concurring specially.
1.
To review a decision that vacates a stipulation and decree, we have repeatedly turned to Minnesota Supreme Court decisions permitting relief upon proof of fraud, mistake, or duress. Steel v. Steel, 305 Minn. 504, 505, 232 N.W.2d 104, 105 (1975); Hafner v. Hafner, 237 Minn. 424, 429, 54 N.W.2d 854, 857 (1952). Addressing the *700same question, the supreme court has also said that an agreement on the terms of a decree may be disregarded if improvidently made “and in equity and good conscience” the agreement should not stand. John v. John, 322 N.W.2d 347, 348 (Minn.1982).
There is no precedent for setting aside a stipulation and decree because it is based on bad judgment or produces a bad result. Prior decisions make it evident that improvidence by itself is not a cause for relief. To set aside the stipulation and decree, it must also be shown that a bad decision was made involuntarily or as a result of fraud or mistake.
Quite simply, appellant here has failed to show a valid reason to set aside the prior stipulation and decree. There may be merit in her claim that she got inadequate maintenance and health insurance benefits. She acknowledges, however, agreeing to provisions on those subjects. She has claimed neither fraud nor mistake. As to possible duress, she has made only conclu-sory observations that she was “not comfortable” with the terms of the stipulation and that some “pressure” was exerted by respondent when me stipulation was signed.
Summarily disposing of appellant’s claim, the trial court found that she had “not alleged a basis” for reopening the judgment. This finding of the trial court is correct and can be affirmed without further elaboration.
2.
The so-called Tomscak factors have nothing to do with the trial court’s decision in this case. See Tomscak v. Tomscak, 352 N.W.2d 464 (Minn.Ct.App.1984). These factors, highlighting the need for involvement of the court and counsel in a party’s acknowledgment of consent to a stipulation, demonstrate the kind of case where the trial court may disregard probative evidence that a party acted under duress, mistake or fraud. It is unnecessary here to examine the Tomscak factors because appellant made no showing of cause for reopening the decree.
I concur specially because of concern for our discussion of the Tomscak factors. Having proceeded inadvisably to discuss policy on the stipulation process, the mischief should not be compounded by publishing an invitation for poor procedure.
Under Tomscak, consent to a stipulation and decree may be protected from attack by a record that a party has consulted with counsel on the stipulation and has personally demonstrated to the court an understanding and acceptance of the terms and conditions of the proposed decree. Id. at 466. The converse of Tomscak should be equally evident: when not protected by these factors, consent is vulnerable to attack. Upon any showing of fraud, mistake or duress, absent careful process there is a clear risk the stipulation and the resulting decree will be set aside.
In my opinion, a party may not waive or somehow be estopped from pointing out the need for either adequate advice of counsel or declarations in open court. Certainly, a party may waive the right to counsel. Indeed, a party may wholly default on claims in a dissolution case. It is quite another thing, however, to suggest that a party’s waiver of process establishes consent for the complicated resolution of vital issues in a proposed stipulation. Where judicial action is premised on personal consent to a stipulation, without evident involvement of counsel for both parties on the contents of the document, the court must inquire of both parties to justly determine whether consent has actually occurred.
One reads in our decision the prescription for summary approval of written stipulations, whether or not each party has consulted with counsel, and with personal appearance by only one of the parties. Such summary process may be expedient, but pennies of that expediency are offset by pounds of mischief. As long as we suffer haphazard approval of stipulations, we risk serious episodes of court-sanctioned injustice, and we invite a bulging pattern of expensive and unnecessary post-judgment litigation. Worse still, because unjust decisions are not always attacked through formal process, we enlarge the occurrence of *701self-help efforts to destroy acceptance of judicial decrees.
The risks of error in summary approval of stipulations are demonstrated by the facts here. The parties addressed complex issues, including the valuation and. division of property, pension interests, and an award of maintenance arising after a 23-year marriage. To deal with these and other dissolution issues, counsel for respondent drafted a 21-page stipulation. The difficulty of dissolution issues, like those here, is patently beyond the grasp of most parties, regardless of their experience. Adding to the hazards for parties who deal with these issues, they are often acting during the course of one of the most distressing experiences of their lives.
The errors arising through poor handling of stipulations are as critical as they are likely to occur. The process of the case should not belittle the importance of deci-sionmaking on dissolution issues. The parties in these matters are engaging in unraveling decades of their lives and shaping their futures. Also, absent successful vacation of the stipulation, the settled judicial interest in finality sets in stone many of the agreements the parties make. See Karon v. Karon, 435 N.W.2d 501 (Minn.1989). When assessing the serious consequence of the settlement process, one should also look beyond the facts of this case to the critical subjects of custody and support for children.
The settlement process employed in this case is unacceptable. The specific arrangements appellant made were not discussed with a lawyer acting for her interest. The language of the lengthy stipulation was not examined by counsel for appellant. The dissolution court had no contact with appellant except to observe her signatures on the stipulation document. Except for a court finding that the parties entered into the stipulation, and that the agreement is “fair and reasonable,” the record shows no inquiry or findings by the court on the merits of critical ingredients of the stipulation or the reliability of appellant’s purported consent to its terms.
What process is appropriate? In my opinion, the trial courts should demand, alternatively, that the record show 1) personal appearance by each party, together with inquiry on their understanding of vital parts of the stipulation, their consent for the terms prescribed, particularized on critical agreements, and their explanation of the merits for accepting concessions they make, or 2) verification that each party has consulted with separate counsel on the content of the stipulation document, together with the usual inquiry to the party who appears regarding the merits of all critical agreements.
Beholden as we should be to good process in family law matters, for the sake of fairness and finality, showing regard for all interests affected by these proceedings, we should not minimize the importance of the fact that consent to a stipulation is made without the advice of counsel and is not personally confirmed before the trial court.