Travis Glass was convicted of first-degree murder, section 565.020, RSMo 2000, and was sentenced to death. This Court affirmed the conviction and sentence in State v. Glass, 136 S.W.3d 496 (Mo. banc 2004), cert, denied, 543 U.S. 1058,125 S.Ct. 869, 160 L.Ed.2d 784 (2005). Glass filed a Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The motion court granted a hearing on all claims except whether Missouri’s lethal injection procedures violated the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The court denied guilt phase relief and granted penalty phase relief. Glass appeals the denial of guilt phase relief. The state appeals the grant of penalty phase relief. This Court has jurisdiction. Mo. Const, art. V, section 10; order of June 16, 1988. The judgment is affirmed.
FACTS
The facts of this case are set forth in detail in State v. Glass, 136 S.W.3d 496 (Mo. banc 2004). In summary, Glass was taken in for questioning for the murder of Steffani Wilkins and he confessed to the crime. DNA material extracted from blood found on Glass’ license plate, jeans *468found in the backseat of Glass’ car, and a hair from the trunk of Glass’ car was consistent with Wilkins’ DNA profile. Glass was convicted of the murder and sentenced to death.
Following his direct appeal, Glass filed a motion for post-conviction relief under Rule 29.15. The motion court granted penalty phase relief on three issues. The court found that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to: (1) object to an improper jury instruction explaining the aggravating circumstance of kidnapping; (2) investigate and present mitigating evidence; and (3) investigate and present expert testimony in mitigation. The motion court denied the claims relating to all guilt phase issues and the remaining penalty phase issues.
ANALYSIS
To prove that counsel was ineffective, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance “did not conform to the degree of skill, care, and diligence of a reasonably competent attorney” and that the defendant was thereby prejudiced. State v. Hall, 982 S.W.2d 675, 680 (Mo. banc 1998) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). This Court presumes that counsel acted professionally in making decisions and that any challenged action was a part of counsel’s sound trial strategy. State v. Tokar, 918 S.W.2d 753, 766, 768 (Mo. banc 1996).
To demonstrate prejudice, a defendant must show that, but for counsel’s poor performance, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the court proceeding would have been different. Id. A “defendant need not establish that the attorney’s deficient performance more likely than not altered the outcome in order to establish prejudice....” Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 175, 106 S.Ct. 988, 89 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986). Rather, the question is whether the deficiency “undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)).
The motion court’s judgment on these issues is reviewed for clear error. Sams v. State, 980 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Mo. banc 1998). The court’s findings and conclusions will be held to be clearly erroneous only if this Court is left with the definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made. Id.
I. Penalty Phase Relief
1. Failure to Investigate and Present Mitigation Evidence
During the penalty phase, Glass’ trial counsel called ten witnesses to provide mitigation evidence. These witnesses included Glass’ family members, friends, and former employers and co-workers. Glass alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present additional testimony from former teachers and other professionals. The motion court agreed, finding that trial “counsel’s failure to investigate and call school officials and prior professionals was deficient and prejudicial since jurors perceive non-family members as more ‘disinterested’ witnesses.”
To prove ineffective assistance for failure to call a witness, the defendant must show that: “(1) trial counsel knew or should have known of the existence of the witness; (2) the witness could be located through reasonable investigation; (3) the witness would testify; and (4) the witness’s testimony would have produced a viable defense.” Hutchison v. State, 150 S.W.3d 292, 304 (Mo. banc 2004). Prevailing pro*469fessional standards for capital defense work require counsel to “discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence ...” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003). This includes “medical history, educational history, employment and training history, family and social history, prior adult and juvenile correctional experience, and religious and cultural influences.” Id. “Virtually no limits are placed on the relevant mitigating evidence a capital defendant may introduce concerning his own circumstances.” Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 822, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991) (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982)).
