dissenting.
I agree with the Court’s holding that Continental Casualty does not have a statutory right to judicial review of the Work*406ers’ Compensation Commission’s decision. But I disagree with the Court that Continental waived its constitutional basis for judicial review merely because it neglected to add this claim to its pleadings once this issue was raised in the trial court. This holding not only elevates form over substance, but is contrary to the spirit of established precedent. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
I
Continental brought this suit to reverse the Commission’s order requiring it to pay for medical services provided by Functional Restoration Associates (“FRA”) and Productive Rehabilitation Institute of Dallas for Ergonomics (“PRIDE”) to James Hood. Continental’s petition stated that Continental sought judicial review “pursuant to Tex. Lab.Code § 410.255 (Vernon Pamph.1995) and Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 2001.171, et seq. (Vernon Pamph.1995),” but did not mention any constitutional basis. In its original answer, the Commission did not contest jurisdiction on any grounds. After the trial court questioned jurisdiction on -its own motion, the Commission filed a plea to the jurisdiction and a trial brief asserting that the statute did not permit judicial review of medical benefits disputes. In response, Continental filed a trial brief contending that it' had both a statutory right to judicial review under Texas Labor Code section 410.255 and an inherent right to judicial review because the Commission’s order adversely affected Continental’s protected property interest. Continental never amended its petition, but the Commission never objected in the trial court to this omission. At the hearing on the plea to the jurisdiction, both the Commission and Continental argued both grounds. The trial court granted the plea and dismissed the suit..
II
A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea that challenges a court’s subject matter jurisdiction. When a plea to the jurisdiction is granted, the trial court dismisses the suit without prejudice. See Bell v. State Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 945 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, writ denied). A plea to the jurisdiction should only be granted, however, “where the court can see from the allegations of a pleading that, even by amendment, no cause of action can be stated” to invoke the court’s jurisdiction. Bybee v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 160 Tex. 429, 331 S.W.2d 910, 917 (1960) (quoting Lone Star Fin. Corp. v. Davis, 11 S.W.2d 711, 715 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1934, no writ)). If the jurisdictional defect can be cured by amendment, a court errs in granting the plea without allowing the plaintiff an opportunity to replead. See Texas Ass’n of Business v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex.1993) (a litigant has a right to amend to attempt to cure jurisdictional defects); Peek v. Equipment Serv. Co., 779 S.W.2d 802, 805 (Tex.1989) (“Unless the petition affirmatively demonstrates that no cause of action exists or that plaintiffs recovery is barred, we require the trial court to give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend before granting a motion to dismiss.... ”); Bybee, 331 S.W.2d at 917 (where jurisdictional defects can be cured “there is involved only a question of sufficiency of the pleading, and not of the jurisdiction of the court”) (quoting Lone Star Fin. Corp., 11 S.W.2d at 715); see also O’Connor & Davis, O’Connor’s Texas Rules—Civil Trials 158 (1998); 2 McDonald, Texas Civil PRACTICE § 8.15, at 200 (Allen et al. eds., 1992). The rule we announce today is contrary to the spirit of these authorities. The sole basis for the Court’s holding is that the constitutional claim was not in the petition when the trial court ruled on the plea to the jurisdiction. But a trial court’s decision about whether to accept or decline jurisdiction should not turn on strict compliance with technical pleading requirements. See Peek, 779 S.W.2d at 805; Bybee, 331 S.W.2d at 917. To the contrary, if the trial court has jurisdiction, it must exercise that jurisdiction. See Stewart v. Moore, 291 S.W. 886, *407891 (Tex. Comm’n App.1927, holding approved); see also Coastal Corp. v. Garza, 979 S.W.2d 318, 322 (Tex.1998) (Hecht, J., dissenting). And if a court erroneously declines to exercise jurisdiction, the losing party should be able to complain on appeal about any jurisdictional basis that it presented to the trial court. Technical pleading failings should no more bar this appeal than did the failure to plead an amount in controversy in a wrongful death case deprive the trial court of jurisdiction in Peek. See Peek, 779 S.W.2d at 805; cf. In re B.I.V., 870 S.W.2d 12, 13-14 (Tex.1994) (summary judgment should not be based on a pleading deficiency that could be cured by amendment); Womack v. Allstate Ins. Co., 156 Tex. 467, 296 S.W.2d 233, 237 (1956) (“[Wjhen the affidavits or other summary judgment ‘evidence’ disclose facts which render the position of the moving party untenable, summary judgment should be denied regardless of defects which may exist in the pleadings of the [nonmovant].”). Because both Continental’s brief and its oral argument set forth its constitutional jurisdictional argument, error has been preserved.1
