dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I am convinced the majority opinion has not correctly construed article 911b, section 16(b).1
Following the entry of an agreed judgment for $3,500.00 against L & L Trucking Company for its violation of the Texas Motor Carrier Act, the State filed suit against Houdaille Industries seeking some $6,600.00 in civil penalties under section 16(b). The State alleged that Houdaille was guilty of procuring, aiding, or abetting L & L’s violation of the Act because it had hired the uncertified motor carrier to transport its products between incorporated Texas cities over public highways.
Whether allegations and proof of intent and knowledge on the part of a purported procurer, aider, or abettor are required to recover civil penalties pursuant to section 16(b) of the Texas Motor Carrier Act is the issue presented to this Court. This precise question has never been considered by the Court.2 However, whether knowledge and intent must be established upon the part of a defendant prior to assessing civil penalties has been considered by this Court in connection with several other statutes. See, e.g., State v. Harrington, 407 S.W.2d 467 (Tex.1966); Bloom v. Texas State Bd. of Pharmacy, 390 S.W.2d 252 (Tex.1965).
In Bloom v. Texas State Bd. of Pharmacy, 390 S.W.2d 252 (Tex.1965), we held that article 4542a, § 12(h) requires the state to allege and prove a pharmacist “knowingly” or “intentionally” substituted a prescribed drug without authorization before canceling, revoking, or suspending his license despite the absence of any such requirement within the statute’s express language. Id. at 256-57. The Court noted the previous holding in Garner v. Texas State Bd. of Pharmacy, 304 S.W.2d 530 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1957, writ ref’d), wherein it was held that section 12(f) of article 4542a, which provides that the board can revoke a pharmacist’s license if he “directly or indirectly aids or abets in the practice of pharmacy any person not duly licensed to practice under this Act,” was determined to require proof of knowledge on the pharmacist’s part. Id. at 534; see Bloom, supra, at 256. We concluded in Bloom that if Gamer was not subject to the civil penalties of section 12(f) in the absence of knowledge which he could have easily obtained, then despite the absence of any specific requirement within the statute’s provisions, proof of knowledge or intent was required to impose civil penalties pursuant to section 12(h). Bloom, supra, at 256-57.
In Harrington v. State, 407 S.W.2d 467 (Tex.1966), we held that proof of knowledge and intent was not a prerequisite to the imposition of the civil penalties provided for by article 6036. Like article 4542a, § 12(h), the language of article 6036 did not specifically require proof of knowledge or intent at the time of the Harrington decision. Distinguishing article 6036 from article 4542a, § 12(h) on the basis of legislative history, we held that article 6036 did not require proof of knowledge or intent. See Harrington, supra, at 478. Unlike article 4542a, § 12(h), article 6036 contained an express knowledge requirement at one time. As originally enacted, article 6036 did not contain words of culpability; however, the words “knowingly and willfully violating” were added to the statute by amendment. In a subsequent amendment the words were deleted, thereby manifesting the Legislature’s intent to render knowledge and intent immaterial to the application of article 6036. See Harrington, supra, at 478.
As in Harrington, the court of civil appeals in City of Galveston v. State, 518 *732S.W.2d 413 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ), used legislative history to determine that proof of knowledge and intent was not necessary to the imposition of civil penalties under Tex.Water Code Ann. § 21.252. In Williams v. State, 514 S.W.2d 772 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1974, writ ref’d n. r. e.), which was cited in City of Galveston, supra, the court of civil appeals purported to follow our decision in Harrington in holding that article 7621e did not require proof of knowledge and intent. The Williams’ court, however, failed to examine or acknowledge the statute’s legislative history in its reasoning, as we had done in Harrington. Instead, as the majority has done here, the court of civil appeals concluded that Harrington controlled on the ground that because article 7621e only assessed civil penalties, proof of knowledge and intent was unnecessary. Williams, supra, at 777. Assuming arguendo that proof of knowledge and intent was required, the court also noted that Williams’ admissions that he had never had a license or certificate of registration from the Texas Well Drillers Board and that despite the fact he was familiar with the application forms he had never applied for one because he knew he could not qualify for a license had satisfied these elements as a matter of law. Id. These cases demonstrate, as the majority’s opinion notes, that depending upon particular legislative history and intent, and the wording of the statute, knowledge and intent may be required. See, e.g., State v. Harrington, 407 S.W.2d 467 (Tex.1966); Bloom v. Texas State Bd. of Pharmacy, 390 S.W.2d 252 (Tex.1965).