Dr. Scherr — Glass’ Treating Physician
The motion court found counsel ineffective for failing to elicit testimony from Dr. Barry Scherr, M.D. Dr. Scherr admitted Glass to the hospital for bacterial meningitis when Glass was 23 months old. The motion court found counsel’s failure to interview and call Scherr “especially prejudicial” because the trial court had excluded Glass’ medical records. It is not unreasonable to conclude that testimony regarding the long-term effects of meningitis would have provided mitigating evidence of Glass’ impaired mental functioning. The state contends that this information was before the jury through Glass’ aunt. However, as the motion court explained, Glass’ aunt admitted that she was “not a doctor” and “didn’t know” if meningitis had any effect on Glass.
The motion court did not clearly err in determining that counsel was ineffective for fading to elicit Dr. Scherr’s testimony. The failure to call a treating physician who would have testified about Glass’ impaired intellectual functioning can be prejudicial as such evidence can be inherently mitigating and critical to the jury’s assessment of whether to impose the death penalty. Hutchison v. State, 150 S.W.3d 292, 297 (Mo. banc 2004).
Teachers — Impaired Intellectual Functioning
The motion court also found counsel ineffective for not eliciting testimony from Glass’ former teachers, each of whom would have testified regarding Glass’ impaired intellectual functioning. The motion court found that several of Glass’ teachers would have explained in detail that Glass exhibited significant difficulty in learning and that he had been harassed by other students for being overweight. The court found that all of these teachers were listed on Glass’ school records and that counsel did not have a reasonable, strategic reason for not eliciting the teachers’ testimony. The motion court did not clearly err in granting relief on this claim.
Probation Officers
The motion court found that counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate and present mitigating testimony from Bruce Capp and Kevin Knickerbocker, who served as Glass’ probation officers on a prior stealing conviction. At penalty phase, the state introduced, as aggravating evidence, a certified copy of Glass’ prior conviction for felony stealing. As the motion court recognized, counsel has a duty “to neutralize the aggravating circumstances advanced by the state.” Ervin v. State, 80 S.W.3d 817, 827 (Mo. banc 2002), and Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. at 524,123 S.Ct. 2527.
Bruce Capp supervised Glass’ probation from late 1998 through early 2000 and they met once a month. Glass had no probation violations. Kevin Knickerbocker supervised Glass’ probation after Capp. He, too, saw Glass once a month and, then, placed *470him in a program in which he supervised Glass through the mail. Glass had no probation violations until the charged offense. Both would have testified to Glass’ good behavior and cooperation while on probation. Though counsel argued in closing that the murder was “simply out of character” for Glass and that the murder was committed while he was “extremely intoxicated,” it was not unreasonable for the motion court to conclude that the officers’ testimony would have supported this argument and reduced the prejudicial impact of Glass’ prior stealing conviction. The motion court did not clearly err in granting relief on this claim.
While there are numerous opinions from this Court affirming a motion court’s decision that counsel was not ineffective for declining to present the testimony of additional witnesses, many of these decisions are premised in large part upon the fact that this Court will defer to the motion court unless there is a showing of clear error. That same deferential standard of review applies where, as in this case, the motion court determines, after an eviden-tiary hearing, that the movant has made a valid claim of ineffective assistance. It is well-established that counsel has a duty to “discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence” in a death penalty case. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. at 524, 123 S.Ct. 2527. The motion court did not clearly err in finding that counsel was ineffective for failing to provide additional perspectives on Glass’ background during the penalty phase of his death penalty trial.
2. Failure to Investigate and Present Expert Testimony
Glass also alleged in his amended motion that trial counsel was ineffective for fading to call experts during the penalty phase. The jury heard from no experts testifying on Glass’ behalf during the penalty phase. Glass identified four expert witnesses who could have been, but were not called during the penalty phase: Dr. Robert Smith, a psychologist; Dr. Michael Gelbort, a neuro-psychologist; Teri Burns, a learning disability specialist; and Terry Martinez, a toxicologist. The motion court granted relief on this claim. Glass concedes that counsel investigated and consulted with Dr. Smith and provided a reasonable strategy for not calling him. Therefore, Glass only addresses three of the experts in his brief.
