(concurring in part and dissenting in part). Although I concur in the majority’s holding that intentional nuisance is not an exception to governmental immunity, I write separately to register my disagreement with the "historical approach” relied upon to reach that result, and to dissent from that portion of the opinion which would remand these cases to the Court of Appeals.
It is important to keep in mind that these cases involve the immunity of governmental agencies other than the state.1 The first sentence of § 7 of the governmental immunity act provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this act, all *597governmental agencies shall be immune from tort liability in all cases wherein the government agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function. [Emphasis added.]
The second sentence provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this act, this act shall not be construed as modifying or restricting the immunity of the state from tort liability as it existed before July 1, 1965, which immunity is affirmed.[2] [Emphasis added.]
The majority today, as did the plurality in Hadfield v Oakland Co Drain Comm’r, 430 Mich 139, 170; 422 NW2d 205 (1988) (opinion of Brickley, J.), asserts that the second sentence of § 7 requires an historical analysis of common-law exceptions to governmental immunity.3 The plurality opinion in Hadñeld, which forms the basis of today’s decision, conceded:
Taken alone, the first sentence of § 7 does support a narrow interpretation of the act, to preclude recognition of any nuisance exception. The Legislature’s use of the word “tort” to describe the liabil*598ity from which governmental agencies are to be held immune exemplifies the breadth of the intended immunity. There is no doubt that nuisance is a tort and that liability for nuisance would be within the scope of statutory governmental immunity as expressed in the first sentence of § 7. [Id., p 147. Emphasis added.][4]
Nonetheless, the Hadñeld plurality rejected a restrictive interpretation of § 7 by contending that "the second sentence of § 7 retains preexisting governmental immunity law except where provided otherwise in the act.” Id. (Emphasis added.)
However, neither the plurality opinion in Hadñeld, nor the majority opinion today, addresses the significance of the Legislature’s use of the terms "governmental agencies” in the first sentence of § 7 and "state” in the second.5 A literal reading of the second sentence of § 7 seems, at most, to require an historical analysis of the state’s common-law immunity.6 The significance of the Legis*599lature’s use of "governmental agencies” in the first sentence and the "state” in the second sentence is underscored by the definitions expressly given those terms in the act. "Governmental agency” is defined as "the state, political subdivisions, and municipal corporations.” The "state,” on the other hand, is defined as "the state of Michigan and its agencies, departments, [and] commissions . . . .”7 The terms are not interchangeable. The statutory provision prohibiting modification or restriction of immunity is specifically applied to the "state,” a term which does not embrace municipalities and other forms of lower government. Definitions supplied by the Legislature in the statute are binding *600on the judiciary.8 Thus, assuming arguendo that the second sentence of § 7 requires an historical analysis, it should be applied to the "state” and not other "governmental agencies.”
The underlying premise of the Hadñeld plurality opinion appears to be that the Legislature’s intent to make uniform the immunity of all levels of government requires that the historical analysis purportedly required by § 7 applies to all levels of government, despite the express limitation of the purported historical analysis to "the state.”9
Although the act’s title declares its purpose is "to make uniform the liability of municipal corporations, political subdivisions, and the state, its agencies and departments,” the uniformity of immunity intended by the Legislature does not necessarily include both governmental and nongovernmental functions. The act’s title qualifies the uniformity purpose by providing that the Legislature sought to make uniform the liability of all government ”when engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function . . . .” Simply because the Legislature claimed immunity on behalf of all levels of government "when engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function” does not necessarily compel the conclusion that the state has no immunity when not engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function. Indeed, the governmental tort liability act was " '[djrafted under the apparent assumption that the state and its agencies enjoyed a total sovereign *601immunity from tort liability . . . ”10 Thus, the legislative intent underlying the second sentence of §7 could merely have been to "affirm” the state’s preexisting absolute sovereign immunity, rather than to codify common-law exceptions to governmental immunity. Strict uniformity of immunity among all levels of government is not clearly mandated by § 7. Ross v Consumers Power (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 666-667; 363 NW2d 641 (1984) (Levin, J., dissenting in part).
