OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
McCORMICK, Judge.Appellant was tried for the murder of his thirteen year old daughter. The evidence showed that appellant and the child’s mother were married for a strife-ridden fifteen year period. After their divorce in 1975, the trouble continued. Testimony at trial alluded to several instances in the intervening years during which appellant threatened to kill his wife. During the evening of February 10,1978, the appellant went to his ex-wife’s home. Upon discovering that she was gone and had left his three daughters, ages fifteen, thirteen and seven alone, appellant became enraged. He began berating his ex-wife’s conduct to his daugh*324ters. When his eldest daughter objected to his characterizations of her mother, appellant replied that he was going to kill his ex-wife. The next afternoon, appellant drove to his ex-wife’s house and parked his truck in front of the house. When his ex-wife came to the front door, he demanded that she come out and talk to him. She told him to go away and then went back inside the house. At that point, appellant got his shotgun out of the truck, walked up on the porch and fired a blast through the front door. Pellets from this blast passed through the door, through the house and into the kitchen, striking appellant’s thirteen year old daughter. Next appellant went to his ex-wife’s car, raised the hood and fired another shotgun blast into the car’s engine. Then he walked to the back of the house and fired a final shotgun blast into the back door. Appellant then kicked in the back door and found his daughter lying wounded on the kitchen floor. Appellant testified at trial that he shot at the door only in order to open it and had no intent to kill anyone.
Frank Salazar, appellant’s ex-brother-in-law testified that appellant phoned him during the afternoon of February 11,1978 and told him that he (appellant) had just shot his daughter. He asked Salazar to summon the police and an ambulance. Salazar testified that appellant said he was trying to shoot his ex-wife and instead shot his daughter.
Finally, testimony showed that the victim lived for approximately forty-eight hours after being shot. Cause of death was a shotgun wound to the head.
On original submission, appellant argued in his fifth point of error that the jury’s verdict on guilt-innocence was void in that it did not apprise him of the actual statute under which he was convicted. A review of the record shows that the indictment contained three paragraphs charging the same offense. The State abandoned one of the paragraphs and proceeded to trial on the two remaining paragraphs. In its charge to the jury the court authorized a conviction for murder if the jury found that appellant committed the offense in either of the two manners alleged in the two paragraphs. The indictment alleged in pertinent part that the appellant:
“did then and there unlawfully intentionally or knowingly cause the death of Elizabeth Aguirre by shooting her with a gun.
“And the Defendant did ... unlawfully intentionally and knowingly attempt to commit and did commit a felony, to wit: Criminal Mischief and in the course of and in furtherance of the said felony did then and there attempt to commit and did commit an act which was clearly dangerous to human life, to wit: shooting a gun into an occupied dwelling which said act caused the death of Elizabeth Aguirre.”
The verdict form signed by the foreman of the jury reads as follows:
“We, the Jury, find the defendant, Benny Aguirre, guilty of the offense of murder, as charged in the indictment.”
After reviewing appellant’s contention, a panel of this court reversed appellant’s conviction after determining that the general verdict from the jury made it impossible to determine upon which theory, either V.T. C.A., Penal Code, Section 19.02(a)(1) or Section 19.02(a)(3) — the felony murder rule, appellant was convicted. The panel, relying on this Court’s opinion in Garrett v. State, 573 S.W.2d 543 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), went on to hold that if indeed appellant was convicted under Section 19.02(a)(3) the appellant’s conviction could not stand because in the allegations made under V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 19.02(a)(3), the State relied on the same act which constituted the underlying felony as the act causing the homicide.