Neuropsychologist
Before trial, Dr. Michael Gelbort, a neuropsychologist, evaluated Glass and administered standardized tests. That testing revealed that Glass has neuropsy-chological deficits that impair his ability to reason abstractly, solve problems and comprehend information. Dr. Gelbort concluded that Glass’ temporal brain lobe was impaired and that, as a result, Glass had difficulties with learning, memory, and impulse control.
The motion court found that counsel’s failure to call Dr. Gelbort prejudiced Glass because neuropsychological deficits have “powerful, inherent mitigating value.” Hutchison, 150 S.W.3d at 307-08. The court found that the failure to call Dr. Gelbort was even more prejudicial because Glass’ penalty phase jury heard from no experts. The motion court was in the best position to assess the probable impact of Dr. Gelbort’s testimony, and it concluded that the failure to elicit the testimony was prejudicial ineffective assistance of counsel. The motion court did not clearly err in granting relief on this claim.
Learning Disability Expert
Glass also alleged, and the motion court found, that counsel was ineffective *471for failing to elicit testimony from Dr. Teresa Burns, a speech and language pathologist, who evaluated Glass after trial. Dr. Burns reviewed background materials, including medical and school records and teachers’ depositions. She administered standardized tests showing that Glass’ aptitude functioning is well-below age level in almost all areas, including reasoning skills, concept formation, and written language.
The state argues that Glass’ learning deficits did not cause him to commit the murder and that, as a result, Glass’ intellectual deficits are not mitigating. It is well-established that evidence of impaired intellectual functioning is valid mitigating evidence in the penalty phase of capital case, regardless of whether defendant has established a nexus between his mental capacity and crime. Hutchison, 150 S.W.3d at 305. Additionally, although Dr. Burns did not evaluate Glass until after trial, this fact does not necessarily preclude a finding that counsel was ineffective for failing to offer Dr. Burns’ testimony. Counsel can be held ineffective even if there is no claim that counsel knew about a specific expert prior to trial. Id. at 307.
The motion court did not clearly err in granting relief on this claim.
Toxicologist
Dr. Terry Martinez, a toxicologist and pharmacologist, evaluated Glass post-trial. Based on Glass’ weight, the type of alcohol, and the time he drank, Dr. Martinez concluded that Glass’ ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct and conform to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired and he suffered from an extreme mental and emotional disturbance. Counsel spoke with Dr. Martinez regarding his fees, but counsel undertook no further investigation.
The motion court found that Dr. Martinez’s testimony would have provided a basis to prove the mitigating circumstances of substantial impairment and extreme emotional distress under sections 565.032.3(2) and (6). The motion court found that this was “powerful” mitigating evidence and recognized the importance of presenting all available mitigation at trial:
The decision to impose the death penalty, whether by a jury or a judge, is the most serious decision society makes about an individual....
State v. Debler, 856 S.W.2d 641, 656 (Mo. banc 1993). In this case, as in any other, counsel is not necessarily ineffective for failing to call the full litany of proposed witnesses. Instead, the record in this case, read in light of the applicable standard of review, leads to the conclusion that there was evidence to support the motion court’s finding that counsel was ineffective and that Glass was thereby prejudiced. We defer to that finding. The motion court’s judgment granting a new penalty phase is affirmed.1
*472II. Remaining Claims
Glass raised several other claims regarding alleged ineffective assistance that were rejected by the motion court. These remaining claims are discussed below.
1. Admissibility of Autopsy Findings
The autopsy of the victim was conducted by Dr. Dix, a medical examiner who passed away prior to trial. During the guilt phase of the trial, the state introduced Dr. Dix’s curriculum vita and called Dr. Adelstein, another medical examiner, who offered testimony explaining Dr. Dix’s conclusions. Trial counsel did not object. Glass argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object because admission of this evidence without Dr. Dix’s testimony violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause as explained in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). Glass also alleges that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue on direct appeal.
