¶ 34. (dissenting). The core issue presented by this appeal is whether Cannon & Dunphy, S.C., has an enforceable lien in each of the cases. I respectfully submit that it does not.
¶ 35. Unless a client recovers a judgment on his or her tort claim, and, accordingly, the lawyer has an equitable lien for fees, Wurtzinger v. Jacobs, 33 Wis. 2d 703, 712, 148 N.W.2d 86, 91 (1967), an attorney's lien for fees must be granted by contract with the client in order to be enforceable, Weigel v. Grimmett, 173 Wis. 2d 263, 267-271, 496 N.W.2d 206, 208-210 (Ct. App. 1992). The Majority recognizes this when it writes: "Wisconsin does not recognize a common law attorney hen for fees before judgment, in the absence of a written contract." Majority, ¶ 11. As the Majority also recognizes, Wis. Stat. § 757.36 permits the client to give his or her lawyer a fee-lien by contract. It provides:
*541Any person having or claiming a right of action, sounding in tort or for unliquidated damages on contract, may contract with any attorney to prosecute the action and give the attorney a hen upon the cause of action and upon the proceeds or damages derived in any action brought for the enforcement of the cause of action, as security for fees in the conduct of the litigation; when such agreement is made and notice thereof given to the opposite party or his or her attorney, no settlement or adjustment of the action may be valid as against the hen so created, provided the agreement for fees is fair and reasonable. This section shall not be construed as changing the law in respect to champertous contracts.
The extent of the agreed-to lien is controlled by the lien contract between the client and the lawyer. See McBride v. Wausau Ins. Cos., 176 Wis. 2d 382, 391, 500 N.W.2d 387, 390 (Ct. App. 1993). Neither Cannon & Dunphy nor the Majority contends that the firm has an equitable lien on the settlements in these cases. Rather, they focus on Cannon & Dunphy's retention/lien-agreements with the firm's former clients. In my view, the lien agreements do not give Cannon & Dunphy liens on the settlement proceeds.
¶ 36. As the Majority notes, the lien agreements in these cases are identical. They provide:
[Client] having sustained personal injuries on or about [date], through the negligence and carelessness of all responsible parties and in consideration of the services agreed to be rendered and furnished do hereby employ CANNON & DUNPHY, S.C. as my attorneys to, with my consent, settle my claim or bring suit thereon for damages and out of the proceeds of said settlement, judgment, monies, etc. agree to give them one third (1/3) thereof as their compensation, and in the meantime, I give them a valid hen in said amount pursuant to sec. 757.36, Wis. Stats. In return, CANNON & DUNPHY, S.C. will make every effort, consistent with *542the Rules of Professional Responsibility to provide me with all reasonable and necessary legal services in connection with the investigation and prosecution of my claim. Additionally, CANNON & DUNPHY, S.C. hereby agrees to advance reasonable and necessary costs, expenses and disbursements for the prosecution of my claim which I will repay in addition to the legal fees. I understand that there will be no charge for services nor reimbursement for costs, expenses or disbursements advanced unless there is a recovery on my claim.
I have been advised that services could be rendered on an hourly basis, but I hereby elect to be bound by the contingent fee contract.
I have been advised that at any time during the handling of my case, CANNON & DUNPHY, S.C. may recommend that the case not be continued for good and sufficient reasons, including, but not limited to, little or no likelihood of success on the claim's merits or a lack of available funds to satisfy the claim should it be successful. In the event they make such a recommendation to discontinue which I reject, I hereby agree that they may withdraw as my attorneys in consideration of their agreement to give me due notice of their withdrawal. CANNON & DUNPHY, S.C. agrees that they will comply with all the applicable provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. I have been advised by CANNON & DUNPHY, S.C. that they will undertake every reasonable effort to bring my claim to a successful conclusion prior to trial. If they negotiate a settlement prior to trial which they recommend I accept, I have the right to reject such recommendation. If I choose to reject their recommendation, then I agree that I will not object to them withdrawing as my attorneys upon their giving due notice and otherwise complying with the Code of Professional Responsibility. In the event CANNON & DUNPHY, S.C. withdraw as my attorneys after I have received a settlement offer *543which I reject, then I give them a valid lien in the amount of the settlement offer on the date of withdrawal or such lower amount as may be required by the Code of Professional Responsibility.
As can be seen from this retention/fee-lien contract, which Cannon & Dunphy drafted, the firm was granted a lien under the following circumstances:
(1) Cannon & Dunphy either settles or gets a favorable judgment on the client's claim; or
(2) Cannon & Dunphy procures a settlement offer that is presented to the client and the client rejects the settlement offer, and Cannon & Dunphy then, as a result of that rejection, withdraws as the client's lawyers.
None of these things happened in any of the cases. • Although Cannon & Dunphy might wish it had drafted its form retention/fee-lien contracts to secure a fee-lien if the client leaves the firm before settlement, it did not do so.
¶ 37. Cannon & Dunphy is a Wisconsin firm with a superb reputation for legal acumen, and all ambiguities in the contract it wrote must be interpreted against it and in favor of its clients (none of whom, insofar as the Record reveals, is a lawyer). See DeWitt Ross & Stevens, S.C. v. Galaxy Gaming & Racing Ltd. P'ship, 2004 WI 92, ¶ 66, 273 Wis. 2d 577, 605-606, 682 N.W.2d 839, 853-854. But Cannon & Dunphy's retention/fee-lien contract is not ambiguous — it plainly does not provide for its survival under the circumstances. Thus, no "interpretation" is necessary. See McBride, 176 Wis. 2d at 391, 500 N.W.2d at 390 (fee-lien agreement must "still be in force at the time the settlement is procured."). Accordingly, I *544respectfully dissent from the Majority's conclusion that Cannon & Dunphy has valid statute-based contractual liens in these cases.