(dissenting). Section 767.32(lm), Stats., in my opinion is remedial and procedural and was intended to be retroactive. The idea that a non-custodial parent (overwhelmingly fathers) who fails to pay child support pursuant to a judgment or order entered before enactment of sec. 767.32(lm), Stats., somehow has a protected "right" to gamble that when he's finally tagged some judge will grant him a reprieve makes support law a sort of sporting lottery. Any of the fathers involved in any of these cases could have come into court in the first instance and sought modification of existing support orders.
Courts have been notorious in the past for their "understanding" of non-paying fathers and have too often left the mothers or the taxpayers to pick up the cost of supporting their children. It was this laxity that forced Congress to step in and require the states to at least give some certainty to collecting support by making the non-custodial parent — overwhelmingly men as these *607cases before us demonstrate — to come into court and seek future modification of existing support orders.
I think there is an equal protection problem arising from the fact that custodial parents and children who have past due support coming from delinquent non-custodial parents are treated differently. The delinquent payers in the cases arising before passage of the statutes may get their arrearages modified or forgiven entirely to the detriment of custodial parents and children. Those custodial parents whose divorces came after the statute run no such risk.
It's even unfair to the two groups of delinquent, non-custodial parents to treat differently those whose orders were entered before passage of the statute and those whose orders were entered after passage.
All should be treated alike. I therefore dissent.
I would affirm the court of appeals in the Schulz, Thompkins and Piaskoski cases and affirm the judgment of the circuit court in the Harms case.