The Motor Carrier Act was enacted in Texas by the Forty-First Legislature in 1929. See 1929 Tex.Gen.Laws, ch. 314, at 698-710. Although we are only concerned with section 16(b), section 16(a) is relevant to our discussion as an aid to section 16(b)’s construction. The record reveals that the State recognizes section 16(a), which provides that a violation constitutes a misdemeanor, as the penal provision of article 911b. See State’s response to Houdaille’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Transcript, at 46. The State contends that unlike section 16(a), section 16(b) is not penal and should not require proof of knowledge and intent. These contentions are based upon the fact that section 16(b) assesses a “civil penalty,” rather than a criminal sanction for the violation of its provisions.
The language of subsections (a) and (b) is identical wherein they set out conduct constituting a violation of the respective provisions. The exact conduct required to violate section 16(a) is necessary for a violation of section 16(b). Moreover, the portion of section 16(b) describing conduct which violates its provisions provides that a party who is guilty of violating section 16(b)— who would be simultaneously guilty of violating section 16(a) — “shall in addition be subject to and shall pay a penalty.” Tex. Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 911b, § 16(b) (emphasis added). Section 16(b)’s civil penalty is cumulative of the criminal penalty assessed in section 16(a); it does not penalize a different offense. As the court wrote in Carter v. William Sommerville & Son, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 274 (Tex.1979): “Section 16(a) of the Act declares that any person or corporation who ‘procures, aids, or abets in the violation of any provision of this Act’ is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by fine. Section 16(b) creates a civil penalty, ..., for the same offense.” Id. at 277 (emphasis added).
The majority’s opinion correctly states that the Texas Motor Carrier Act is a comprehensive Act designed to regulate the equipment used and those who haul for hire over Texas highways between incorporated cities. See Oil Field Haulers Ass’n v. Railroad Comm’n, 381 S.W.2d 183, 194 (Tex.1964); Great Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Chapa, 377 S.W.2d 632, 634-35 (Tex.1964); New Way Lumber Co. v. Smith, 128 Tex. 173, 96 S.W.2d 282, 285-86 (1936). When construing such a statute the Court must use diligence to effectuate the Legislature’s intent as gleaned from the language of the entire statute and, if available, from an express statement of legislative intent within the statute. Section 22b of the Texas Motor *733Carrier Act contains such an expression of legislative intent.3
Benefiting public welfare through regulations which, inter alia, render highways safer by minimizing traffic congestion, reducing wear to roadways, and eliminating potential rate discrimination by carriers is the stated policy of the Motor Carrier Act. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 911b, § 22b; see Oil Field Haulers, supra, at 194; Great Nat'l Life Ins. Co., supra, at 634-35. In Tarry Moving & Storage Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, 367 S.W.2d 322 (Tex.1963), we stated that the paramount consideration in state regulations controlling common carriers is that of the public interest. Id. at 324.
This is not a case involving a manufacturer or distributor of an adulterated product intended for human consumption, nor does it involve a greedy lender or an unscrupulous merchant. Instead, this case involves a shipper, a member of the class intended to be protected rather than regulated by the Texas Motor Carrier Act. See New Way Lumber Co., supra, at 285-86. I fail to see how the State’s infliction of civil penalties upon a shipper using an uncertificated carrier, in the absence of requiring that the State plead and prove knowledge and intent on the shipper’s part to procure, aid, or abet a violation of the Act, facilitates the furtherance of the Legislature’s goals. Prosecuting shippers on a strict liability basis will do little to curb carrier abuses. Imposing a burden to prove a shipper’s knowledge and intent upon the state would seem unlikely to hinder its effectiveness in prosecuting truly culpable shippers who knowingly and intentionally hire unlicensed carriers for such illicit purposes as receiving kickbacks, reduced tariffs, or to ship contraband.
