Opinion by
SARAH B. DUNCAN, Justice.Port Terminal Railroad Association appeals the judgment in favor of Michael Jones in his suit under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act for violations of the Safety Appliance Act. We hold there is no evidence of a precondition of liability — that the train was “in use” at the time of the accident — and therefore reverse the trial court’s judgment and render judgment in the PTRA’s favor.
Factual and ProceduRal Background
On the afternoon of the accident, Michael Jones, a railroad switchman for PTRA, was assigned to drop off a string or “cut” of railroad cars at three facilities (Lubrizol, Grace, and Diamond Deer Park), pick up each facility’s loaded cars, and take the cars to the Pasadena Yard, where they would be coupled with other cars and an engine to form a train. Before Jones could pick up a cut of cars, however, he had to release the hand brake on each car, visually inspect the safety appliances (steps, handholds, and rails), lace or “cut in” the compressed air supply lines, perform an air brake test, and couple his engine to the cars.
Jones first went to Lubrizol, working first on the car furthest from where the engine would be coupled. When he was approximately half way through the cut, he fell from the brake platform of a railcar when the handhold broke. At that point, the engine had not been coupled to the cars, nor had an air brake test been performed. These steps were not performed *128until Jones and his crew first dropped off the cars at the other two facilities, performed the same predeparture procedures on their “outbound” rail cars, and returned with those cars to pick up the “outbound” cars at Lubrizol.
After the accident, Jones sued PTRA for negligence and violations of the Safety Appliance Act. The jury found that the broken handhold, but not negligence, was a proximate cause of Jones’ injuries. The trial court rendered judgment on the verdict, after first ruling that the train was “in use” at the time of the accident.
Standard of Review
Because the material facts are undisputed, whether the train car was “in use” at the time of the accident is a question of law. Deans v. CSX Transp., Inc., 152 F.3d 326, 329 (4th Cir.1998). We review questions of law de novo. See Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Ashworth, 943 S.W.2d 436, 437 (Tex.1997); Pony Express Courier Corp. v. Morris, 921 S.W.2d 817, 820 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996, no writ).
Discussion
“The Safety Appliance Act imposes strict liability on railroads for violations of the Act’s safety standards.” Trinidad v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 949 F.2d 187, 188 (5th Cir.1991). However, strict liability does not attach unless the train is “in use” at the time of the accident. See Brady v. Terminal R.R. Assn., 303 U.S. 10, 13, 58 S.Ct. 426, 82 L.Ed. 614 (1938). To determine whether a train is “in use,” the federal circuit courts have developed competing tests. For instance, in Trinidad, the Fifth Circuit held the train was not “in use” when “it had not been released following inspection because the inspection was not yet complete.” Trinidad, 949 F.2d at 189. This “bright line” test was rejected as “too facile” by the Fourth Circuit. Deans, 152 F.3d at 329. Instead, “to determine whether a train is ‘in use’ for purposes of the FSAA, the primary factors [the Fourth Circuit] considers] are where the train was located at the time of the accident and the activity of the injured party.” Id.; see McGrath v. Consol. Rail Corp., 136 F.3d 838, 842 (1st Cir.1998). In Deans, a conductor was injured while attempting to release a stuck hand brake and before conducting a predeparture air brake test. Deans, 152 F.3d at 328. The court held the train was “in use” because “it already had its engine coupled to it and was standing on a track in the rail yard in preparation for imminent departure”; the injured conductor “was part of the transportation crew and in no way involved in the repair or maintenance of the train.” Id. at 330. That the predeparture air brake test had not yet been conducted was of no practical significance since it could have been performed before the hand brakes were released. Id.
PTRA contends that both tests mandate reversal and rendition of judgment in its favor in light of the facts adduced at trial. We agree. Under the “bright line” test adopted by the Fifth Circuit, the Safety Appliance Act clearly does not apply. Jones’s testimony establishes his predeparture inspection of the Lubrizol cars was not complete at the time of the accident. The Fourth Circuit’s test leads to the same result. Jones’s testimony establishes the cars were not in the yard, but on the Lubrizol lead; his prede-parture inspection of the cars had not been completed; the engine had not yet been coupled to the cars; and the air brake test had not yet been performed. Indeed, neither of the latter two steps would be accomplished for a number of hours. In short, the departure of the cars was far from “imminent.” See Phillips v. CSX Transp., Inc., 190 F.3d 285, 289-90 (4th *129Cir.1999) (holding train was not in use, even though train was assembled and sitting in the yard, in part because “the train was about to be uncoupled from its engine, its handbrakes were being engaged, and it had yet to undergo its predeparture inspection”), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1004, 120 S.Ct. 1269, 146 L.Ed.2d 218 (2000). We therefore hold the train was not “in use” when Jones’s accident occurred.
Conclusion
Because the train was not “in use” when Jones’s accident occurred, regardless of whether we employ the Fifth or Fourth Circuit’s test for “in use,” the Safety Appliance Act does not apply. Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and render judgment in favor of Port Terminal Railway Association.
Dissenting opinion by PHIL HARDBERGER, Chief Justice.