In Crawford, the Court substantially altered the Confrontation Clause analysis for hearsay evidence. State v. March, 216 S.W.3d 663, 665 (Mo. banc 2007). Cases before Crawford focused on whether the evidence at issue had adequate indicia of reliability to justify admission. The Crawford opinion held that the Confrontation Clause protects a defendant from the use of testimonial hearsay as substantive evidence against him, unless the non-testifying witness is unavailable, and the defendant has a prior, meaningful opportunity to cross-examine that witness. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54, 124 S.Ct. 1354. The Confrontation Clause analysis thus centers on whether the particular evidence at issue is “testimonial” in nature. Id. at 51,124 S.Ct. 1354.
In reviewing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, counsel’s conduct is measured by what the law is at the time of trial. Counsel will generally not be held ineffective for failing to anticipate a change in the law. State v. Parker, 886 S.W.2d 908, 923 (Mo. banc 1994). Glass was tried and convicted before the Crawford case was decided. In order to make the Crawford objection at trial, counsel would have had to anticipate the Supreme Court’s holding in an opinion that had not yet been issued. Glass attempts to avoid this problem by arguing that the United States Supreme Court established in Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 32 S.Ct. 250, 56 L.Ed. 500 (1912), that autopsy reports are subject to the Confrontation Clause.
The Diaz case does not support Glass’ argument. In Diaz, the Court held only that an accused could waive his right to “meet witnesses face to face” under Section 5 of the Philippine civil government act and that, because of that waiver, the accused “cannot now complain” of the admission of evidence that included an autopsy report. 223 U.S. at 451-453, 32 S.Ct. 250. The Diaz case did not provide a preexisting basis for a valid objection. Moreover, at the time of Glass’ trial, Missouri law permitted one medical examiner to testify as to the results of another medical examiner’s autopsy. See State v. Mahan, 971 S.W.2d 307, 316 (Mo. banc 1998).
The motion court did not clearly err in finding that trial counsel was not ineffective. Because the court did not clearly err in finding that trial counsel was effective, the court also did not clearly err in rejecting Glass’ claim that appellate counsel should have raised the issue on appeal. The motion court did not clearly err in denying relief on this claim.
2. Inconsistent Theories
Glass argues that trial counsel was ineffective for pursuing inconsistent theories in the guilt and penalty phases.
*473During the guilt phase, counsel argued that the state had not presented evidence beyond a reasonable doubt establishing that Glass had deliberated prior to killing the victim. After Glass was found guilty of first-degree murder, counsel argued in the penalty phase that Glass was remorseful and that this one act was out of character. The motion court denied relief, finding that the strategy was not unreasonable and that Glass had not demonstrated prejudice.
Where counsel has investigated possible defense strategies, courts should rarely second-guess counsel’s actual choices. Middleton v. State, 103 S.W.3d 726, 736-737 (Mo. banc 2003). After Glass was found guilty, counsel had to direct all efforts toward establishing mitigating circumstances, which included arguing that Glass had shown remorse. The motion court did not clearly err in denying Glass’ claims.
3. Failure to Object to State’s Closing Argument
Glass raises multiple claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for faffing to object to various statements made by the prosecutor during closing argument.
To prevail on these claims, Glass must show that his counsel’s objections would have been upheld if made and that the failure to object resulted in a substantial deprivation of his right to a fair trial. State v. Clemons, 946 S.W.2d 206, 228 (Mo. banc 1997). Counsel is not ineffective for failing to make non-meritorious objections. Clemons, 946 S.W.2d at 228. Further, counsel’s failure to object during closing argument is generally not error, but is a function of trial strategy. Id. So long as the prosecutor stays within the record and its reasonable inferences, the argument is proper. State v. Jones, 384 S.W.2d 554, 560 (Mo.1964).