Moreover, this Court has previously rejected the argument that § 7 "froze” the case-law precedent of governmental immunity. As stated in Parker v Highland Park, 404 Mich 183, 192; 273 NW2d 413 (1978):
[T]o read the second sentence of MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107) as "preserving for all time state governmental immunity heretofore recognized by case law” would be to "assume that the Legislature failed to recognize that the evolution of case-law precedent is exclusively committed to the judicial branch of government.” [Quoting Thomas v State Hwy Dep’t, 398 Mich 1, 17, n 4; 247 NW2d 530 (1976) (Kavanagh, C.J., dissenting).11 Citation omitted.]
*602Contrary to the historical approach employed in the Hadñeld plurality opinion, this Court has repeatedly stated that the act constitutes a " 'broad grant of immunity’ with 'four narrowly drawn statutory exceptions.’ ”12 The historical approach adopted by the majority today leaves ajar the door to additional immunity exceptions that cannot be fairly culled from the language of § 7.
Significantly, this Court has previously examined whether an intentional-tort exception exists under the act. In finding that there is no such exception, the Court in Smith v Public Health Dep’t, 428 Mich 540; 410 NW2d 749 (1987),13 did *603not resort to any "historical analysis” of common-law exceptions to governmental immunity. Instead, the Court stated:
In order to now decide whether to recognize any form of intentional tort exception to the governmental immunity act, this Court must first determine whether the Legislature intended the term "tort liability” in § 7 of the act to exclude intentional torts. We conclude that nothing on the face of the statute indicates an intent to create such an exception. [Id., p 602.]
As in the case of intentional torts, there is nothing on the face of the statute which indicates a legislative intent to create an exception for nuisance.14 Thus, under the analysis set forth in Smith, "[i]t only remains then to decide if an intentional tort can arise out of the exercise of a governmental function.” Id., pp 603-604.15
The primary purposes of the act were to restore immunity to municipalities in the wake of Williams v Detroit, 364 Mich 231; 111 NW2d 1 (1961), and "halt this Court’s attempts to abolish sover*604eign and governmental immunity.”16 The first sentence of § 7 achieves uniform immunity to the extent that all levels of government enjoy immunity when engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function. However, the Legislature made clear in the second sentence that the state’s preexisting immunity was not to be modified or restricted regardless of the governmental function limitation in the first sentence. As Justice Levin observed in Ross, supra, pp 668-670, three years after Williams abrogated the common-law immunity of municipalities:
[T]he Legislature enacted the governmental tort liability act. The primary purpose of the act, which, "was drafted by a special committee of the Michigan Association of Municipal Attorneys and lobbied through the legislature with the strong backing of that association’s parent organization, the Michigan Municipal League,” appears to have been to restore immunity to non-sovereign governmental units.
To achieve this purpose, the Legislature provided in the first sentence of § 7 that "[e]xcept as in this act otherwise provided, all governmental agencies shall be immune from tort liability in all cases wherein the government agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function.” The act thereby conferred uniform statutory immunity on all governmental entities— both the state and non-sovereign political units alike — when engaged in the exercise or discharge of a ’’governmental function.”
To make clear that, by restoring to municipal corporations immunity for governmental functions and making uniform the immunity of all govern*605mental entities for governmental functions, it was not thereby waiving the state’s common-law absolute sovereign immunity for non-governmental functions, the Legislature provided in the second sentence of §7 that "[ejxcept as otherwise provided herein, this act shall not be construed as modifying or restricting the immunity of the state from tort liability as it existed heretofore, which immunity is affirmed.” The "which immunity is affirmed” clause codified the state’s common-law sovereign immunity from tort liability — an absolute immunity except to the extent it is waived by the Legislature. [Emphasis added.]
In my opinion, the fundamental purposes of the act were to restore immunity to municipalities, grant immunity to all levels of government when engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function, and prevent judicial abrogation of governmental and sovereign immunity. The second sentence of § 7 was merely intended to prevent further erosion of the state’s common-law immunity, rather than preserve any common-law exceptions to governmental immunity. Under this analysis, unless the activity of a municipality falls within one of the five narrowly drawn statutory exceptions,17 the only question remaining in these cases is whether the activity is a "governmental function,” as defined by the Legislature.18
For these reasons, and because, in any event, plaintiffs failed to preserve for appeal the question *606whether either nuisance per se or public nuisance is a common-law exception to governmental immunity, I would not remand these cases to the Court of Appeals.
