concurring in part; dissenting in part. I concur with the majority in reversing the Commission and holding that Ms. Stephenson is entided to temporary total disability benefits and permanent partial disability benefits for her cervical disc herniation, because I believe there was no substantial evidence that supported the Commission’s denial of these benefits. I cannot agree, however, that there was no substantial evidence to support the Commission’s finding that the medical treatment Ms. Stephenson received from Drs. Tanner, Bishop, and Williams was unauthorized.
Following her injury at work, Ms. Stephenson’s employer, appellee Tyson Foods, directed her to Healthcare Plus, who then referred her to Dr. John Lytle. If Ms. Stephenson wished to change physicians, she was entitled to petition the Commission for a onetime-only change. Ark. Code Ann. § ll-9-514(a)(2)(A) (Repl. 1996). Without doing so, however, she was seen thereafter by Drs. Tanner, Bishop, and Williams. Consequendy, medical treatment by these unauthorized doctors and payment for their services was not the responsibility of Tyson, unless Tyson failed to give Ms. Stephenson notice, after her injury, of her rights and responsibilities pertaining to a change of physician as required by Ark. Code Ann. § ll-9-514(c). The Commission found that “at the time of the claimant’s injury, the appropriate form advising claimant of her rights and duties was Commission Form N” and the “Claimant acknowledged at the hearing that the Form N introduced into evidence bore her handwriting at the top and her signature at the bottom.” Ms. Stephenson does not appeal these findings, but contends that the date of “January 2, 1997,” appearing on the form was not written by her, and that she signed the form when she was hired about six months earlier. The Commission held that notice had been given to Ms. Stephenson, and, therefore, she was required to petition for a change of physician, which she did not do.
We should affirm the Commission unless there is no substantial evidence in the record that supports its decision. The substantial evidence standard of appellate review means that the appellate court must affirm the Commission if fair-minded people could have reached the same result after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the result that the Commission reached, Hubley v. Best Western-Governor’s Inn, 52 Ark. App. 226, 916 S.W.2d 143 (1996), even if the preponderance of the evidence would indicate a different result. Tahutini v. Tastybird Foods, 18 Ark. App. 82, 711 S.W.2d 173 (1986).
There are two items of evidence that are substantial and support the Commission’s finding that Tyson gave the required notice. First, there is tangible evidence consisting of form N dated January 2, 1997, the date of the incident, bearing Ms. Stephenson’s signature that was introduced as an exhibit at the hearing. This is the form that the Commission found gives the notice concerning a change of physician that is required by section ll-9-514(c). Secondly, Ms. Felita Wilkes, Tyson’s workers’ compensation claims coordinator at its Pine Bluff plant, testified that it was standard procedure at Tyson that when an employee is injured and is brought in to see one of the plant nurses, the attending nurse gives the employee a tablet of forms that includes the change of physician rights-responsibility notice form. The nurse explains the forms and asks the employee if the employee understands. The employee is then asked to sign the form.
The majority holds today that the above items of proof do not constitute substantial evidence in support of the Commission’s conclusion that Tyson gave Ms. Stephenson the statutory notice. In doing so, the majority has engaged in a de novo consideration of the case, and has weighed the evidence and adjudged the credibility of the witnesses and tangible evidence. This is improper on an appeal from the Workers’ Compensation Commission. While we are to view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the fight most favorable to the findings of the Commission, Bates v. Frost Logging Co., 38 Ark. App. 36, 827 S.W.2d 664 (1999), the majority appears to have considered Ms. Stephenson’s testimony which controverted Tyson’s proof, then weighed the credibility of this evidence and concluded that Ms. Stephenson’s testimony was more credible than Tyson’s proof.
The majority opinion also stated that the evidence is “clear that the care Stephenson received from Drs. Tanner, Bishop, and Williams was necessary and reasonable,” and that “there is no evidence that the expenses of such treatment was any greater than it would have been had it been provided by pre-approved physicians.” I doubt that anyone familiar with this case would dispute these statements; however, one must wonder why these statements appear in the majority opinion. They have no relevance whatsoever to the substantial evidence standard of review before our court. Even if Drs. Tanner, Bishop and Williams did render reasonable care to Mrs. Stephenson for reasonable charges, this would not convert their status from unauthorized physicians to authorized ones.
While we may be sympathetic to Ms. Stephenson’s plight, we should not permit our sympathy to compromise the standard of review that we are obliged to apply. I would affirm the Commission’s holding that Tyson gave Ms. Stephenson the required notice concerning a change of physician, and that the treatment rendered to her by Drs. Tanner, Bishop, and Williams was unauthorized.
R.OAF, J., joins.