¶ 24. (iconcurring in part; dissenting in part). I concur with that part of the majority opinion affirming the circuit court's order suppressing Herrmann's statements and the evidence seized from beneath the couch. I respectfully dissent, however, regarding the balance of the majority's analysis. In my opinion, encountering the door that was locked from the inside with a chain lock gave the officers reason to *151believe that they would exceed the scope of their lawful search by going beyond that door.
¶ 25. The officers searched a "catacomb" of "many rooms" in Landis's apartment. They eventually found marijuana in the sewing room closet. The officers noticed a door that was approximately one foot from the closet containing the marijuana. They believed it to be a closet door. It was closed and secured with a chain lock.1 "Naturally," they unfastened the chain and opened the door, whereupon they discovered not a closet, but another room.
¶ 26. In Garrison, the Supreme Court observed that if the officers had known, or should have known, that the third floor contained two apartments before they entered the living quarters of the third floor, they would have been obligated to limit the scope of the search. See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 86-87 (1987). Later, the Court held that "the validity of the search of respondent's apartment pursuant to a warrant authorizing the search of the entire third floor depends on whether the officers' failure to realize the overbreadth of the warrant was objectively understandable and reasonable." Id. at 88. Thus, Garrison provides that the scope of an officer's search is subject to both a subjective and objective test.
¶27. The circuit court found that the officers believed that the door secured with the chain lock led to another area of Landis's apartment. This finding of subjective belief is based upon the court's credibility assessment and will therefore not be disturbed on appeal. The circuit court also found, without explica*152tion, that the officers' belief was reasonable.2 The majority embraces this finding, explaining that the officers' conduct constituted a reasonable effort to ascertain the place to be searched. The conduct referred to was their unlatching a device commonly used and understood to provide security against the world on the other side of the door to which it was attached.
¶ 28. The question of reasonableness in a search and seizure setting is an issue of constitutional fact, making our review de novo. See State v. Turner, 136 Wis. 2d 333, 344, 401 N.W.2d 827 (1987). In my view, when the officers encountered a door that was locked to safeguard the apartment against outside intrusion, they had reason to know that it was at least likely to be the apartment's terminus. It was not, again in my opinion, objectively reasonable for them to assume that they were facing a closet door, locked to prevent an exit from within. To the extent it was reasonable, however, the reasonableness was compromised when they were confronted not with what they expected, a closet, but a separate room. At this point, the combination of the chain-locked door and the therefore questionable assumption proven unjustified would alert reasonable officers that searching beyond the door might well take them beyond the scope of their search warrant.
*153¶ 29. I would hold that when the officers had, objectively, reason to know that proceeding past the locked door might take them beyond the scope of their search, they should have ended their search until they undertook reasonable steps to ascertain the limits of Landis's apartment. For example, with the privacy of a citizen's home at issue, it would not unreasonably burden the officers to go back to the stairway that led them to Landis's residence in an attempt to ascertain if there were neighboring apartments. They could have contacted Landis to inquire as to whether she had a neighbor.3 They could have similarly inquired of the landlord or of other tenants in this multi-unit building.
¶ 30. Under Garrison, because the officers had reason to know that proceeding beyond the latched door would exceed the scope of the search warrant, their conduct in doing so violated Herrmann's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. I would therefore reverse the circuit court's order denying the motion to suppress the nine marijuana plants. Suppression of this evidence "taints" the basis for the second search warrant that the majority relies upon. Under my analysis, the officers never would have entered Herrmann's residence and would therefore not have been in a position to make any observations upon which a warrant could be issued. I would accordingly affirm the circuit court's order suppressing all evidence obtained during the second search.
A photograph admitted at the hearing shows that the chain lock was located approximately six inches above doorknob level.
Similarly, the State does not attempt to explain the reasonableness of the officers' assumption that the chain-latched door led to more of Landis's apartment. Instead, it asserts that the officers had no reason to know that they were entering another apartment. In referring to the door, the State observes that is was "fastened only with a chain lock" and was "unmarked." (Emphasis added.) It characterizes the officers' entry into Herrmann's apartment as "inadvertent."
Landis was in jail at the time the warrant was executed. There is some indication in the record that she may not have cooperated with the authorities. That possibility, however, would not excuse an attempt to contact her.