Levin, J.(separate opinion). The majority declares that "intentional nuisance” is not a recognized common-law exception to governmental immunity,1 and that the cases are remanded to the Court of Appeals "to consider the existence of nuisance per se and public nuisance exceptions to immunity, and their applicability to these cases if, and to the extent that, they were properly raised before the Court of Appeals.”2
I agree with the majority that nuisances have not been classified on the basis of whether they are intentional or unintentional. Accordingly, there being no separate category of intentional nuisance, there is no need to decide whether there is an intentional nuisance exception to governmental immunity.
Nuisance per se and public nuisance are recognized categories of nuisance. While the majority remands the cases for a determination of whether those categories of nuisance are exceptions to immunity, it opines that "any case-law exceptions devised after [July 1, 1965, the effective date of the governmental tort liability act,] would not escape governmental immunity.”3 The question whether there is a nuisance per se or public nuisance exception to governmental immunity should be decided in a case where the court concludes that factually there is a nuisance per se or a public nuisance.
The Court states that the negligence per se and *607public nuisance issues can only be considered by the Court of Appeals on remand if "they were properly raised before the Court of Appeals.”4 It is, however, for the Court of Appeals in the first instance to decide to what extent issues need to be properly raised and what constitutes properly raising them before that Court. We would, I think, all agree that the decisions of this Court on the nuisance "exception” to governmental immunity have not been crystal clear. In that context, the Court should be cautious about suggesting or deciding to what extent preservation of a precise category of nuisance is required.
Public nuisance is a long-recognized category of nuisance. The majority adopts the historical approach5 without indicating what authority there may be for the notion that a public nuisance committed by government is historically immune.6
Interference with use of a public highway or waterway is a public nuisance, historically. The plaintiffs in Li were using a public highway. The plaintiff’s decedent in Garcia may have been using a public waterway. The common-law tradition is to decide cases, i.e., the facts and the law, together. The facts inform the decision on the law._
The City of Ann Arbor and the City of Jackson are "municipal corporations” within the definitions provided by the governmental tort liability act. MCL 691.1401(l)(a); MSA 3.996(101)(l)(a). Although municipal corporations, along with the state, are within the definition of "governmental agency” MCL 691.1401(l)(d); MSA 3.996(101)(l)(d), municipal corporations are not within the definition of "state.” MCL 691.1401(l)(c); MSA 3.996(101)(l)(c).
MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107), as amended by 1986 PA 175. (Emphasis added.)
Sovereign immunity " 'is a specific term limited in its application to the State and to the departments, commissions, boards, institutions, and instrumentalities of the State.’ ” Ross v Consumers Power (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 597; 363 NW2d 641 (1984), quoting Myers v Genesee Co Auditor, 375 Mich 1, 6; 133 NW2d 190 (1965) (opinion of O’Hara, J.).
"Over the years, by judicial construction, this 'sovereign’ immunity has been transmogrified into 'governmental’ immunity and made applicable to the 'inferior’ divisions of government . . . but with an important distinction. These subdivisions of government enjoyed the immunity only when engaged in 'governmental’ as distinguished from 'proprietary’ functions.” [Ross, supra, p 597, quoting Myers, supra, pp 8-9.]
See also Ross v Consumers Power (On Rehearing), n 3 supra, p 618:
[T]he immunity from tort liability provided by §7 is expressed in the broadest possible language — it extends immunity to all governmental agencies for all tort liability whenever they are engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function.
See also Gerzeski v State Hwy Dep’t, 403 Mich 149; 268 NW2d 525 (1978). In holding that a nuisance cause of action survived the act, the Court "did not appear to have considered” the second sentence of § 7. Ross v Consumers Power (On Rehearing), n 3 supra, p 703, n 64 (Levin, J., dissenting in part).
