dissenting;.
I respectfully dissent. It is undisputed that there has been a prior adjudication on the merits that Derrick Warren (“Insured”), the policyowner, has no coverage for the claims asserted against him by Melba Wilkes and Rodney Butler (“Plaintiffs”). Inasmuch as Plaintiffs’ rights to recover on the policy are wholly derivitive of Insured’s, they likewise must be barred from recovery under the policy. To hold otherwise is to hold that a third party beneficiary of an insurance policy can nonetheless collect even when it is undisputed that the policyholder could not collect if he paid the full amount of the judgment and sought reimbursement.
The relevant facts are essentially undis- ' puted. In 1991, Insured and Ms. Wilkes began a significant personal relationship. When they met, Ms. Wilkes already had two children, Rhonda and Rhoneshia Butler, who were then approximately fifteen months old and six months old respectively. By 1993, Ms. Wilkes and Insured had two children together, Derrick and Deric-ka.
Prior to 1996, Ms. Wilkes (with her four children) and Insured lived in separate residences. In 1996, Insured bought a house in St. Louis County. Shortly thereafter, Insured, Ms. Wilkes and all four children moved into this residence. In March 1996, Insured obtained a homeowner’s insurance policy for the residence from Insurer. Derrick Warren was the only “named insured” on the policy.
On November 27, 1997, all four children were left in the home with Ms. Wilkes’ uncle while Insured and Ms. Wilkes were *124out. A fire broke out, tragically killing all four children.
It is undisputed that the homeowner’s policy originally procured by Insured in March 1996 was in effect on the date of the fire. The policy provides in the section entitled Definitions that “in this policy, ‘you’ and ‘your’ refer to the ‘named insured’ shown in the Declarations and the spouse if a resident of the same household. ‘We’, ‘us’ and ‘our’ refer to the Company providing this insurance.” In addition, certain words and phrases are defined as follows:
2. Bodily Injury means bodily harm, sickness or disease including required care, loss of services and death that results.
4. Insured means you and the residents of your household who are:
a. your relatives; or
b. other persons under the age of 21 and in the care of any person named above.
With respect to liability coverage, the policy provided, in pertinent part: Coverage E — Personal Liability If a claim is made or a suit is brought against an insured for damages because of bodily injury or property damage caused by an occurrence to which this coverage applies, we will:
1. pay up to our limit of liability for the damages for which an insured is legally liable ...
2. provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our choice, even if the suit is groundless, false or fraudulent. We may investigate and settle any claim or suit that we decide is appropriate. Our duty to settle or defend ends when the amount we pay or tender for damages resulting from the occurrence equals our limits of liability.
The policy also contained the following exclusions:
2. Coverage E — Personal Liability, does not apply to:
f. bodily injury to you or any insured within the meaning of part a. or b. of insured as defined.
In May 1998, Ms. Wilkes filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Insured for the deaths of Rhoneshia and Rhonda Butler in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County. Rodney Butler later joined in this lawsuit. Plaintiffs claimed that the deaths of the two children were caused by Insured’s negligence when he left the stove on when leaving the house with her. Insured sought defense and indemnity under his homeowner’s insurance policy from Insurer. Insurer defended Insured under a reservation of rights.
In December 1998, Insurer filed a declaratory judgment action against Insured in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. Insurer asserted that the household exclusion in Insured’s policy barred coverage for Rhones-hia and Rhonda’s deaths because they were “insureds” under the policy. Specifically, Insurer asserted that Rhoneshia and Rhonda were residents of Insured’s household who were under the age of twenty-one and in the care of Insured.
While the declaratory judgment suit was pending, in March 1999, Insured terminated the attorney retained by Insurer and proceeded with his own counsel. He then entered into an agreement with Plaintiffs pursuant to Section 637.065 RSMo 2000.1 Under the agreement, Insured admitted liability for the deaths of Plaintiffs’ children. In exchange, Plaintiffs agreed to limit any recovery on their wrongful death *125claim to the proceeds of Insured’s homeowner’s policy issued by Insurer.
In May 1999, one of Insurer’s counsel contacted Plaintiffs’ counsel to discuss the declaratory judgment action pending in federal court. Insurer’s counsel informed Plaintiffs’ counsel that Insurer would not object if Ms. Wilkes sought to intervene in the declaratory judgment action. Plaintiffs’ counsel indicated he had no intention of intervening in the declaratory judgment action pending in federal court.
On August 2, 1999, the Circuit Court of St. Louis County held a hearing on damages and fault in Plaintiffs’ wrongful death lawsuit. Insured waived his right to a jury trial and to cross-examine witnesses. The court found that Insured was at fault for the children’s deaths. Judgment was entered in Plaintiffs’ favor and against Insured in the sum of $300,000 for Rhonda’s death and $800,000 for Rhoneshia’s death.
