(concurring). I join the majority opinion and write separately to summarize what I view as the key principles regarding the court of appeals' powers of discretionary review and reversal as set forth by the majority opinion:1
1. Sections 751.06 and 752.35, the statutes governing discretionary reversal, are identical except that the former section applies to the supreme court and the latter section applies to the court of appeals. Majority opinion at p. 17. The statutes give both appellate courts the same "broad discretion," majority opinion at p. 21, to review all unobjected-to, alleged errors and reverse judgments.
2. I think the majority opinion has in effect overruled the discussion of statutory discretionary reversal appearing in State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 732-43, 370 N.W.2d 745 (1985), and State v. Schumacher, 144 Wis. 2d 388, 424 N.W.2d 672 (1988), which is based on and follows from Wyss. The majority opinion relying on pre-Wyss cases concludes that both the supreme court and the court of appeals have broad discretion to reverse a judgment under secs. 751.06 and 752.35 if there is an unobjected-to error:
a. When the real controversy has not been fully tried (which, as a result of the majority opinion, is not limited to erroneously included or excluded evidence). Majority opinion at p. 19.
b. When the issue was not "fully or properly tried," majority opinion atp. 20, quoting Air Wisconsin, Inc. v. North Central Airlines, Inc., 98 Wis. 2d 301, 318, 296 N.W.2d 749 (1980) (because of an unobjected-to *24erroneous instruction a party was prevented from "having a full, fair trial of the issues of the case." 98 Wis. 2d at 318). See also Erickson v. Westfield Milling & Electric Light Co., 263 Wis. 580, 589, 58 N.W.2d 437 (1953) ("the issues had not been fully tried nor justice done . . . the interest of justice [requires reversal]"), majority opinion at p. 21, Priedeaux v. Milwaukee Automobile Ins. Co., 246 Wis. 390, 394-95, 17 N.W.2d 350 (1945) ("justice has miscarried by reason of failure of the jury to bear all the evidence in mind and properly consider it"), majority opinion at pp. 20-21.
I do not know what, if anything, distinguishes these cases, which are "not an exclusive list of every situation" allowing the exercise of statutory discretionary reversal (majority opinion at p. 21), from the common law "integrity of the fact-finding" test "for review" discussed in Schumacher, 144 Wis. 2d at 403-409, 416, and limited to this court, majority opinion at pp. 13, 15, 17. See Air Wisconsin, 98 Wis. 2d at 318; Schumacher, 144 Wis. 2d at 419 (Abrahamson, J., concurring).2
*25If there is a difference, this court should receive and grant more by-passes, petitions for review, and certifications. Schumacher, 144 Wis. 2d at 420 (Abrahamson, J., concurring).
c. When it is probable that justice has for any reason miscarried, that is, the appellate court can conclude that a new trial would probably produce a different result.
3. The cases arising before Wyss (which the majority opinion resurrects, including Air Wisconsin upon which the majority opinion and the court of appeals decision in Vollmer rely) illustrate the variety of circumstances under which this court has exercised its broad statutory discretion to review and reverse in the interest of justice. See also State v. Wyss, supra 124 Wis. 2d at 746-58 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
In contrast, Wyss abandoned this broad view of the discretionary reversal statute and emphasized a mechanistic "two-part" test, reversing the court of appeals decision in Wyss because it discussed the "fair trial" test (2b above) using the words "miscarriage of justice" (2c above) without concluding that a new trial might produce a different result.
Schumacher further restricted the discretionary reversal power granted by statute to both the court of appeals and the supreme court, noting that such powers *26are "relatively narrow" under the Wyss test, Schumacher, supra 144 Wis. 2d at 404. See also, 144 Wis. 2d at 416-20 (Abrahamson, J., concurring).
Although the majority opinion sub silentio abandons this mechanistic "two-part" test, see majority opinion at pp. 19-21, a possible continuing effect of State v. Wyss on the issue of statutory discretionary reversal, is, as far as I can determine, in the terminology created by that decision.
As a result of the majority opinion, lawyers and the court of appeals can now fit numerous unobjected-to errors affecting the fairness of the trial into the "real controversy not fully tried" category to reach the merits of an unobjected-to error. In order to steer clear of any linguistic problems created by this court's decisions in Wyss and Schumacher and in the majority opinion, the court of appeals and lawyers discussing statutory discretionary reversal should, I believe, employ the talismanic "real controversy not fully tried" formulation. They should also avoid talking about "miscarriage of justice" unless the court can make a determination that a new trial might have a different result. Apart from this caution regarding terminology, I do not think that much remains of the substance of Wyss or Schumacher.
See State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 744-58, 370 N.W.2d 745 (1985) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting); State v. Schumacher, 144 Wis. 2d 388, 416-20, 424 N.W.2d 672 (1988) (Abrahamson, J., concurring).
One student author writing on the Wyss case (before Schu-macher was decided) concluded that a fairness test was not needed under secs. 751.06 and 752.35, because both the court of appeals and this court have the power, apart from sec. 752.35 and sec. 751.06, respectively, to review an alleged error that goes to the integrity of the fact-finding process, that is, "an appellate court which determines a trial to be fundamentally unfair recognizes a constitutional denial of due process." See Note, State v. Wyss: A New Appellate Standard for Granting New Trials in the Interest of Justice, 1987 Wis. L. Rev. 171, 184-85.
The majority opinion denies the power to the court of appeals to review under the common law standard, as did Schu-macher, majority opinion at p. 17.
More recently a student author has criticized the Schu-macher case for creating dual standards whereby the court of appeals is confined to a purely error-correcting function and may *25rely only on the "narrow" discretionary reversal under sec. 752.35, while the supreme court has the broader power under the common law standard to review unobjected-to errors. The student author advocated that this court adopt a uniform broad standard of statutory discretionary reversal for both courts and recognize that the court of appeals may use the common law standard. See Note, State v. Schumacher: Dual Standards of Review for Waived Claims of Error in the Wisconsin Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, 1989 Wis. L. Rev. 773, 775, 802, 808-809.