Justice Brickley’s Hadfield opinion cites Thomas v State Hwy Dep’t, 398 Mich 1, 11; 247 NW2d 530 (1976), for the principle that the second sentence of § 7 affirmed the case-law precedent of governmental immunity, thus implying that an historical analysis is required. However, Thomas concerned the immunity of a state agency. Indeed, few commentators or court opinions have expressly concluded that the second sentence of § 7 codifies the common-law exceptions to governmental immunity. Most merely agree that the second sentence of § 7 codifies the common-law exceptions to sovereign immunity. See, *599e.g., Ross v Consumers Power (On Rehearing), n 3 supra, p 595; ("the second sentence statutorily affirms the law of sovereign [state] immunity from tort liability”); Thomas v State Hwy Dep’t, supra, p 11 ("this language must be construed as an 'affirmation’ of case-law precedent on the subject of the state’s immunity”); Pinchette v Manistique Schools, 403 Mich 268, 278, n 2; 269 NW2d 143 (1978); Perry v Kalamazoo State Hosp, 404 Mich 205, 210-211; 273 NW2d 421 (1978) ("historical context in which this statute was enacted suggests that the Legislature’s intent in adopting this act was to codify the existing common-law or judge-made immunity of the state”); Killeen v Dep’t of Transportation, 432 Mich 1, 19; 438 NW2d 233 (1989) (Riley, C.J., dissenting) ("[the] governmental immunity statute codified the common-law principle of sovereign immunity”). See also Weller, Sovereign immunity in Michigan: Sources and outline, 6 Cooley L R 217, 254, n 237 (1989) ("the plain language of § 7[1] of the . . . Act seems to provide a specific exclusion for the state from those common law exceptions to governmental [but not sovereign] immunity that existed before July 1, 1965”). But see Rosario v City of Lansing, 403 Mich 124, 146; 268 NW2d 230 (1978) (Ryan, J., dissenting); DeMars, Intentional nuisance in fact: Should it be a bar to a governmental function defense in Michigan?, 1981 Det C L R 771, 790.
Professor Cooperrider’s article, cited prominently by the plurality in Hadñeld, did not rely on the second sentence of § 7 in arguing that nuisance trespass survived the enactment of the governmental tort liability act. Instead, Cooperrider argued that given the long history of the common-law nuisance exception, the Legislature would have expressly abolished it had that been their intent. Cooperrider, The court, the legislature, and governmental tort liability in Michigan, 72 Mich L R 187, 279-281 (1973).
MCL 691.1401; MSA 3.996(101).
People v Smith, 246 Mich 393; 224 NW 402 (1929); W S Butterfield Theatres, Inc v Dep’t of Revenue, 353 Mich 345, 350; 91 NW2d 269 (1958); McRaild v Shepard Lincoln Mercury, Inc, 141 Mich App 406; 367 NW2d 404 (1985); 1A Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction (4th ed), § 20.08, p 88.
The Hadñeld plurality considered its "historical approach” to be consistent with Ross, wherein this Court stated that "[t]he governmental immunity act was intended to provide uniform liability and immunity to both state and local governmental agencies.” Ross, n 3 supra, p 614.
Ross, n 3 supra, p 665 (Levin, J., dissenting) (quoting Cooperrider, n 6 supra, p 277).
In Thomas, the Court held that the test for whether an activity is within the exercise or discharge of a governmental function must be determined by case-law precedent as it stood prior to 1965. This analysis, similar to today’s historical analysis of common-law exceptions to governmental immunity, was rejected in Parker and Ross, supra, pp 609-610. In Parker, supra, p 198, the question was whether the operation of a hospital is a governmental function. Despite two pre-1965 decisions holding that the operation of a hospital is a governmental function, the Court held it was not bound by those decisions, declining to follow the rationale of Thomas that the second sentence of §7 affirmed "case-law precedent on the subject of the state’s immunity.” Today, however, the Court feels bound by an historical analysis which leaves open the possibility of finding public and nuisance per se exceptions to governmental immunity. As Justice Coleman observed in Pinchette v Manistique Schools, n 6 supra, p 291 (1978) (affirming in part and dissenting in part):
*602As I see it, our problem derives from a desire to circumvent the governmental immunity statute — or eliminate it in effect. To this end, the Court has contrived to establish by-paths (e.g., some theories of nuisance . . .).