Ill
It is well-established that there is no right to judicial review of an administrative order unless a statute provides one or the order violates some provision of the state or federal constitution. See Stone v. Texas Liquor Control Bd., 417 S.W.2d 385, 385-86 (Tex.1967); City of Amarillo v. Hancock, 150 Tex. 231, 239 S.W.2d 788, 790 (1951); see also Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 376-389 (1965) (setting forth state and federal constitutional bases for judicial review of administrative decisions). Generally, the constitutional provisions implicated are federal due process or state due course of law. See Brazosport Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. American Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 161 Tex. 543, 342 S.W.2d 747, 751 (1961) (citing English Freight Co. v. Knox, 180 S.W.2d 633, 640 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1944, writ refd w.o.m.)); see also Texas Workers’ Compensation Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 525 (Tex.1995) (the Texas due course provision requires at least the same protections as the federal due process clause). Therefore, due process supplies a right to judicial review if the agency decision adversely affects a protected property interest. See Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Falkner, 369 S.W.2d 427, 433 (Tex.1963); Brazosport Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. American Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 161 Tex. 543, 342 S.W.2d 747, 750, 751 (1961); Hancock, 239 S.W.2d at 790-91; see also Board of Ins. Comm’rs v. Title Ins. Ass’n of Tex., 153 Tex. 574, 272 S.W.2d 95, 97 (1954) (“[P]roperty rights ... cannot be determined by the orders of an administrative agency without affording a right of judicial review....”); Schwantz v. Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 415 S.W.2d 12, 15 (Tex.Civ. App.—Waco 1967, writ refd) (same).
The key inquiry for determining if Continental has an inherent right to judicial review is whether Continental has a protected property interest that was adversely affected by the Commission’s decision. See Alford v. City of Dallas, 738 S.W.2d 312, 314 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, no writ). Because this is a plea to the jurisdiction, we must take the pleaded facts as true and construe them in the plaintiffs favor. We must then determine whether these facts demonstrate that Continental’s protected property interest has been adversely affected by the Commission’s decision, thereby giving Continental a due process right to judicial review. See Texas Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446; Hernandez v. Texas Workers’ Compensation Ins. Fund, 946 S.W.2d 904, 906 (Tex.App.—Eastland *4081997, no writ) (citing Huston v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 663 S.W.2d 126 (Tex.App.—Eastland 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
In my opinion, Continental meets this burden. The interest at stake is the money Continental was ordered to pay. Continental owns and possesses this money; it therefore has a protected property interest in it. While the property interests protected by due process extend well beyond actual ownership of property, ownership of money is among the core property interests protected by due process. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1971); see also Campbell v. Miller, 787 F.2d 217, 222 (7 th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1019, 107 S.Ct. 673, 93 L.Ed.2d 724 (1986) (inmate has property interest in funds in his prison account); Chauffeur’s Training School, Inc. v. Riley, 967 F.Supp. 719, 729 (N.D.N.Y.1997) (school has protected property interest in retaining the funds in its accounts); Black v. Dallas County Bail Bond Bd., 882 S.W.2d 434, 439 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1994, no writ) (bondsmen have property right in the money they use to pay rearrest costs); Brewer v. Collins, 857 S.W.2d 819, 823 (Tex.App.—Houston [1 st Dist.] 1993, no writ) (prison inmate has protected property interest in money seized by state from inmate’s trust fund). Because the Commission’s decision would have deprived Continental of this property, due process provides Continental with an inherent right to judicial review of that decision.2 See Board of Ins. Comm’rs, 272 S.W.2d at 97. In that review, the trial court should determine whether the agency decision is supported by substantial evidence, is not arbitrary and capricious, and satisfies procedural due process. See, e.g., Chemical Bank & Trust Co., 369 S.W.2d at 433; Brazosport, 342 S.W.2d at 747; Board of Ins. Comm’rs, 272 S.W.2d at 99; Fire Dep’t of City of Fort Worth v. City of Fort Worth, 147 Tex. 505, 217 S.W.2d 664, 666 (1949).
