Appellant Campbell sued appellee Hamilton and alleged that appellee’s agent, Duncan, committed fraud in the sale of an automobile to her. The trial court found, based upon the undisputed evidence, that *634Duncan was not appellee’s agent. We hold that as a matter of law Duncan was appel-lee’s agent. Therefore, we reverse the judgment and render the judgment the trial court should have rendered.
On December 1, 1978, appellant responded to a newspaper ad which stated “ ’78 Grand Marquis, 2-DR, 1 owner, 8,000 mis., all options except moon roof, $7,500.00, must sell, 690-3471.” Thereafter, she inspected the vehicle at Duncan’s residence, believed that Duncan was the “1 owner” of the car, believed that the right door had been dented, but it was fixed and was now all right, and believed that she was purchasing basically a brand new car. On December 2, she agreed to purchase the vehicle from Duncan for $6,800.00, leaving him a $50.00 deposit, and on December 4,1978, she wrote Duncan two additional checks for the balance of the $6,800.00 purchase price, plus transfer fees. Appellant believed that Duncan was the original owner of the automobile, she was not aware that it had been wrecked or sold as salvage, and she would not have purchased the car had she known its history or true ownership. Only several weeks later, as a result of receiving her title and discovering the transferror was Hamilton Auto Company, did Campbell learn that the vehicle was not indeed a one owner car, owned by Duncan.
It is undisputed that Hamilton Auto Company transferred title to appellant. Several weeks after the purchase, appellant discovered the vehicle had been wrecked, and thereafter obtained a set of title records from the State whereupon she learned that the vehicle had been totaled, sold as salvage, and then transferred through a series of dealers, including Hamilton Auto Company, to her. The title records demonstrate: the vehicle was originally sold as a new car by Leland Lincoln-Mereury to Robert R. Byrnes on February 10, 1978; a Texas salvage certificate of title was issued on July 3, 1978 to State Farm Insurance Company who transferred title on July 5, 1978 to Ed Lane Motors; Ed Lane Motors sold the car to Virgil Gunter Auto Sales on November 8, 1978; Virgil Gunter Auto Sales sold the car to Hamilton Auto Company on November 9, 1978; Hamilton Auto Company reassigned title to appellant on December 4, 1978. Appellant would not have purchased the vehicle had she known this ownership history instead of believing Duncan was the original owner of the automobile.
Although appellant was told she was purchasing basically a brand new car and she was not informed that the vehicle had been wrecked, a repair estimate demonstrated an estimated repair cost on June 6, 1978 of $8,530.28. There was testimony that the automobile was worth $3,000.00 less than appellant paid for it as of the date and place of purchase, considering its actual condition.
The undisputed evidence shows that pursuant to a verbal agreement between appel-lee and Duncan, appellee authorized Duncan to purchase automobiles with drafts drawn on Hamilton Auto Company. The purchase of the automobiles was financed with appellee’s credit at a bank. Title to the automobiles purchased by Duncan was placed in appellee’s name because it was appellee’s credit that had financed the purchase of the vehicles. Appellee limited Duncan to purchasing three automobiles at any one time and required Duncan to dispose of each automobile purchased within thirty days. Appellee prohibited Duncan from giving any warranties on the vehicles he was selling and instructed him not to run back speedometers. If Duncan did not follow appellee’s instructions, appellee could “pick up the ears” and “shut off his credit.”
Since the evidence is undisputed, the question of whether Duncan was appellee’s agent is a question of law for the court. Minneapolis-Moline Company v. Purser, 361 S.W.2d 239 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1962, writ ref’d n. r. e.). “Agency is the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act.” Restatement (Second) of Agency Sec. 1 (1957). It is undisputed that appellee manifested his consent to Duncan *635that Duncan should act on appellee’s behalf with respect to appellee’s credit and the title to the automobiles purchased and subject to appellee’s control, and Duncan consented so to act. We hold, therefore, that as a matter of law Duncan was appellee’s agent.
Since Duncan was acting as appellee’s agent, appellee is liable for Duncan’s fraud and misrepresentations within the scope of the agency even though appellee had no knowledge of the fraud or misrepresentations and even if appellee received no benefit from the fraud or misrepresentations. Wink v. Wink, 169 S.W.2d 721 (Tex.Civ.App.—Galveston 1943, no writ). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and render judgment for appellant in the amount of $23,000 against appellee Hamilton.
Reversed and rendered.
SPARLING, J., dissents.