(dissenting). The two issues can be simply stated: 1) Are political intra-associational communications "contributions" to a candidate within the meaning of Wisconsin's Campaign Finance Law if the communications are prompted by a *163candidate or candidate's campaign committee? 2) If so, is such law constitutional?
I.
As best I can discern, the majority opinion holds that "disbursements made in connection with political communications which exceed the scope of the statute are subject to disclosure and limitation under ch. 11." Majority op. at 160, 161. There can, of course, be no argument with that conclusion. The problem, unless I'm missing something, is that this conclusion begs the question. The question presented by WEAC is whether any intra-associational disbursements, if prompted by a candidate or a candidate's organization, "exceed the scope" of the statute. WEAC wants, and deserves, an answer to that question. The answer of the majority seems to be "maybe."
I conclude, based on the legislative history, the clear and unambiguous language of sec. 11.29(1), Stats., and the constitutional implications if interpreted otherwise, that expenses incurred by a voluntary association in communicating exclusively with its members about political matters, regardless of the impetus of such communication, need not be reported and are not contributions within the meaning of ch. 11.
I cannot comprehend how the majority can conclude that we do not have sufficient facts to resolve the second issue, the constitutional question presented. The majority says, in essence, that they need to know the nature of the intra-associational communication before they can issue an opinion on the statute's constitutionality. WEAC claims that any intra-associational political com*164munication is constitutionally protected, regardless of source or impetus. We do not need to know the nature of the communication to answer that issue as presented by WEAC. Any political communication, WEAC says, is protected. Thus, any example of a political intra-associa-tional communication we could surmise, without limitation, is covered by WEAC's argument. What more could we possibly need to answer the constitutional question presented?
WEAC is now left in an untenable position because of the majority's failure to adequately answer the first issue, and their failure to answer at all the second. Is any political intra-associational expenditure prompted by a candidate or a candidate's organization a contribution? If it depends upon the "nature" of it, what communications are included and what are not? Does the nature of the communication depend upon the type of expenditure? Or does it depend upon the type of prompt? If so, what "type” of expenditure, what "type" of prompt?
WEAC is now caught between Scylla and Charybdis. They can forego political activity which they believe is constitutionally protected, or they can proceed with their plans at their peril. In order to find out what the law means, they must proceed, but proceed with the knowledge they may be either breaking the law or coming perilously close to doing so. I dissent.