Justice OWEN, joined by Justice HECHT, dissenting.
Because the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act provides for judicial review of medical benefits issues in section 410.255,1 respectfully dissent.
I
James Hood sustained a job-related injury and received treatment from two medical service providers. Hood’s employer’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier, Continental Casualty, refused to pay for these services, contending that they were not medically necessary. The health care providers pursued the matter with the Commission, and the Commission determined that Continental should pay. Continental requested a hearing by the State Office of Administrative Hearings, as it had the right to do under section 413.031(d) of the Labor Code. At the conclusion of that proceeding, Continental was ordered to pay for the medical services provided to Hood. Continental then attempted to appeal to a Travis County district court, but that appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
The Court concludes that the Workers’ Compensation Act does not provide for judicial review of medical benefits dis*409putes. The Court’s construction of the Act is an unreasonable one. Section 410.255 provides for judicial review under a substantial evidence standard and was intended to be a significant change when enacted as part of the 1989 revamping of the Act. But as interpreted by the Court, it has never applied to any issues other than attorney’s fees incurred in connection with a medical benefits dispute and disputes that may arise when two physicians disagree about the necessity of spinal surgery. Thus, the Court says that a party who loses a medical benefits dispute hearing may not seek judicial review of the merits of that decision, but that the amount of attorney’s fees awarded in connection with that dispute is subject to judicial review. I find it implausible that the Legislature intended to elevate the issue of attorney’s fees above a worker’s or service provider’s right to payment for medical benefits or that the Legislature intended for judicial review under section 410.255 to apply to so few issues.
II
Medical benefits disputes are covered by section 413.031 of the Labor Code.1 When a workers’ compensation insurer denies payment, as Continental did in this case, the worker or the health care provider can request review by a “health care provider professional review organization.” Tex. Lab.Code § 413.031(c). If the dispute remains unresolved, a party is entitled to a hearing by the State Office of Administrative Hearings in the manner provided for contested case hearings under the Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act. See id. § 413.031(d). The issue before the Court is whether there is a right to judicial review of administrative decisions that result from these hearings.
Section 410.255 appears in Chapter 410. Chapter 410 is entitled “Judicial Review— General Provisions.” Section 410.255 expressly grants the right of judicial review for “all issues other than those covered under section 410.301(a)”:
§ 410.255. Judicial Review of Issues Other Than Compensability or Income or Death Benefits
(a) For all issues other than those covered under Section 410.301(a), judicial review shall he conducted in the manner provided for judicial review of a contested case under Subchapter G, Chapter 2001, Government Code [sections 171 et seq. of the Administrative Procedure Act].
(b) Judicial review conducted under this section is governed by the substantial evidence rule.
Id. § 410.255 (emphasis added). Medical benefits issues are “issues other than those covered under Section 410.301(a).” Section 410.301(a) covers only matters that *410relate to compensability, eligibility for, or the amount of income or death benefits. See id. § 410.301(a).2
Section 410.255 expressly grants a right to judicial review because it provides that, for all issues other than those covered under section 410.301(a), judicial review “shall be conducted .... ” The section then specifies the manner in which the required judicial review is to be conducted, which is in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act (the APA). See id. § 410.255.
The Court does not accept the straightforward meaning of section 410.255. Instead, it reads into that section a limitation that it does not contain. The Court says that section 410.255 only applies when there has been a final decision from an appeals panel. Since virtually no medical benefits disputes are heard by an appeals panel under the Act, see id. § 413.043, the Court reasons that there is no right to judicial review.