We find the panel opinion untenable in light of our decision in Murphy v. State, 665 S.W.2d 116 (Tex.Cr.App.1983). In Murphy v. State, supra, the application paragraph of the court’s charge read as follows:
“Therefore, if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Clyde Clifton Murphy, did ... commit the felony offense of Arson by then and there starting a fire in a habitation located in Angelina County, Texas, owned by Clyde Clifton Murphy, with *325intent to damage and destroy said habitation and to collect insurance for such damage and destruction, and while in the course of and furtherance of the commission of said offense did then and there commit an act clearly dangerous to human life, to wit: did start a fire in a habitation, and did thereby cause the death of an individual, John Thomas Johnson, you will find the defendant guilty.”
Because we believe Murphy v. State, supra, clearly controls the case at bar, we quote extensively from that opinion:
“Appellant further maintains the merger doctrine operates as a bar to his prosecution for felony murder. He argues, ‘the conduct that allegedly constituted the gist of the underlying felony, namely, “starting a fire,” was the exact same act alleged to have been clearly dangerous to human life and thus was ‘inherent in the homicide.’
“Sec. 19.02(a)(3), supra, the ‘felony murder rule’, provides that a person commits an offense if he:
‘commits or attempts to commit a felony, other than voluntary or involuntary manslaughter, and in the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempt ... he commits or attempts to commit an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual.’
“In Garrett v. State, 573 S.W.2d 543 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), however, we held that the felony murder doctrine does not apply where the precedent felony is an assault inherent in the homicide. Garrett’s conviction could not stand because the underlying aggravated assault and the act resulting in the homicide were one and the same. This limitation on the felony-murder rule is known as the merger doctrine.
“In the instant cause, the indictment alleges and the proof shows that appellant was engaged in felonious criminal conduct, namely, arson at the time the deceased was killed. Therefore, as required in Garrett, there was a showing of felonious criminal conduct other than the assault which caused the homicide. Unlike Garrett, appellant’s act of arson in setting a habitation on fire and the resulting homicide of the victim were not one in the same. In this case, appellant attempted to set fire to a house in order to destroy it and collect insurance money, a property offense, and in the furtherance of such offense, the deceased was killed.
“Appellant is incorrect in his assertion that Garrett requires the reversal of his conviction.”
The same reasoning is applicable in the case at bar. The appellant testified at trial that on the day of the offense he had gone to his ex-wife’s home to speak to her about leaving the children alone at night. When his ex-wife refused to let him into the house, appellant went to his truck and retrieved his shotgun. He testified that he shot at the door in order to open it and did not consider the fact that someone could have been behind the door. Unbeknownst to appellant, one of his children was standing behind the door and was killed by the blast fired from appellant’s shotgun.
If indeed, the appellant was engaged in felonious criminal conduct, that is committing felony criminal mischief by attempting to blow open a door with a shotgun, this conduct was clearly a property offense. In the furtherance of this offense, the deceased was shot and killed. Unlike the situation in Garrett v. State, supra, the appellant’s act of criminal mischief and the deceased’s resulting homicide were not one in the same. Garrett v. State, supra, does not mandate the reversal of this case.
Next we determine if the submission of a general verdict form constitutes reversible error. Article 21.24(b) V.A.C. C.P., provides that each separate count in an indictment may contain as many separate paragraphs charging the same offense as necessary. The one count indictment in the instant case contained two paragraphs charging two different theories as to the victim’s murder. In McArthur v. State, *326132 Tex.Cr.R. 447, 105 S.W.2d 227, 280 (1937) (Opinion on Rehearing), this Court wrote:
. The rule seems well settled that, if but one transaction is involved, and the offense be one which may have been committed in any one of several ways, the pleader may charge in the indictment in one count that such offense had been committed by doing this, and that, and the other, and there will be no duplicity, and need be but a verdict of guilty; or the pleader may set out in separate counts each one of the various ways in which it is claimed the offense might have been committed, in which event also there need be but a verdict of guilty.” 105 S.W.2d at 230.
Because appellant’s indictment did not allege different offenses but only alleged different ways of committing the same offense, the court properly furnished the jury with a general verdict form. Riley v. State, 658 S.W.2d 818 (Tex.App.—Ft. Worth 1983, no petition); Bailey v. State, 532 S.W.2d 316, 322 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Floyd v. State, 164 Tex.Cr.R. 50, 296 S.W.2d 523, 528 (1956).
