dissenting.
I would not reach the last two issues because I believe the first issue is disposi-tive of the case. Section 44-04-19, N.D. C.C., as well as Section 5 of Article XI of the North Dakota Constitution require meetings of public bodies, including school boards, to be open to the public except as otherwise provided by law. It is conceded that no statute exists which permits a school board to meet in executive session to discuss the contemplated nonrenewal of a teacher’s contract. In Peters v. Bowman Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 231 N.W.2d 817 (N.D. *7851975), this court held that official action taken at an illegal meeting is void. Whether or not that principle was well established before that time, Peters firmly established the rule that executive sessions at which a discussion of the contemplated nonrenewal of a teacher’s contract takes place are illegal. The trial court recognized this principle and found that the nonrenewal of the teacher’s contract had been determined as a result of the secret meeting held by the school board on March 17 and that the meeting of March 24 was merely a pro forma ratification of the significant discussion had at the secret meeting. I agree with those findings and conclusions. The trial court proceeded to apply the remedy ordered by this court in Peters, i.e., that the school board should reconsider its action in determining to not renew Danroth’s contract at an open meeting; that if a decision to not renew was reached that Danroth be given notice of opportunity for hearing; and that because the dates specified for these proceedings under Sections 15-47-27 and 15-47-38 could not be met, the trial court established a new timetable.
Notwithstanding this court’s decision in Peters, I cannot agree that the school board has an opportunity, at this late date, to remedy the failure to give notice by April 1 as required by Section 15-47-38(5). Because the March 17 meeting was invalid and because the trial court determined that the motion made at the March 24 meeting to send a notice of contemplated nonrenewal was a result of an illegal meeting of the school board, it follows that the notice itself was invalid. The trial court so determined. However, Section 15-47-38 requires that a notice of contemplated nonrenewal be sent by April 1. If the notice is invalid, as the trial court determined, it is apparent that no valid notice was sent by April 1 as required by statute.
The remedy fashioned by this court in Peters may have been appropriate under the circumstances existing at that time, i.e., the issue of the legality of action taken at an open meeting as a result of discussion at an executive session had not previously been determined. However, since the Peters decision it is clear that an executive session with discussion followed by an open meeting at which pro forma action is taken is not permissible. I therefore do not agree that the remedy fashioned by this court in Peters should be extended beyond that case. Furthermore, the decision in Peters devotes little discussion to whether or not the remedy fashioned by the court was appropriate and cites no authority in support of the remedy.
This court has made it abundantly clear that failure to give the required statutory notice of contemplated nonrenewal constitutes an offer to renew the contract for the ensuing school year under the same terms and conditions as the contract for the current year. Pollock v. McKenzie County Public School Dist. #1, 221 N.W.2d 521 (N.D.1974) [letter from the school board stating “it is the intent” of the board not to offer a contract constituted notice of final decision to not renew teacher’s contract]; Henley v. Fingal Public School District #1, 219 N.W.2d 106 (N.D.1974) [board sent final notice of nonrenewal rather than notice of contemplated nonrenewal]; Huso v. Bismarck Public School Board, 219 N.W.2d 100 (N.D.1974) [school board failed to give notice of contemplated nonrenewal but teacher failed to give notice of acceptance of statutory offer created by failure of the board to give notice]. If the notice of contemplated nonrenewal is invalid because the board met in executive session contrary to statute the board should be given no greater opportunity to correct its action than it would have if it had failed to send the required notice or had worded the notice improperly. As noted above, the previous decisions of this court clearly indicate that failure to give a proper notice of contemplated nonrenewal by the statutory date is fatal.
The open-meeting requirement and the requirement for notice of contemplated nonrenewal by April 1 are meaningless if a school board can ignore them and, if the teacher objects, the school board is permitted to merely retrace its steps with no sanctions. In this instance the school board *786was informed by a representative of the North Dakota Education Association that an executive session was contrary to law. The school board, although not required to accept the advice of the Association, did not attempt to verify the information with its legal counsel. In view of the decision in Peters that notices sent as a result of an illegal executive session are invalid and in view of the information given by the North Dakota Education Association, there can be little excuse for what took place.
I agree that a board which has met in a closed meeting, contrary to statute, is not forever barred from thereafter renewing that action at an open meeting. However, if the action must be taken by a specified statutory date the open meeting must be held before that date. In this instance a valid notice of contemplated nonrenewal was not given to Danroth by the April 1 deadline specified in Section 15-47-38(5). Danroth accepted the statutory offer of a contract by the school board created as a result of the board’s failure to give the proper notice. I would reverse the decision of the trial court and direct that judgment be entered for Danroth in the amount of her contract for the 1980-1981 school year.