(dissenting).
We first consider SDCL 16-19-31, which provides, inter alia:
The license to practice law in this state is a continuing proclamation by the Supreme Court that the holder is fit to be entrusted with professional and judicial matters, and to aid in the administration of justice as an attorney and as an officer of the court.
Considering this admonition, it is our duty to disbar Tidball. It is noted that Tidball’s conduct has been a serious violation of professional ethics, which would cause the maintenance of respect for the courts and *858judges, and the respectability of the legal profession, to greatly suffer. Matter of Walker, 254 N.W.2d 452, 455 (S.D.1977); In re Kunkel, 88 S.D. 269, 218 N.W.2d 521 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1036, 95 S.Ct. 521, 42 L.Ed.2d 312 (1974). As detailed below, not only has the legal profession suffered, his clients have also suffered.
Tidball has admitted to using his clients' funds without permission. This conduct began November 30, 1989, and ended in the middle of December, 1992. He commingled his clients’ funds with his own funds in violation of Rule of Professional Conduct 1.15(a). According to Tidball, he kept a sizeable amount of his clients’ money in a vault in his office to avoid his personal creditors from garnishee proceedings on a trust account. Therefore, he established no trust account to avoid garnishment. We strongly disapproved of ethical misconduct in Matter of Pier, 472 N.W.2d 916, 917 (S.D.1991) and disbarred Pier. Like Pier, Tidball used his clients’ funds. Tidball’s misuse of his clients’ funds was a serious ethical breach.
An admission has been made by Tidball that he did not promptly remit funds of his client, one Glenda Hall, unto her whereupon she filed a complaint with the South Dakota State Bar. This constitutes a violation of 1.15(d)(2)(d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Hall filed a complaint against Tidball for mishandling and wrongfully appropriating to his own use certain settlement funds in a divorce action. A dispute arose over Tid-ball’s attorney fee. Tidball took $2,500.00 as his fee out of a $10,000.00 partial settlement she received in the case, without her permission. She maintained she authorized a sum which was not to exceed $1,000.00. Knowing a dispute existed, he failed to separate the disputed amount in a separate account. He had no writing with Hall concerning his fee and he commingled his money with her money. Repeated demands for money held in trust for Hall produced no positive response by Tidball. Rule 1.15(c) provides: “... if a dispute arises concerning their respective interests, the portion in dispute shall be kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved.”
Patricia Marshall, another client of Tid-ball’s, also complained of his professional misconduct in representing her in a wrongful death case. A contingent fee contract was drawn whereby Tidball was entitled to twenty-five percent of the recovery if no trial ensued. No trial ensued. We should adopt these findings of the Disciplinary Board:
XXIV.
The Board finds as fact that the Respondent during December 1989 paid himself in lieu of fees $8,382.00 from the sum of $10,331.55 received, without consent of either the client or the court which sum was not earned nor due.
XXV.
The Board finds as fact that the Respondent failed to properly pay to his client the trust funds received on behalf of his client although requested to do so numerous times by the client and the client’s new attorney as early as February 19, 1992 through December 15, 1992.
XXVI.
The Board finds as fact that the records kept by the Respondent of funds received on behalf of his client, Patsy Marshall, were woefully inadequate.
XXVII.
The Board finds as fact that the Respondent has now paid Patsy Marshall the funds due her but not the interest thereon for late payment.
Tidball’s conduct, as reflected above, adversely reflects upon his integrity, competency, and fitness to practice law. In re Parker, 269 N.W.2d 779, 780 (S.D.1978).
Lastly, we should examine Tidball’s attitude towards the complaints made against him and his failure to respond to the Disciplinary Board. The record reflects that Tidball repeatedly failed to respond to the lawful demands of said Board. Further*859more, and additionally, process was served upon him by his admission of service, to produce client ledgers and provide records. These particular demands were initiated by the Board on November 14, 1991. After repeated notices to comply with the Subpoena Duces Tecum, finally in January, 1992, Tidball responded. This conduct was indifference at best. We have repeatedly denounced such non-action. It is a violation of Rule 8.1(b) and prior Supreme Court pronouncements. In re Rude, 88 S.D. 416, 221 N.W.2d 43 (1974). It constitutes grounds for disbarment in this state. We cannot tolerate nor condone a lawyer who has complaints filed against him to disregard a lawful demand to answer the complaints. Were we to do so, the entire ethical machinery of the legal profession would disintegrate. Such type of conduct, if excused, would cripple the legal profession in its duty to police the profession and protect the public. See Discipline of Kirby, 336 N.W.2d 378, 380 (S.D.1983).
Tidball’s alcoholism is a mitigating factor but is not a defense to his many ethical breaches. Walker, 254 N.W.2d at 457. Only after it was apparent that Tidball would suffer severe sanctions, did he turn himself into Ft. Meade, South Dakota, as an alcoholic. His rectification and remorse came at the eleventh hour. To use his clients’ money, to lock his clients’ money up in a safe to avoid his own creditors, to fail to have a trust account, to commingle his funds with those of his clients, to wrongfully appropriate money within a settlement is activity disrespecting the office of an Attorney At Law. And this profession, above and beyond that rebuke, owes a greater duty to protect the public in the future from such wrongdoing. Walker at 455. Matter of Discipline of Bergren, 455 N.W.2d 856, 857 (S.D.1990).