maintain uniformity in our decisions. However, we have decided to grant appellants’ motion to publish.
Accordingly, appellants’ motion for rehearing is overruled, but their motion for publication of the original opinion as well as this opinion, is granted.