OPINION
DUGGAN, Justice.This is an appeal from the entry of a take-nothing judgment following a nonjury trial in a suit arising from an insurer’s refusal to defend under a title insurance policy.
In its sole point of error, plaintiff/appellant, Capital Bank, formerly known as San Jacinto Bank (Capital), asserts the trial court erred in granting a take-nothing judgment in favor of defendant/appellee, Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company and its agent, Commonwealth Title Insurance Company of Houston (Commonwealth), “before the plaintiff had an opportunity to present its evidence and rest.”
Capital was a lender/mortgagee and the insured party under a mortgagee’s policy of title insurance issued by Commonwealth on February 22, 1983. Commonwealth refused Capital’s demand that it defend, under the policy, a tendered lawsuit against Capital. Capital sued Commonwealth, asserting causes of action for breach of contract, violation of article 21.21 of the Texas Insurance Code, and breach of Commonwealth’s duty of good faith and fair dealing.
The nonjury trial proceeding
The trial court called for and received announcements of “ready for trial1,1 from both parties. The judge then inquired about outstanding pretrial motions, heard the attorneys’ statements and arguments about the nature of the case and the issues, and ruled on the motions and the admissibility of certain of Commonwealth’s defenses. The trial court denied Commonwealth’s motion for leave to file a counterclaim. Capital, as plaintiff, then offered some 31 exhibits; the court overruled Commonwealth’s objections, and admitted Capital’s exhibits “for all purposes.” The trial court then ordered both parties
to submit short briefs by 10:00 o’clock next Wednesday, the 1st,2 regarding the policy question of adversary proceeding, subject of the suit, attorney’s fees for it, whether that’s covered by the policy or not, and then we’ll reconvene for argument on those briefs and decision on Monday, November 26, 10:30 a.m.
It is undisputed that, following the recess for briefing, the trial court did not “reconvene for argument on those briefs and decision,” and that Capital never announced that it rested its case. Capital states without challenge in its appellant’s original brief, and we accept as fact, that “[cjounsel for Capital returned at the appointed time and was informed by the court clerk that the court had rendered a take-nothing judgment against Capital.” Tex.R.App.P. 74(f). However, it is equally clear that Capital has not asserted by motion for new trial, or otherwise, what addi*86tional exhibits or testimony it sought but was not allowed to offer.
The court’s docket sheet entry for November 26, 1990, states that “upon review of evidence, find as a matter of law no duty to defend under insurance policy; therefore, judgment for [defendant Commonwealth Title], costs of court (not atty fees) assessed against [plaintiff Capital].” (Emphasis added.) On November 27, 1990, the trial judge entered judgment as follows:
On November 14, 1990, this case came on for trial on the merits. The Plaintiff appeared in person and by its attorney, and the Defendants appeared by and through their attorney, and all parties announced ready for trial. The plaintiff introduced its evidence. The Court thereupon called for trial briefs on the question of whether the Defendants had a duty to defend, which were timely tendered by all parties. The Court, having considered the evidence, the law, and the arguments of counsel, finds that neither Defendant had a duty to defend. It is, therefore,
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Capital Bank take nothing by its suit against Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company and Commonwealth Land Title Company of Houston, and it is further
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that all costs of suit are hereby taxed against Capital Bank.
All relief not hereby granted is denied. This is a final judgment.
SIGNED this 27th day of November, 1990.
(Emphasis added.)
The dissent concludes that no trial took place at all, and that the proceeding shown in the statement of facts was a pretrial hearing only. The dissent appears to base this conclusion on three factors, none of which are urged by appellant: (1) the title affixed to the statement of facts; (2) the fact that there were pretrial motions not yet ruled upon when the parties announced ready for trial and the trial began; (3) plaintiffs evidence, although admitted for all purposes, was admitted “subject to [defendant’s motion to] disregard.”
We note that the title and memorialization pages at the front of the statement of facts refer to “Motions,” rather than “trial,” and recite that the “cause came on for motions.” Further, the official court reporter’s certificate page at the end of the proceeding recites that “the foregoing is a true and complete transcription of the Pre-Trial Motions as set out therein.” (Emphasis added.) However, just as we have found erroneous and conflicting dates in the statement of facts, as discussed in footnote two, so do we find the court reporter’s designation of the proceeding itself to be in error. The text of the statement of facts shows that the parties both announced ready for trial and appellant, as plaintiff, introduced evidence.
