dissenting.
The issue in this case is whether the order which the director of public safety gave to the appellee Wadman was of such a nature that Wadman was required to obey it. The trial court found that under the circumstances in this case, the order was not a reasonable order and that the appellee’s refusal to obey it was not insubordination.
The majority opinion points out that although it has been the custom for disciplinary notices to be signed by both the safety *831director and the chief of police, the authority to impose discipline is vested in the safety director and the only disciplinary authority vested in the chief of police is purely advisory.
The order involved in this case was a direct order from the safety director to the appellee to sign three letters which advised the officers addressed of discipline which the safety director had decided to impose upon them. The letters, however, were in the form of letters from the appellee to the officers and concluded with the words, “By order of.” Although the safety director informed the appellee that he could “sign under duress” and “disclaim” and “disagree with my discipline,” the forms of the letters indicated that the discipline was being imposed by the order of the appellee. The appellee had no authority to impose discipline.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 14-602 (Reissue 1987), which provides in part that “[a]ll orders relating to the direction of the police force shall be given through the chief of police, ” in my opinion, does not relate to the imposition of discipline but refers to the operation of the department and the performance of police work.
I would affirm the judgment of the district court.