First, Glass argues that the motion court erred in denying his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to an alleged improper attack on defense counsel. During guilt phase closing argument, defense counsel argued that the jury should carefully consider the reliability of Glass’ confession because it was not audio or videotaped and notes from the meeting were not available. In response, the prosecutor argued that regardless of how a confession is memorialized, defense counsel will argue that it is insufficient. The prosecutor concluded that “I’ve given up trying to satisfy them. I don’t have to. I’ve proved the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”
The prosecutor is entitled to respond to the defense argument that a confession is unreliable. See State v. Collins, 150 S.W.3d 340, 350 (Mo.App.2004). In this case, the prosecutor did not attack defense counsel’s integrity, but instead made a proper response to defense counsel’s argument regarding the reliability of Glass’ confession.
Second, Glass argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s argument that in order to find Glass not guilty, “you must believe that everyone who came in here lied to you.” Glass asserts that this argument improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defense. This argument did not shift the burden of proof. Instead, this was a proper comment on defense counsel’s attempt to discredit the credibility of the witnesses. See State v. Kreutzer, 928 S.W.2d 854, 872 (Mo. banc 1996).
Third, Glass argues that counsel was ineffective for faffing to object to the prosecutor’s rebuttal closing argument. Glass argues that the following argument *474was improper because the prosecutor was stating a personal opinion:
Now, let’s talk about this idea that Sergeant Platte lied to this man. Why not? He was lying to Sergeant Platte. If he was telling the truth to Sergeant Platte, how did that little girl’s blood get on his car? Oh, I forgot, there’s something wrong with how Mr. Hoey did that.
The prosecutor can argue the evidence, the reasonable inferences from that evidence, and the credibility of the witnesses. Kreutzer, 928 S.W.2d at 872. The motion court correctly found that this was a proper commentary on the evidence.
Finally, Glass argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to an alleged improper personalization by the prosecutor. One way in which improper personalization results is when the prosecutor asks the jurors to imagine that they, or some other person, is in the victim’s situation or at the crime scene. Hall v. State, 16 S.W.3d 582, 585 (Mo. banc 2000). Here, the prosecutor asked jurors to “watch that clock” for 30 seconds, which, according to Dr. Adelstein’s testimony, was the earliest time that Wilkins would have been rendered unconscious. This was not improper personalization. Instead, as counsel testified at the eviden-tiary hearing, the prosecutor was not asking the juror to imagine themselves in the victim’s position but was only illustrating Glass’ deliberation. The prosecutor was entitled to demonstrate that 30 seconds is a sufficient period of time to deliberate about killing another person. The motion court did not clearly err in denying this claim.
4. Voir Dire
Glass argues that trial counsel was ineffective during voir dire for: (1) failing to ask whether the venire panel could consider specific mitigating circumstances; (2) failing to object when the prosecutor discussed Glass’ age; and, (3) failing to object when the prosecutor told the venire panel that jurors had to come to a unanimous decision regarding mitigation.
Glass asserts that counsel should have questioned the panel as to whether they would consider age, family background, alcohol addiction, drinking on the night of the murder, good character, and lack of significant criminal history as mitigating circumstances. Although trial counsel testified that it was a mistake not to question the venire panel regarding these matters, Glass made no showing at the evidentiary hearing that the jurors were unable or unwilling to consider the evidence presented. All of the jurors stated that they were willing to follow the court’s legal instructions. Glass cannot establish prejudice. The motion court did not clearly err in denying relief on this claim.
Glass also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s questions regarding Glass’ age at the time of the murder. During voir dire, the prosecutor asked the venire panel whether “any of you ... feel that the laws of the State of Missouri should apply with any greater or lesser weight because the defendant was a relatively young man at the time of the offense?” Glass argues that this question suggested that the jurors should not consider Glass’ age when determining punishment. This question was a legitimate inquiry into whether any prospective jurors would ignore the law and instructions because of Glass’ age at the time of the murder. The motion court did not clearly err in denying this claim.
