The State Bar of Wisconsin filed a petition on August 31, 1989 seeking the amendment of sec. (Rule) 809.23(3), Stats., which provides that unpublished opinions of the court of appeals are of no precedential value and prohibits the citation of those opinions in any Wisconsin court as precedent or authority, except to support a claim of res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case.1 The State Bar asks that the rule be amended to permit unpublished opinions to be cited for persuasive and informational purposes, provided the person citing them contemporaneously provides the court and all opposing parties with a copy of the opinions, as well as copies of all other unpublished opinions of the court of appeals of which that person has knowledge, the holdings of which are directly adverse to the cited opinions on the issue for which they are cited.
*833Upon consideration of the matters presented at the public hearing on the proposed amendment held March 21, 1990 and the submissions made in response to the proposed amendment, the court has determined that the petition to amend sec. (Rule) 809.23(3), Stats., be denied.
The reasons for which the court adopted the rule limiting citation of unpublished appellate opinions in 1978 are set forth in the Judicial Council Committee's Note to the rule:
1. The type of opinion written for the benefit of the parties is different from an opinion written for publication and often should not be published without substantial revision;
2. If unpublished opinions could be cited, services that publish only unpublished opinions would soon develop forcing the treatment of unpublished opinions in the same manner as published opinions thereby defeating the purpose of nonpublication;
3. Permitting the citation of unpublished opinions gives an advantage to a person who knows about the case over one who does not;
4. An unpublished opinion is not new authority but only a repeated application of a settled rule of law for which there is ample published authority.
The court continues to adhere to those expressions of general policy.
Although the proposed amendment attempts to eliminate the advantage one having knowledge of an unpublished opinion would have over one who does not, it addresses only matters that have reached the stage of *834litigation, for it would require a copy of the cited unpublished opinion and all other known unpublished opinions with holdings directly adverse to the relevant issue of the cited opinion to be furnished to the court and all opposing parties. Yet, if citation of unpublished opinions were permitted for persuasive and informational purposes, the inequality between persons knowing of unpublished opinions and those who did not would exist well before a matter reached the courts. Indeed, it would be present at the outset of legal representation, even in matters never intended to be litigated.
Moreover, if unpublished opinions were permitted to be cited for persuasive and informational purposes, lawyers would not be entitled to rely on published precedent in advising clients concerning their legal matters. Competent representation could well require research into a large body of unpublished appellate opinions lest some of them ultimately be considered persuasive or informative on issues relevant to the client's matters.
This additional burden on the practitioner, with a concomitant increase in fees to the client, would not be alleviated by the availability of services printing the unpublished appellate opinions or their inclusion in automated legal research tools or availability at law libraries. All law offices are not created equal: differences in geographical location, client base and economic resources create an inequality in the ability of a practitioner, whether a lawyer practicing alone in a small town or one practicing in a 35-member firm in a large metropolis, to easily and affordably conduct the research needed for adequate client representation.
The court is also cognizant of the potential for unintended abuse inherent in the citation of unpublished appellate opinions for purposes other than those currently permitted. Trial courts and appellate courts might *835unwittingly give unpublished opinions more weight than that to which they are entitled, merely because they express the reasoning of an appellate tribunal on the same or similar issue. Moreover, courts might inadvertently give the appearance of improperly having relied on unpublished opinions as precedent for their holdings on the same issue. Erosion of the concept of precedent embodied in published decisional law is too great a price to pay for the sake of informing or persuading a court by means of opinions not designed for citation.
While we acknowledge that sound arguments may be and have been made for permitting citation of unpublished opinions for informational and persuasive purposes, they are outweighed by the reasons we have enunciated herein for continuing to limit the citation of unpublished appellate decisions to the support of claims of res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case.
IT IS ORDERED that the petition for the amendment of sec. (Rule) 809.23(3), Stats., is denied.
Eight of the federal appellate circuits have similar rules prohibiting the citation of unpublished decisions, including the Seventh Circuit, comprising Illinois, Indiana and Wisconsin. Two other circuits have rules "disfavoring" the citation of unpublished decisions except for those purposes. "Unpublished Dispositions: Problems of Access and Use in the Courts of Appeals," Federal Judicial Center, 1985.