As construed by the Court, the role of section 410.255 has been one of obscurity since the day it was enacted. If the Act means what the Court says it means, then the only issues to which section 410.255 has ever applied are differing medical opinions about whether spinal surgery is necessary, see id. § 408.026, and disputes over attorney’s fees in connection with medical benefits, since those are the only two issues that proceed to an appeals panel and fall within section 410.255.
The Court’s erroneous construction of section 410.255 flows from its misinterpretation of section 410.251 of the Act, which says:
§ 410.251 Exhaustion of Remedies
A party that has exhausted its administrative remedies under this subtitle and that is aggrieved by a final decision of the appeals panel may seek judicial review under this subchapter and sub-chapter B, if applicable.
Id. § 410.251. The Court views this section as the exclusive grant of judicial review of issues other than those arising under section 410.310(a). That erroneous premise then leads the Court to conclude that unless there has been a decision by an appeals panel, there is no right to judicial review.
But section 410.251 does not purport to be an exclusive grant of the right to judicial review. It says only that a party who has exhausted administrative remedies and is aggrieved by a final decision of the appeals panel may seek judicial review under subchapter F and subchapter G if G applies. Section 410.251 does not say that judicial review is foreclosed under all other circumstances.
It is apparent that section 410.255 was meant to be a separate grant of a right to judicial review distinct from 410.251 because section 410.255 differs from section 410.251 in two important ways. First, section 410.255 does not provide that judicial review may be sought under subchapter G of the Act, as does section 410.251. Section 410.255 recognizes that the issues that it covers are to be treated differently from those covered by subchapter G. The second difference between 410.251 and 410.255 is that section 410.255 explicitly recognizes that the standard of review for the issues it covers is different from the standard of review of issues covered in subchapter G under section 410.301(a). The standard of review under section 410.255 is the substantial evidence rule. The standard of review under subchapter G, which includes section 410.301(a), is a very different standard.
The Court has also drawn unwarranted conclusions from section 413.031’s failure *411to include a specific reference to “judicial review.” The Court reasons that if the Legislature intended for there to be judicial review, then it would have said so in section 413.031. But if section 413.031 were to contain a provision regarding judicial review, it would needlessly duplicate the provision for review in section 410.255.
The Court’s reliance on sections 415.034 and 415.035 of the Labor Code as examples of how the Legislature provides for judicial review when it intends to do so is inapposite. Section 415.034 provides for a hearing when violations of the Act are charged, and section 415.035 provides for judicial review in those matters. See id. §§ 415.034, 415.035. Neither the general provisions for judicial review in Chapter 410 nor the specific provisions in section 410.255 apply to disputes about alleged violations of the Act. Chapter 410 applies only to proceedings to determine the liability of a carrier for compensation for injury or death. See id. §§ 410.002; 410.255. Accordingly, it was necessary to include a separate provision for judicial review when alleged violations of the Act are at issue under Chapter 415.
It is also of no moment that the words used in section 415.035 to provide for judicial review are not identical to those used in section 410.255. Although different words are used, both Code provisions make it clear that there is a right of judicial review.
Ill
The Court’s construction of section 410.255 cannot be squared with the legislative history of the Act. Why was there an extended debate in the Texas Legislature about substantial evidence review and why did the Legislature take pains to say in section 410.255 and its predecessor, article 8308-6.64, that “judicial review conducted under this section is governed by the substantial evidence rule” if the only issues to which the substantial evidence rule could ever apply were attorney’s fees and differing medical opinions about the necessity of spinal surgery? The question of what standard of judicial review should apply was a much-debated, controversial issue when the Legislature was promulgating the Act. The Legislature unquestionably intended for there to be a dichotomy between the standard of review applied to medical benefits issues and the standard of review to be applied to issues regarding compensability, eligibility, and the amount of income or death benefits. The Court’s decision eliminates the significance of that dichotomy.