Although Houdaille is a commercial shipper which of necessity employs common carriers with some regularity, the construction of section 16(b) announced by this Court is to be equally applicable to the “casual,” even “one-time,” private shipper. Thus, anyone who naively hires a moving company, selected from the phone book’s yellow pages or newspaper’s classified section, to transport their worldly possessions without ascertaining whether the carrier in fact possesses a Railroad Commission Motor Carrier permit, will be subject to section 16(b)’s “civil penalties” if the carrier lacks the requisite certificate. Regardless of whether they inquire if the carrier possessed a permit and are lied to,4 and irrespective of whether they know that a carrier is required to have a certificate of convenience and necessity, such an unenlightened individual can be the target of enforcement by the Attorney General’s Office under the majority’s holding.
As shippers constitute that portion of the Act’s protected class primarily intended to be guarded against carrier abuses, the imposition of no fault liability will unreasonably penalize them. Shippers should be entitled to presume that one who holds himself out to the public as being a bona fide carrier is in compliance with the applicable statutes. This favorable presumption should persist until the carrier’s conduct indicates to the contrary or the shipper receives some *734knowledge which would put him on notice of the carrier’s noncompliance.
The rippling effect of the harsh construction given section 16(b) by the majority will go beyond affecting uninformed shippers. The statute expressly states that “[e]very officer, agent, servant or employee of any corporation and every other person who . .. aids ... in the violation ... shall pay a penalty.. . . ” Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 911b, § 16(b) (emphasis added). Thus, service station attendants and mechanics, as well as anyone else who unsuspectingly facilitates the continued progress of an unlicensed carrier down the Texas highways, are liable for civil penalties under the majority’s interpretation of section 16(b).
Although termed a “civil penalty,” section 16(b)’s sanctions are of a punitive nature and should not be construed to create liability without fault. Contrary to the majority’s holding, allegations and proof of knowledge and intent on the part of the purported “procurer, aider, or abettor” should be required of the State. To construe section 16(b) as imposing strict liability will subject innocent, albeit unwitting shippers to broad and wideranging liability not reasonably contemplated by the Legislature in its efforts to regulate motor carrier traffic. I believe that the court of civil appeals correctly concluded that the “duty to supervise and regulate the transportation of property for compensation or hire by motor vehicle on any public highway in [Texas]” is imposed upon the Railroad Commission, rather than shippers. Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat.Ann. art. 911b, § 4.
I would affirm the judgment of the court of civil appeals.
GREENHILL, C. J., and BARROW and CAMPBELL, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.. Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to Vemon’s Revised Civil Statutes Annotated.
. In Carter v. William Sommerviile & Son, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 274 (Tex.1979), we held that a violation of section 16(a), article 911b, does not constitute negligence per se. In a footnote thereto, we noted that the question whether actual knowledge, criminal intent, and active or affirmative encouragement is required to enforce the Motor Carrier Act through section 16(a)’s misdemeanor fines and section 16(b)’s civil penalties was not reached because of the manner in which the case was disposed. Id. at 279 n.4.
. Section 22b provides:
The business of operating as a motor carrier of property for hire along the highways of this State is declared to be a business affected with the public interest. The rapid increase of motor carrier traffic, and the fact that under existing law many motor trucks are not effectively regulated, have increased the dangers and hazards on public highways and make it imperative that more stringent regulation should be employed, to the end that the highways may be rendered safer for the use of the general public; that the wear of such highways may be reduced; that discrimination in rates charged may be eliminated; that congestion of traffic on the highways may be minimized; that the use of the highways for the transportation of property for hire may be restricted to the extent required by the necessity of the general public, and that the various transportation agencies of the State may be adjusted and correlated so that the public highways may serve the best interest of the general public.
. During oral arguments counsel for the Attorney General’s Office stated that the fact a shipper inquired about the necessary permit and was lied to by the carrier about the same is not a defense to prosecution under Section 16(b), rather, it would be considered as a mitigating factor when determining the amount of the civil penalty to be assessed.