dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because I feel there was no prejudicial error in the instructions, and the judgment should be affirmed.
We have said many times that in reviewing instructions to a jury this court must read and consider the instructions as a whole. Bunselmeyer v. Hill, 179 Neb. 140, 137 N. W. 2d 354. If that is done in this case, it is obvious that the jury could not have been misled.
The instruction questioned is essentially the language of Bramhall v. Adcock, 162 Neb. 198, 75 N. W. 2d 696. The last two syllabus points in that case are as follows: “The presence of ice upon a highway is not generally an independent, intervening causal factor that reheves an automobile operator from responsibility for the result of his negligence.
“In order for an accident to be solely attributable to *776an icy condition of the highway, it must be made evident that the accident would in some manner have occurred because of the ice, even if the motorist had not been negligent.”
I do not consider the instructions conflicting, but even if they could be so construed, they are not prejudicial as it is apparent from the record that the jury was not misled thereby. Barney v. Adcock, 162 Neb. 179, 75 N. W. 2d 683.
As to the requiring of an instruction on the ordinance in question, it seems to me that such instruction is superfluous at best under the issues of the case.
In my judgment, the trial judge fully, adequately, and carefully instructed the jury on the issues involved.