I concur with the majority opinion except the reversal of the punitive damages. I dissent from that reversal and would affirm the punitive damages.
The majority opinion goes to great lengths to discuss cases which this appeal is like, and cases which this appeal is not like; however, one previous opinion of this court is disposi-tive of this appeal. In the Country Roads case, the facts are very similar to the facts of this case, although the past history of the establishment is more egregious than in the current appeal. See Country Roads, Inc. v. Witt, 737 S.W.2d 362 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987). In Country Roads, a customer was, assaulted by an employee. The employer testified that the employees were “not to handle disturbances involving physical violence; in such a situation they were to summon a police officer.” Id. at 364. The assailant in Country Roads, like the assailant in this appeal, was the head doorman. The Country Roads “doorman” were instructed that their job was only to “monitor the patrons compliance with age restrictions and dress code.” In the present appeal, the assailant, Lewis, was only to monitor the patrons entering the club. However, the jury in Country Roads and the trial judge in Durand both apparently recognized the inherent duty of a doorman is to also be a part-time “bouncer”, in that he must either eject patrons from the club or prevent their entry into the club. Both acts, out of necessity, will frequently result in physical contact. In both cases the trier of facts found that the doorman was acting within the course and scope of his employment, that he assaulted the plaintiff, that the plaintiff was injured, that there was malice, and that such malice of the employee could be inferred to the employer in assessing punitive damages. Although there was more evidence in Country Roads of prior physical assaults, that alone was not determinative of the punitive issue.
The trial court, as the finder of fact, was in the best position to listen to the evidence and determine the credibility of the witnesses. Quite simply, the trial court could have disbelieved Durand’s testimony that the assault was outside the authority that he had given to Lewis. The court could have believed that Durand ratified and approved of the acts committed by Lewis by keeping him in his employment in the same capacity that he was in when he assaulted Michael Moore. The court could have also found that Lewis was a “manager” or a person with managerial power or duty when testimony was elicited that Lewis worked 18 hours a day. It is not common for employees below managerial level to work more than 8 hours a day on a regular basis. All of these facts would cer*205tainly corroborate the statements of Lewis that he was the “manager, the boss;” “this is my show;” “I am running this show;” “I’m the manager of this damn business.” The court could have also assessed the punitive damages by finding that Durand was reckless in employing Lewis who proved to be a violent and dangerous person. Durand did no background check on Lewis, failed to contact any of his prior employers, and failed to cheek to determine if he had a criminal record. Or, the court could have found that Lewis worked in a “managerial” capacity because he had sole authority to determine which customers would enter the club, and who could not. Finally, the court could have believed the testimony of Durand when he testified under oath that Lewis did not “operate outside the scope of his job duties that night.” Even though Durand followed his answer with an attempted explanation, the trial court simply could have believed his answer and disbelieved his explanation. The trier of fact is free to believe or disbelieve all or any part of any witnesses testimony. Miller v. Kendall, 804 S.W.2d 933, 939 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990).
It is not within the power of the court of appeals to second guess the finders of fact. “In reviewing factual sufficiency points, the court of appeals is not called on to summarily disregard evidence or to substitute its judgment for the [fact finders]. Rather, the court of appeals is called on to apply legal analysis to the evidence and avoid summary conclusions ...” (emphasis added). Lofton v. Texas Brine, 720 S.W.2d 804, 805 (Tex.1986). We should not disturb the judgment when there is some evidence of probative value to support the findings of the trial court. Lee-Wright, Inc. v. Hall, 840 S.W.2d 572 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ.) I would affirm the findings and judgment of the trial court.