A bench trial, once begun, does not cease to be a trial in progress simply because pretrial motions may not yet have been ruled on. Neither does the trial court’s admission of evidence subject to an opponent’s motion to disregard affect the status of the trial. The exhibits admitted “for all purposes” were plaintiff Capital’s evidence, and defendant Commonwealth made no motion to disregard them — indeed, Commonwealth relied upon them as well. Finally, Capital’s admitted exhibits encompassed the totality of Capital’s plaintiffs case, and are not referable to any of Capital’s pretrial motions. Obviously none of Capital’s pretrial motions sought to bar introduction of Capital’s own exhibits.
Capital’s presentation of evidence and lack of opportunity to “rest its case”
Capital has phrased its point of error in terms found in a series of decisions reversing and remanding judgments and stating that the trial court cannot render judgment until a party has “had an opportunity to present evidence and rest its case.” Producer’s Constr. Co. v. Muegge, 669 S.W.2d 717, 719 (Tex.1984). Safway Scaffold Co. v. Safway Steel Products, 570 S.W.2d 225, 229 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, writ refd n.r.e.); see also Oertel v. Gulf States Abrasive Mfg., Inc., 429 S.W.2d 623, 624 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1968, no writ) (“The rules do not authorize the trial court to render a judgment against the defendant in an action before he has had an opportunity to *87present his defense and has rested his case.”).
In each of these decisions, the words “and rest its case” are dicta. Each case involved a procedural situation in which the complaining party was not allowed to present any evidence. Producer’s Constr. Co., 669 S.W.2d at 719 (“The partial statement of facts [which the supreme court held sufficient] and the judgment show that Producer’s was not given an opportunity to present its defense and evidence in support of its counterclaims.”); Safway, 570 S.W.2d at 229 (“The judgment and the statement of facts clearly show that the trial court did not allow the appellant to present any evidence at the trial ...”). In the case before us, by contrast, nothing in the statement of facts, or in Capital’s motion for new trial or appellate brief, indicates that Capital did not offer all the evidence it sought to introduce.
Nothing in the relevant Texas Rules of Civil Procedure speak of “resting” a case. Rule 262 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure states that the rules governing jury trials shall govern nonjury trials “in so far as applicable.” Rule 2653 specifies the order of proceeding in jury trials, and never speaks of a party “resting.” Of its seven subparts, 265(b) is the only subsection of the rule applicable to a nonjury trial such as the one before us. Here, defendant has presented no evidence [rules 265(a), (e), and (d) ], there are no “intervenors and other parties” [rule 265(e), (f) ], and the evidence consists entirely of plaintiffs documentary exhibits admits ted before the trial court without live witnesses, such that cross-examination might be required [rule 265(g) ]. Rule 265(b), the only applicable subsection, provides that “[t]he party upon whom rests the burden of proof on the whole case shall then [after making its opening statement] introduce his evidence”; Capital has done so.
Although the word “rest” or the phrase “rests its case” does not appear in rule 265, the rule is nevertheless clear that each party must be allowed to introduce its evidence [rules 265(b), (d), (e) ], cross-examine opposing witnesses [rule 265(c) ], and present rebuttal evidence [rule 265(1)]. Defense evidence, cross-examination, live witnesses, in-tervenors or third parties, and rebuttal evidence were not involved in the case before us. Capital, as plaintiff, introduced the controlling documentary evidence in its suit arising from Commonwealth’s refusal to defend; Commonwealth, as defendant, introduced no evidence.
The insurer’s duty to defend
In ascertaining the scope of an insurer’s duty to defend, courts should look to the language of the policy and the allegations in the complaint against the insured. Fidelity & Guaranty Underwriters v. McManus, 683 S.W.2d 787, 788 (Tex.1982); Feed Store, Inc. v. Reliance Insurance Co., 774 S.W.2d 73, 74 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ denied). As stated in American Alliance Ins. v. Frito-Lay, 788 S.W.2d 152, 153-54 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied):
Texas courts follow the “Eight Corners” or “Complaint Allegation” rule when determining the duty to defend action. This rule requires the trier of fact to examine only the allegations in the complaint and *88the insurance policy in determining whether a duty to defend exists. The duty to defend is not affected by facts ascertained before suit, developed in the process of litigation, or by the ultimate outcome of the suit.
788 S.W.2d at 154 (citations omitted).
Under this analysis the court cannot consider anything outside (a) the policy and (b) the pleadings. Feed Store, Inc., 774 S.W.2d at 74. The effect of this “eight corners rule” is to minimize uncertainty in assessing a liability insurer’s duty, as well as to favor the insured in cases where the merits of the action may be questionable. Feed Store, Inc., 774 S.W.2d at 75.
