dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I disagree with the majority’s holding that no verbal exchange occurred at the November 14, 1990 meeting. Under the 1987 amendments to the Texas Open Meetings Act1 (TOMA), the DISD2 *540Board of Trustees (the Board) was required to open the meeting to the public.
To reach the majority’s result, unnecessary emphasis is placed upon Webster’s definition of the term “verbal exchange.” Because the legislature chose not to define the term, we are to give it its ordinary meaning. See Tex.Gov’t Code Ann. § 312.002 (Vernon 1988); Hopkins v. Spñng I.S.D., 736 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Tex.1987); Estate of Padilla v. Charter Oaks, 843 S.W.2d 196, 198 (Tex. App. — Dallas 1992, writ denied). An ordinary meaning is not limited to only those definitions contained in secondary authorities such as WebsteR’s Third New International Dictionary. Common sense also goes a long way in assisting us.
However, even using Webster’s own language, the definition of “verbal” includes “of or relating to words, consisting in or having to do with words, spoken rather than written words.” The definition of “exchange” includes “giving [a thing] and receiving [a thing in return,]” “[such] as words.” Using these definitions from the majority opinion, common sense satisfies me that the act of listening on the part of the Board — the reception of the words from the TEA3 representative — was sufficient to constitute a “verbal exchange” required for “deliberation” by article 6252-17 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes. See Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6252-17 (Vernon Supp.1993).
Further, a review of the record shows that Board member Yvonne Ewell questioned TEA representative Walter Chandler about the format of the TEA presentation. TEA representative Larry Garcia also testified that several Board members spoke at the meeting, but before he began his presentation. Even with this evidence before it, the trial court concluded that the meeting was not a “meeting” as defined by TOMA because no verbal exchange occurred between a quorum of the Board members or between a quorum of the members and any other person. The majority’s definition of “verbal exchange” and its narrow application to the facts here would allow the Board to close any presentation before it, regardless of what occurs before or after a “presentation.” I believe that the interaction between the board and the TEA representatives was sufficient to bring the meeting within the definitions set forth in article 6252-17. See art. 6252-17. The “verbal exchange” between the Board and the TEA representatives occurred before Garcia’s formal presentation began; however, article 6252-17 only specifies that a “ ‘meeting’ means any deliberation between ... a quorum of members of a governmental body and any other person, at which any public business or public policy over which the governmental body has supervision or control is discussed or considered. ...” See art. 6252-17, § 1(a).
The topic of the meeting between the Board and the TEA representatives was accreditation of the DISD. There is no dispute that this is an area that the Board supervises and over which the TEA has control. See art. 6252-17, § 1(a). There is also no dispute that Ewell asked Chandler a question regarding the format of the presentation. I believe that this is “a reciprocal giving and receiving of spoken words” as the majority has defined the term “verbal exchange.” See Majority Opinion at 537. There is no specification in TOMA that the “verbal exchange” must occur at a particular time during a presentation. Nor does TOMA state that the exchange must occur regarding a particular substantive area of a presentation.
In addition, the majority incorrectly concludes that Attorney General Opinion DM-191 erroneously construed the amended version of TOMA. That attorney general opinion quite properly concluded that the Board’s silence is irrelevant in deciding whether or not a meeting was held in violation of the Act. See Op.Tex.Att’y Gen. No. DM-191 at 3 (1992).
Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court’s judgment and render judgment for the Dallas Morning News.
. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6252-17 (Vernon Supp.1993).
. Dallas Independent School District.
. Texas Education Agency.