Later in August 1999, Insurer and Insured filed cross motions for summary judgment in the declaratory judgment action pending in federal court. In November 1999, the District Court2 granted Insurer’s motion, holding that the children were “insureds” within the meaning of the household exclusion clause set forth in the policy. Following the analysis set forth in American Family Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wemhoff, 972 S.W.2d 402, 404-05 (Mo.App.1998), the District Court held that the phrase “in the care of’ as it pertained to Insured’s relationship with Rhonda and Rhoneshia was not ambiguous. The District Court noted that the children had lived with Insured for over a year. He had provided them with health insurance, listed them as beneficiaries on his life insurance, supervised their activities as necessary, disciplined them, and otherwise presented himself as a father figure. Under such circumstances, the District Court held that the children were in the care of Insured at the time of the fire and the household exclusion was therefore applicable. Accordingly, the District Court held that the homeowner’s policy issued by Insurer provided no coverage to Insured for the wrongful death claims brought by Plaintiffs.
In April 2000, Plaintiffs filed the underlying equitable garnishment action pursuant to Section 379.2003 against Insurer and Insured in the Circuit Court for the City of St. Louis. Plaintiffs sought to satisfy the judgment against Insured from the proceeds of the homeowner’s policy. Insurer moved for summary judgment based on the judgment entered in the District Court in November 1999. Insurer argued that Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel because Plaintiffs’ rights were derivative of Insured’s under the policy and the District Court had held that the household exclusion barred coverage. Plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, claiming that collateral estoppel did not apply because they were not parties to the federal action and were not in privity with Insured. They further claimed there was coverage under the policy to satisfy their judgment against Insured.
The trial court denied Insurer’s motion and granted Plaintiffs’ motion. The court entered judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor and against Insurer in the sum of $300,000, which was the per occurrence limit of cov*126erage under the policy. Insurer now appeals.
In its sole point for review, Insurer argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Plaintiffs on the existence of insurance coverage under the homeowner’s policy because the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars Plaintiffs’ claim. Insurer claims that the declaratory judgment in the District Court was on the merits and that the coverage issues decided in the federal action were identical to the coverage issues in Plaintiffs’ equitable garnishment action. Insurer also argues that privity exists between Plaintiffs and Insured, and that Plaintiffs had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the coverage issues in the federal action.
Collateral estoppel is defined as issue preclusion and it precludes the same parties or their privies from relitigating issues that have been previously litigated. Hangley v. American Family, 872 S.W.2d 544, 547 (Mo.App.1994). In deciding whether to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel, we must consider: (1) whether the issue decided in the prior adjudication was identical with the issue presented in the present action; (2) whether the prior adjudication resulted in a judgment on the merits; (3) whether the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and (4) whether the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior suit. Hayes v. United Fire & Casualty Co., 3 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Mo.App.1999).
Plaintiffs concede that the issue decided in the federal court is identical to the issue in the present case. The second issue is whether the prior adjudication resulted in a judgment on the merits. This court has defined a judgment on the merits as “one rendered after argument and investigation and when it is determined which party is in the right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or technical point, or by default, and without trial.” Laususe v. Normandy Osteopathic Hosp., 918 S.W.2d 953, 956 (Mo.App.1996). Plaintiffs initially concede that for purposes of the Laususe standard, the judgment was on the merits. However, Plaintiffs then argue that the federal judgment was not on the merits to the extent that all interested parties were not joined in the case. Plaintiffs claim that the judgment was without any effect upon their rights because Insurer failed to join them in the action, as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 57. Therefore, Plaintiffs assert that the federal judgment was little more than an advisory opinion between Insurer and Insured. We disagree.
Plaintiffs rely on the advisory committee notes to Rule 57 which state that “all parties having an interest therein or adversely affected must be made parties or be cited.” However, the Eighth Circuit has held:
Nevertheless, the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act contains no express requirement that all interested parties must be joined, and we think there is no language in the act from which such a requirement could be implied.... If Congress intended that a declaratory judgment should only be entered in a case after all interested parties had been joined, it is fair to assume that it would have inserted in the act a provision to that effect. Not having done so, this court does not feel justified in imposing any such condition upon the maintenance of this statutory proceeding.
Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Beverforden, 93 F.2d 166, 168 (8th Cir.1937). See also Alpers Jobbing Co. Inc. v. Northland Casualty Co., 173 F.R.D. 517, 519 (E.D.Mo.1997) (If a person is not a party *127to the contract in litigation and has no rights or obligations under that contract, he will not be regarded as an indispensable party in a suit to determine obligations under the disputed contract, even though he may have obligated himself to abide by the result of the pending action by another contract that is not at issue).