The policy and the allegations in the adversary proceeding against Capital
In determining that Commonwealth had no duty to defend, the trial court had among Capital’s admitted exhibits both (1) the title insurance policy Commonwealth issued to Capital (plaintiffs exhibit number five) and (2) the adversary pleading containing the allegations against Capital that Commonwealth was called on, under the policy, to defend (plaintiffs exhibit number 19). The title policy stated in pertinent part that Commonwealth, as insurer:
will pay to the Insured ... all loss or damage not exceeding the amount stated ... which the Insured ... may sustain or suffer by reason of the failure of, defects in, encumbrances upon, or liens ... against the title of the mortgagors or grantors ... existing at or prior to the date of this policy ...
This policy does not insure against loss or damage by reason of defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims, or other matters (a) created, suffered, assumed or agreed to by the insured claimant; (b) not known to the Company and not shown by the public records but known to the Insured claimant either at Date of Policy or at the date such claimant acquired the insured mortgage and not disclosed in writing by the Insured claimant to the Company prior to the Date such insured claimant became an Insured hereunder; (c) resulting in no loss or damage to the insured claimant; or (d) attaching or created subsequent to Date of Policy
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(Emphasis added.)
Capital’s live pleadings alleged that Capital foreclosed on the insured property; that Capital thereafter sold the property to James C. Motley; and that Capital was later sued in an adversary proceeding that arose out of the bankruptcy proceedings of the, party Capital had foreclosed on earlier. Capital further pled that Commonwealth provided guidance in the matter but refused to formally accept the defense of the adversary proceedings or pay attorney fees reasonably incurred for defense services.
Under the “eight corners” doctrine, the trial court was restricted to considering only the pleadings and the policy. Feed Store, Inc., 774 S.W.2d at 74. The trial court could determine from the pleadings and the policy that Capital’s alleged causes of action against Commonwealth arose as a result of Capital’s foreclosure on the insured property. The foreclosure and resulting adversary proceeding occurred after the policy date. The policy expressly excludes coverage for subsequent events. Therefore, Capital’s own pleadings and exhibits showed as a matter of law that Commonwealth Title had no duty to defend.
After hearing both parties and receiving all the evidence Capital offered, the trial judge determined that the threshold issue was whether Commonwealth had a duty to defend under the title insurance policy. He instructed both parties to file trial briefs on this issue, recessed, and set the issue for argument. After reviewing the briefs and examining Capital’s exhibits in evidence, he found that, as a matter of law, Commonwealth had no duty to defend.
We overrule appellant’s point of error.
The judgment is affirmed.
. Although the docket sheet shows that a jury fee was paid, jury trial was apparently waived; no point of error and no statement in appellant’s brief complains that appellant was denied a jury trial. The dissent concludes that Capital received no trial at all, either jury or non-jury.
. Both the trial judge’s statements of dates in this quotation and the court reporter’s recording of pertinent dates in the statement of facts are, at various points, obviously in error. The court reporter recites at the beginning of the statement of facts that the proceeding took place on November 11, 1990, a date which we judicially notice was a Sunday. Tex.RXiv.Evid. 201(c). The court reporter’s certification, 35 pages later, states the proceedings took place on November 16, 1990, which was a Friday. The judgment entered shows the proceedings took place on November 14, 1990, a Wednesday. Assuming the proceeding took place on Wednesday, November 14, 1990, or Friday, November 16, 1990, the "next Wednesday," the date by which the judge ordered the parties "to submit short briefs,” was November 21, 1990, not "next Wednesday, the 1st.” No 1st day of a month in 1990 was on a Wednesday, except in August.
. Rule 265. ORDER OF PROCEEDINGS ON TRIAL BY JURY
The trial of cases before a jury shall proceed in the following order unless the court should, for good cause stated in the record, otherwise direct:
(a) The party upon whom rests the burden of proof on Ae whole case shall state to the jury briefly Ae nature of his claim or defense and what said party expects to prove and Ae relief sought. Immediately Aereafter, Ae adverse party may make a similar statement, and intervenors and oAer parties will be accorded similar rights in Ae order determined by. Ae court.
(b) The party upon whom rests Ae burden of proof on Ae whole case shall Aen introduce his evidence.
(c) The adverse party shall briefly state the nature of his claim or defense and what said party expects to prove and Ae relief sought unless he has already done so.
(d) He shall Aen introduce his evidence.
(e) The intervenor and oAer parties shall make Aeir statement, unless Aey have already done so, and shall introduce Aeir evidence.
(f) The parties shall Aen be confined to rebutting testimony on each side.
(g) But one counsel on each side shall examine and cross-examine Ae same witness, except on leave granted. (Emphasis added.)