(dissenting).
This suit is an attempt by the Parish of Jefferson to block the Louisiana Department of Correction’s purchase of the site and facilities of the Plouse of the Good Shepherd in Jefferson Parish for use as a juvenile training institution. The trial court held that Act No. 452 of 1970, which authorized the department’s purchase and use of the site and facilities, was unconstitutional, and also held two other statutes unconstitutional in certain respects.
The majority of this court on original hearing and on rehearing has reversed the trial court by declaring all three acts constitutional in whole or in part. Act No. 192 of 1968 (R.S. 15:821-839); Act No. 353 of 1970 (R.S. 15:901-907); Act No. 452 of 1970. The majority has determined: “The parish sues to assert its right. That right is a right to enjoin the violation of its zoning ordinance.” The majority has correctly decided the only issue for our determination — that is, whether the defendant’s use of the property as a juvenile training facility would entail a violation of the parish’s zoning ordinances. It has held that the purchase under color of. any statute would not result in a zoning violation since the proposed use of the property would be a continuation of a previous nonconforming use. This is the threshold question. It puts to rest on non-constitutional grounds the only justiciable issue raised by the Parish of Jefferson, and *1119therefore a consideration of the constitutionality of the statutes should have been pretermitted.
It is a universally accepted principle of law that courts will not pass on the constitutionality of an act of the Legislature if the merits of the issue presented may be determined and disposed of on other grounds. Courts do not have the power to question, review, and pass judgment on the constitutionality of legislative enactments except when a decision on the constitutionality of statutes is necessary to determine a justiciable controversy.
“ * * * It is a matter of common occurrence — indeed, it is almost the undeviating rule of the courts, both state and federal — not to decide constitutional questions until the necessity for such decision arises in the record before the court. This court has followed that practice from the foundation of the government * * Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284, 18 S.Ct. 323, 42 L.Ed. 748; Arkansas F. Oil Co. v. Louisiana ex rel. Muslow, 304 U.S. 197, 58 S.Ct. 832, 82 L.Ed. 1287.
“This Court has said repeatedly that it ought not pass on the constitutionality of an act of Congress unless such adjudication is unavoidable. This is true even though the question is properly presented by the record. If two questions are raised, one of non-constitutional and the other of constitutional nature, and a decision of .the non-constitutional question would make unnecessary a decision of the constitutional question, the former will be decided. * * ” Alma Motor Co. v. Timken-Detroit Axle Co., 329 U.S. 129, 67 S.Ct. 231, 91 L.Ed. 128. See also Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, 9 L.Ed. 773; Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 75 S.Ct. 790, 99 L.Ed. 1129.
“ * * * This non-constitutional issue must be met at the outset, because the case must be decided on a non-constitutional issue, if the record calls for it, without reaching constitutional problems. * * * ” Communist Party of U. S. A. v. Subversive A. C. Bd., 351 U.S. 115, 76 S.Ct. 663, 100 L.Ed. 1003. See also 16 Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law §§ 111, 113; 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law §§ 92, 94, and the numerous cases cited in footnotes 56 and 57, pp. 317-321.
Like the United States Supreme Court, our Louisiana courts have followed this rule of restraint from earliest times. Ranger v. New Orleans and New Orleans, etc., Co., Man.Unr.Cas. 176; Parish of St. Landry v. Stout, 32 La.Ann. 1278; State v. Coulon, 197 La. 1058, 3 So.2d 241; Dowling v. Orleans Parish Democratic Committee, 235 La. 62, 102 So.2d 755; Aucoin v. Dunn, 255 La. 823, 233 So.2d 530.
The constitutional issues presented here are not germane to a determination of the zoning rights of Jefferson Parish. They *1121are side issues which become moot upon a determination of the non-constitutional question.
On original hearing the majority of this court failed to note and pass upon whether the Parish of Jefferson had a right of action to question the constitutionality of the statutes. See the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Tate and my dissenting opinion. I noted in that dissent this court’s apparent feeling of urgency to adjudicate the constitutionality of these statutes. The majority persists in its attempt to reach that issue.
Since we can and must dispose of the •only complaint of the plaintiff on a non-constitutional ground and since we are mandated to then desist from passing upon the constitutional questions, the remainder of the opinion is dicta.
The majority in a final attempt to justify its reaching the constitutional questions has stated that since the trial court declared the statutes unconstitutional, we must pass upon their constitutionality. This is totally without merit. The right of appeal from a decision declaring a law unconstitutional does not dictate that we must reach the constitutional issue. If this court decides the case before it on the proper ground and dismisses plaintiff’s action, the trial court’s judgment is of no effect, and its decision of unconstitutionality falls just as effectively as if this court should say that the statutes are constitutional.
I could concur in the decree of dismissal, but since that decree is based in part on a judgment on the constitutionality of the statutes, I must dissent for the reasons assigned in my dissent on original hearing and those here expressed.