In his first point of error, appellant contends that there is no evidence to show that he “intentionally and knowingly” caused the death of his daughter. The State argues that when he fired through the door appellant intended to kill his former wife and that felonious intent transferred over to the killing of the child. We agree.
V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 6.04(b)(2), provides as follows:
“(b) A person is nevertheless criminally responsible for causing a result if the only difference between what actually occurred and what he desired, contemplated, or risked is that:
(2) a different person or property was injured, harmed, or otherwise affected.”
The jury was charged on the law of transferred intent.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict of guilty, we find the evidence sufficient to show that appellant was acting with the intent to kill his wife. This is especially true in light of appellant’s statements to his daughters the evening before the offense and appellant’s statements to Salazar immediately after the offense. Under Section 6.04(b)(2), this intent carried over to the death of the victim. Appellant’s first point of error is overruled.
In his second point of error, appellant argues that fundamental error occurred when the trial court included in its charge on guilt-innocence the unproven allegation of murder under V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 19.02(a)(1). Because we have found the evidence sufficient to support a conviction for Section 19.02(a)(1) murder in point of error one, we find this point of error to be without merit.
In his third and fourth points of error, appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction for murder under V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 19.-02(a)(3) and the underlying offense of criminal mischief. As noted above one of the paragraphs of the indictment alleged that appellant committed murder by virtue of the felony-murder doctrine. In this instance the underlying felony was criminal mischief. Appellant specifically alleges that the evidence was insufficient to show the fair market value of the damaged property and destroyed property.
Where a general verdict is returned, and the evidence is sufficient to support a finding under any of the counts submitted, the verdict will be applied to the offense finding support in the facts. Adair v. State, 155 S.W.2d 170, 235 S.W.2d 170, 172 (1950) (Opinion on Rehearing). See also: Bailey v. State, 532 S.W.2d 316 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Cavazos v. State, 365 S.W.2d 178 (Tex.Cr.App.1963). Since we have already found the evidence sufficient to support a conviction under Section 19.02(a)(1) murder, we will not review the sufficiency of the evidence to show a Section 19.-02(a)(3) murder. These points of error are overruled.
In his final point of error, appellant argues that the judgment and the sentence *327are void m that they state specific findings not made by the jury. As shown above, the jury verdict reads that the appellant was found “guilty of the offense of murder, as charged in the indictment.” The judgment quotes the jury verdict and then continues with the following:
“It is therefore considered, ordered, and adjudged by the Court that the Defendant is guilty of the offense of a felony, murder as charged in the first and third paragraphs of the indictment. ...”
The sentence contains similar language.
At the time of appellant’s trial, Article 42.01, V.A.C.C.P., provided in pertinent part:
“Sec. 1. A ‘judgment’ is the declaration of the court entered of record, showing:
8. The verdict;
9. In the case of a conviction, that it is considered by the court that the defendant is adjudged to be guilty of the offense as found by the jury; ...”
Article 42.02, V.A.C.C.P., provided:
“A ‘sentence’ is the order of the court in a felony or misdemeanor case made in the presence of the defendant, ... and entered of record, pronouncing the judgment, and ordering the same to be carried into execution in the manner prescribed by law.”
Although not a model of draftsmanship, we find that the language set out in the judgment and sentence properly describes the findings of the jury. It is suggested that in the future, in a similar situation, the language merely set out that the accused “is guilty of the offense of murder.”
Moreover, even if we found that the judgment and sentence improperly reflected the findings of the jury, the proper remedy would not be reversal of appellant’s case, but reformation of the judgment and sentence. Article 44.24(b), V.A. C.C.P.
We find no error here. This point of error is overruled.
The judgment is affirmed.
CLINTON, J., dissents, adhering to the opinion on original submission.