concurring.
I concur in the majority’s conclusion that the Department’s claim was untimely. But I reach that result without deciding whether the claim arose “before” as opposed to “at or after” Lillian’s death.
I believe that under either § 30-2485(a) or (b), the Department’s claim in the present case is barred. Of course, as *105the majority concludes, if the claim arose at or after Lillian’s death, subsection (b)(2) clearly bars it as untimely. But, even if it was deemed.to have arisen before Lillian’s death, the claim was still not presented in a timely manner under subsection (b) unless one first concludes that Tvrz failed to comply with §§ 25-520.01 and 30-2483. Only then would the Department get the benefit of the inordinately long 3-year period to file a claim under subsection (a)(2), presumably as retribution because Tvrz failed to give notice to one “appearing to have a direct legal interest in the estate.” See § 25-520.01. “Appearing” as used in the statute can mean only as of the time the notice is to be mailed to creditors. I fail to see any evidence to support the finding of the county court that Tvrz knew of this debt to the Department or in any way transgressed the mailing-of-notice provision of the aforementioned statute. Accordingly, in my view, even if this was viewed as a claim that arose before Lillian’s death, the Department was left with only the provisions of § 30-2485(a)(1), which granted it 2 months after publication of notice to creditors to file its claim, a time period even shorter than that of subsection (b)(2), which the majority concludes is applicable.