Hadfield, supra, p 146; Ross, n 3 supra, p 618; Reardon v Mental Health Dep’t, 430 Mich 398, 412; 424 NW2d 248 (1988); Smith, supra, pp 591-592; Thomas, n 6 supra, p 9, n 3; Pittman v City of Taylor, 398 Mich 41, 62; 247 NW2d 512 (1976) (Coleman, J.); Pinchette, n 6 supra, p 277.
The four statutory exceptions are MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102) (highway repair); MCL 691.1405; MSA 3.996(105) (negligent operation of government-owned motor vehicle); MCL 691.1406; MSA 3.996(106) (public buildings); MCL 691.1413; MSA 3.996(113) (proprietary function).
A fifth statutory exception was added by 1986 PA 175, MCL 691.1407(4); MSA 3.996(107)(4) (ownership or operation of a hospital or county medical care facility).
Aside from these five narrow statutory exceptions, a governmental agency may be liable for an unconstitutional taking. Const 1963, art 10, § 2. See Buckeye Union Fire Ins Co v Michigan, 383 Mich 630; 178 NW2d 476 (1970). See also Hadfield, supra, pp 168-169. Whether a governmental agency enjoys immunity for a violation of the Takings Clause, however, is a separate question from whether § 7 preserves common-law exceptions to governmental immunity.
The lead opinion was authored by Justice Brickley and joined by Chief Justice Riley. A separate opinion, authored by Justice Boyle and joined by Justice Cavanagh, "concurred] with Justice Brickley’s conclusion that . . . the allegation of a common-law intentional tort does not avoid statutory immunity per se . . . .” Smith, supra, p 637.
See Hadfield, supra, p 147.
In Ross, n 3 supra, p 620, the Court fashioned a new definition of "governmental function”:
[A] governmental function is an activity which is expressly or impliedly mandated or authorized by constitution, statute, of other law. When a governmental agency engages in mandated or authorized activities, it is immune from tort liability, unless the activity is proprietary in nature (as defined in § 13) or falls within one of the other statutory exceptions to the governmental immunity act.
We invited the Legislature to modify our broad definition in the event that it did not reflect the Legislature’s intent regarding the scope of immunity. Id., p 621. The Legislature subsequently adopted the Ross definition practically verbatim. 1986 PA 175. "In so doing, the Legislature put its imprimatur on the broad scope of immunity as defined in Ross and, by implication, the narrow scope of its exception.” Reardon v Mental Health Dep’t, n 12 supra, p 412.
Hyde v Univ of Michigan Regents, 426 Mich 223, 244; 393 NW2d 847 (1986); Thomas, n 6 supra, p 10; Maki v East Tawas, 385 Mich 151, 164, n 3; 188 NW2d 593 (1971) (Williams, J., dissenting); Littlejohn & DeMars, Governmental immunity after Parker and Perry: The king can do some wrong, 1982 Det C L R 1, 5; Ross, n 3 supra, p 605.
MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102) (highway repair); MCL 691.1405; MSA 3.996(105) (negligent operation of government-owned motor vehicle); MCL 691.1406; MSA 3.996(106) (public buildings); MCL 691.1413; MSA 3.996(113) (proprietary function); MCL 691.1407(4); MSA 3.996(107)(4) (ownership or operation of a hospital or county medical care facility).
"Governmental function” is an activity which is expressly or impliedly mandated or authorized by constitution, statute, local charter or ordinance, or other law. [MCL 691.1401; MSA 3.996(101).]
Ante, p 587.
Ante, p 596.
Ante, pp 592-594.
Ante, p 596.
"We adopt the historical approach endorsed by a majority of this Court in Hadfield” v Oakland Co Drain Comm’r, 430 Mich 139; 422 NW2d 205 (1988). Ante, p 594.
Courts in other jurisdictions held, before July 1, 1965, that a governmental entity was subject to liability for personal injury caused by a nuisance although the injury was suffered on property owned by the government, and there was no trespass by the government on private property. Johnson v Tennessean Newspaper, Inc, 192 Tenn 287; 241 SW2d 399 (1951); Lehmkuhl v Junction City, 179 Kan 389; 295 P2d 621 (1956).