dissenting in part. While I agree with the majority opinion’s statement of the law with respect to the proof needed to establish the crime of attempted kidnapping, I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that there was not overwhelming evidence of Julian Proctor’s guilt on the. attempted kidnapping charge. The majority correctly notes that intent can seldom be proven by direct evidence, and that it must frequently be established by circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., Gaines v. State, 340 Ark. 99, 8 S.W.3d 547 (2000); Jackson v. State, 290 Ark. 160, 717 S.W.2d 801 (1986) (inferring from circumstantial evidence an intent to terrorize a kidnapping victim). Likewise, the majority properly states that the prosecution had to offer overwhelming circumstantial evidence of three elements: 1) of Proctor’s intent to restrain Melissa’s liberty for the purpose or terrorizing or harming her; 2) of a substantial step toward the commission of the crime; and 3) that his actions were strongly corroborative of his criminal purpose.
However, I disagree with the majority’s application of these rules to the facts presented in the case at hand. Evidence of Proctor’s intent to restrain Melissa can be found in the fact that he had handcuffs and duct tape — items that can be employed to restrain another — in addition to a knife. Next, evidence of a substantial step toward the commission of the crime can be seen in his breaking into her home. See subsection (4) of the Original Commentary to Ark. Code Ann. § 5-3-201 (Repl. 1995). Finally, Proctor’s actions were strongly corroborative of his criminal purpose. After breaking into Melissa’s house, he waited in her attic, in possession of a knife (as well as the other items discussed above) for her to come home. Clearly, Proctor was not in her attic planning to bake cookies. I would hold that the foregoing constitutes overwhelming evidence of Proctor’s guilt on the attempted kidnapping charge.