(dissenting). I respectfully dissent.
I would read MCL 700.424a; MSA 27.5424(1) to require the probate court to exercise its discretion when granting a parental petition to either create or terminate a limited guardianship. In both instances the statute states that the court "may” act in accordance with the petition.
I agree that parental consent to both the ap*470pointment of a limited guardian and the suspension of parental rights are required before the probate court may grant the petition to appoint a limited guardian. However, I do not agree that a parental petition for termination of the guardianship operates to erase the consent given at the guardianship’s inception. In other words, consent is required before creating a limited guardianship under this section, but continuance of the guardianship does not depend solely upon continued parental consent. To hold otherwise requires changing the statutory language in § 424a(2) from "may be terminated” to "shall be terminated.”
I disagree with the majority’s position that the last sentence in § 424a(2) refers only to terminating the appointment of a particular guardian. That the "appointment of a limited guardian” refers to both a guardianship itself and to a particular guardian, is supported by the language in § 424a(l) which also uses the phrase "appointment of a limited guardian.” Such an appointment obviously creates a "guardianship” while termination of the appointment would, in most cases, also terminate the guardianship.
The statutory language in this section stands in stark contrast to provisions for automatic termination mandated when a person, for whom a testamentary appointment of a guardian is made, files an objection to the appointment. MCL 700.441(4); MSA 27.5441(4). If the Legislature intended the probate court to perfunctorily grant termination under § 424a, it could have provided for an automatic termination upon filing of a petition like that provided in § 441(4).
The fact that so many areas involving child custody and child welfare are treated with great care and concern for the best interests of the minor leads me to conclude that, once a consen*471sual limited guardian is appointed, termination is not automatically required when a parent has a change of heart.
Parents who recognize a need to seek probate court help with a perceived inability to provide for their child should be given credit for consenting to the appointment of a limited guardian rather than passively waiting for someone outside the nuclear family to recognize a deficiency and file a petition based on abuse, neglect or abandonment. However, once the parents have consented to the jurisdiction of the probate court, the statute does not grant an absolute right to terminate the arrangement.
I would hold that §424a provides the probate court with discretion to grant or deny a petition to terminate a limited guardianship. The proper factors for consideration will differ depending on the circumstances of the guardianship’s creation. In some instances, considering the factors listed in the Child Custody Act, MCL 722.21 et seq.; MSA 25.312(1) et seq., would be appropriate. While giving due deference to parental rights, the court should not be absolutely bound to immediately grant a petition for termination when the circumstances merit a different decision.
The probate court’s discretion should extend to providing guidelines for reintroducing a young child to her natural parents when, as here, the separation has been of a substantial duration. I believe that recognizing the probate court’s discretion in granting petitions to terminate limited guardianships is essential to provide a young child with the stability necessary for normal growth and development.