dissenting.
The majority concludes that the prosecutor’s statement during closing argument *94concerning defense counsel constitutes reversible error. I respectfully dissent.
The majority’s holding rests on the legal theory that it is improper for the prosecutor to argue matters not in evidence. State v. Cannady, 660 S.W.2d 33, 39 (Mo.App.1983). However, the defense counsel did not assert that theory in his objection at trial nor in the motion for a new trial. Therefore, the objection has not been properly preserved for appellate review. State v. Reed, 629 S.W.2d 424, 429 (Mo.App.1981).
Nonetheless, defense counsel did object to the statement on the grounds that it impugned his reputation and character. A conviction will be reversed for improper argument only if it is established that the complained of comments had a decisive effect on the jury’s determination. State v. Webster, 659 S.W.2d 286, 289 (Mo.App.1983). The court should consider the entire record to determine whether the error was sufficiently prejudicial to have tipped the scales and thereby denied defendant a fair trial. State v. Reed, 629 S.W.2d 424, 428 (Mo.App.1981); United States v. LeFevre, 483 F.2d 477 (3rd Cir.1973). For the court to grant reversal, statements in closing argument must be plainly unwarranted and clearly injurious. State v. Ofield, 651 S.W.2d 190, 194 (Mo.App.1983). Convictions are not generally reversed because of improper comment in closing argument. This is especially true where there is strong evidence of defendant’s guilt. State v. Degraffenreid, 477 S.W.2d 57, 65(15) (Mo. banc 1972). Here the victim and a police officer heard and identified the voice of the defendant when he telephoned the victim and threatened to kill her if she testified in the murder trial of the defendant’s brother. Furthermore, the defendant stated to police officers that he was going to a bus station to pick up Donald Stanley who was a “hitman” who was “going to take care of some people.” The record thus demonstrates that the evidence of defendant’s guilt is strong and the error is harmless. State v. Degraffenreid, supra, p. 65.
Another case the majority relies upon is State v. Spencer, 307 S.W.2d 440 (Mo.1957). The aggrieved comment in that case was by the prosecutor in closing argument to the effect that the defendant would have the thought, “ ‘I can employ a good attorney, someone who can make a fine argument and make a cross-examination and browbeat the witness....’” Firstly, this statement is an attack directly upon the defendant and not his attorney thus making it more prejudicial. Secondly, in Spencer there was another important assignment of error on which the court also based its reversal. Spencer does not stand for the position that the above comment on closing argument alone will warrant reversal. The majority fails to consider the record as a whole to determine if the defendant received a fair trial. State v. Reed, supra. See State v. Renfro, 408 S.W.2d 57, 60(2) (Mo.1966) where a single improper comment on closing argument was not found to rise to the level which necessitates the granting of a mistrial.
The statement in question alleged that defense counsel conspired with the defendant to tamper with the witness, Myra Adams. While the statement was improper, it could not by itself be said to have had a decisive effect on the jury’s determination. The statement attacks the attorney and not the defendant. Viewing the record as a whole, I find that the defendant was not denied a fair trial. The conviction should be affirmed.