Finally, Glass asserts that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a line of questioning that allegedly suggested, incorrectly, that jurors had to be unani*475mous regarding mitigating circumstances. The prosecutor stated as follows:
Remember, I told you aggravating circumstances must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the State, and you must unanimously find one or more exists. That’s not so with mitigating circumstances. You as jurors either believe them or you do not. And if you believe them, you may assign whatever weight to them that you see fit. You may decide that something does not exist and therefore it, you know, doesn’t deserve any consideration. You may decide that it exists but it’s worthy of very little consideration or weight. Or you may decide that it exists and it deserves a good bit of consideration or weight in your evaluation of what the penalty should be.
But if you find in the third step the aggravating circumstances outweigh those mitigating circumstances, you then reach phase four or step four. In step four the question is what should the penalty be? Because if you’ve gotten through all three of the first three steps, then you still have both choices on the table. And you may go either way. That’s up to you. But whichever way you go, assuming you get there, you must be unanimous. Clear so far?
Although the prosecutor did indicate that mitigating circumstances did not need to be found unanimously, the subsequent statements indicated that all decisions had to be unanimous. However, as the motion court found, these statements occurred very early in trial process and there is no dispute that the jury was properly instructed that it did not have to find mitigating circumstances unanimously. The motion court did not clearly err in denying this claim.
5. Statutory Mitigator Instruction
Glass argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a specific instruction regarding the statutory mitigator of age. As a result, Glass claims, the jury was “unable to consider ... youth as mitigation.”
This claim is without merit. Counsel pursued a reasonable trial strategy in not requesting a specific instruction regarding Glass’ age. The state’s list of aggravating circumstances alleged that the murder was wantonly vile and involved a sexual assault and kidnapping. Counsel testified that the best course of action was to submit the general mitigating circumstances instruction that permits the jury to consider any fact as mitigation. Counsel further testified that offering a specific mitigating instruction on Glass’ age would “invite the jury to compare or juxtapose that instruction with ... the list of aggravating circumstances that the State wants the jury to consider” and that this would cause the jury to “balance ... the penalty phase process in favor of the State.... ” Based upon this reasoning, counsel decided to rely on the general mitigating circumstance instruction so that the jury could consider any fact as mitigation and to avoid unduly focusing the jury’s attention on Glass’ age. Moreover, the jury was instructed that it could consider any and all evidence in mitigation and counsel argued that Glass’ age was a mitigating factor. This was reasonable trial strategy. There was no prejudice. The motion court did not clearly err in denying this claim.
6. Proportionality Review
Appellant claims that this Court’s proportionality review denies due process because de novo review should apply on appellate review of death sentences, this Court’s database does not comply with § 565.035.6 and omits numerous cases, and *476this Court fails to consider all similar cases required by statute. The motion court did not clearly err in denying this claim. These claims has been repeatedly denied by this Court and appellant offers no new arguments in support. See State v. Edwards, 116 S.W.3d 511 (Mo. banc 2003); Lyons v. State, 39 S.W.3d 32, 44 (Mo. banc 2001); and State v. Clay, 975 S.W.2d 121, 146 (Mo. banc 1998).
CONCLUSION
The motion court’s judgment is affirmed.
LAURA DENVIR STITH, C.J., White and Wolff, JJ., concur; RUSSELL, J., concurs in part and dissents in part in separate opinion filed; PRICE and LIMBAUGH, JJ., concur in opinion of RUSSELL, J.. The motion court also granted penalty phase relief on Glass’ claim of instructional error. There is no need to address this issue as the motion court’s judgment is supported by its findings regarding the failure to introduce sufficient mitigation evidence. Glass also raises additional claims for penalty phase relief that were rejected by the motion court. Because this Court affirms the motion court’s judgment granting a new penalty phase, the Court does not address these additional penalty phase claims. Glass also asserts that Missouri’s use of lethal injection is unconstitutional, violating the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Because Glass has been granted a new penalty phase, he is no longer subject to a death sentence, and it is not certain whether he will again be sentenced to death. As a result, there is no need to address his lethal injection challenge at this point.