Plaintiffs cite Automobile Club Inter-Ins. Ex. v. Nygren, 975 S.W.2d 235 (Mo.App.1998), for the proposition that when an indispensable party to a declaratory judgment is not joined in the case, any judgment rendered in that party’s absence is a nullity. Nygren is distinguishable for two reasons. First, it involved a declaratory judgment in Missouri, not federal court. Second, the court reversed the judgment because the insurer, which issued the policy that was the subject of the trial court’s coverage declarations, was not a party to the lawsuit. In the federal action, all parties to the policy were before the court.
Moreover, in the instant case, Insured specifically raised the issue of whether Ms. Wilkes was a necessary party to the declaratory judgment action in the District Court. The District Court held that Ms. Wilkes was not a necessary party because her interests were identical to and fully represented by Insured. In their brief, Plaintiffs advance various arguments why this finding was error, urging that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to proceed despite its express finding to the contrary. However, neither this court nor the trial court has any authority to rule on the federal court’s jurisdiction and the federal court’s decision with respect to its jurisdiction, and any other matter submitted for its determination, is exclusive and conclusive. Craig v. Missouri Department of Health, 80 S.W.3d 457, 460 (Mo. banc 2002) (citing Dale v. Hardy, 835 S.W.2d 444, 447 (Mo.App.1992)).
Plaintiffs nevertheless urge that Insured could not adequately represent their interests because he was shielded from liability by his section 537.065 agreement with Plaintiffs. However, the agreement clearly provided that Warren “do such further acts consistent with the intent and purpose of this Agreement.” The intent and purpose of the agreement was that Warren admit liability and Plaintiffs would limit their recovery to his policy with Defendant. Therefore, Warren had in effect contracted to adequately represent Plaintiffs.4 The record reflects that he hired counsel and fully litigated the coverage issue in federal court. Plaintiffs have not identified any evidence or legal arguments Insured failed to advance in the District Court and specifically declined the opportunity to intervene and advance any additional arguments they wanted considered. The District Court judgment was a judgment on the merits.
The third issue is whether the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication. Plaintiffs argue that whether there is privity is irrelevant because there is no privity analysis with declaratory judgments. Plaintiffs cite no authority for this proposition. The Missouri Supreme Court has held that a judgment creditor seeking to garnish the proceeds of a homeowner’s insurance policy is, as a matter of law, in privity with the insured. James v. Paul, 49 S.W.3d 678, 683-84 (Mo. banc 2001). This is because the judgment creditor is a third party beneficiary of the contract between the insurer and the insured. Id. at 683. The judgment creditor stands in the shoes of *128the insured and has rights no greater and no less than the insured’s rights would have been if the insured paid the judgment and then sought reimbursement. Id. Plaintiffs are clearly in privity with Insured.
The fourth and final issue is whether the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior suit. Again, James is instructive. James held:
The “full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first suit” is not a second layer of privity analysis under which only those in privity who had actual notice and an opportunity to intervene may be bound by a prior adjudication. Rather, it is a shorthand description of the analysis required to determine if non-mutual collateral estoppel should be applied.
49 S.W.3d at 684. In determining whether collateral estoppel will apply, we must consider whether the doctrine is being applied offensively or defensively. Id. at 685. Defensive collateral estoppel involves a defendant who invokes the doctrine to prevent a plaintiff from relitigating a fact decided against it in an earlier litigation that is necessary for the plaintiff to establish and carry his or her burden of proof. Id. That is exactly the case here. Defendant is invoking the doctrine to prevent Plaintiffs from recovering under Warren’s policy after it was already determined in federal court that Warren did not have coverage. Had the District Court’s judgment been in favor of Insured, Plaintiffs would clearly have been entitled to establish the existence of coverage by collateral estoppel. They should not be allowed to sit on the sidelines and take advantage of a judgment establishing coverage but ignore one that precludes coverage. Finally, failure to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel would afford Plaintiff rights greater than Insured would have if he paid the judgment and sought reimbursement, a result the Missouri Supreme Court characterized in James as “irrational.” Plaintiffs had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior suit.
The trial court erred in holding that Plaintiffs negated Insurer’s defense of collateral estoppel. Accordingly, the summary judgment entered in favor of Plaintiffs should be reversed.
. Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to RSMo 2000.
. The Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, Sr., Senior United States District Judge.
. Section 379.200 permits a judgment creditor to proceed in equity against the defendant and the insurance company to reach and apply insurance money to the satisfaction of the judgment.
. Insured also maintained a close relationship with Ms. Wilkes, with whom he had an additional child during the pendency of this litigation.