Interpreting the Act as providing for judicial review of medical benefit disputes is consistent with the writings of Senator Montford, the principal sponsor of the Workers’ Compensation Act. He wrote in his guide to the Act that it created two distinct tracks for review, one for medical benefits disputes and another for other benefits disputes:
In Chapter F of Article 6 are provisions changing the judicial review step of the prior comp law ... to (1) a non-“de novo” and »on-APTRA trial by jury (or judge) with respect to issues regarding compensability, income benefits, and/or death benefits, and (2) for all other comp issues/disputes (that is, all not included in the foregoing category (1), such as a medical benefits dispute/issue), an AP-TRA Section 19 judicial review tried ... without a jury.
1 John T. MontfoRD et al„ A Guide to Texas WorkeRs’ Comp Reform, § 6F.0(a) (1991). This same publication deals more extensively with judicial review in succeeding sections, and repeats at other junctures that former section 6.64(a), reco-dified as section 410.255, made judicial review “mandatory” for “a medical benefits dispute/issue.” Id. at § 6F.64. Additional references to the availability of judicial review for medical benefits decisions appear throughout Senator Montford’s workers’ comp guide.
I generally am loathe to refer to secondary materials in construing a statute, even *412when those materials were authored by the primary sponsor of the legislation at issue. See C & H Nationwide, Inc. v. Thompson, 903 S.W.2d 315, 329 (Tex.1994) (Hecht, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 95 S.Ct. 335, 42 L.Ed.2d 320 (1974); National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass’n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 639 n. 34, 87 S.Ct. 1250, 18 L.Ed.2d 357 (1967); American Fed’n of Gov’t Employees Locals 225, 1501 & 3723 v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 712 F.2d 640, 647 n. 29 (D.C.Cir.1983)). But in some instances, secondary materials authored by a legislator so clearly reflect the generally accepted, fundamental meaning of a statute that a court should be guided by that interpretation and should not construe the statute in a highly technical and unreasonable manner. This is one of those instances. It seems extremely unlikely that Senator Montford would write as extensively and as matter-of-factly as he has done about judicial review of medical benefits decisions if there were any question about the matter. It seems equally unlikely that Senator Montford’s view of something as basic as judicial review under the Act, which was debated so extensively by the Legislature, could be as far off the mark as the Court concludes.
Senator Montford’s explanation of judicial review of medical benefits issues is entirely consistent with the wording of section 410.255. No one questioned Senator Monford’s view before or after he wrote the workers’ comp guide. There is no indication that when the non-substantive recodification of the Act occurred in 1993,3 Senator Montford or any other member of the Legislature thought that judicial review of medical benefits decisions was unavailable. As the Court explains, even the Commission thought that judicial review of medical benefit disputes was available until it argued to the contrary in this litigation. See 19 S.W.3d 393.
Senator Montford’s guide also discusses the fact that former article 8308-6.64, which is now section 410.255 of the Labor Code, refers to sections of the Administrative Procedure Act that include section 2001.171. See MontfoRD, supra, § 6F.64(b). As Senator Montford explains, section 2001.171 in turn provides that, “[a] person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within a state agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review under this chapter.” Tex. Gov.Code § 2001.171. The petitioner in this case has exhausted all administrative remedies available within a state agency. Those remedies did not include review by an appeals panel, but that is not required by section 410.255 of the Labor Code or section 2001.171 of the APA as a prerequisite to judicial review.
The Court’s response to Senator Mont-ford’s writings about the Act is unpersuasive. The Court first says that “Senator Montford’s book deals with the precodification version of the Act rather than the current version.” 19 S.W.3d at 403. As *413noted above, the current version is a non-substantive codification of the law about which Senator Montford wrote. The Court next discusses early drafts of the Act. See 19 S.W.3d at 403. But Senator Montford’s writings are not addressed to drafts. He wrote in 1991 about the Act as passed by the Legislature in 1989.
Finally, the Court says that “further revisions during codification then expressly tied section 410.251 to both sections 410.255and 410.301, requiring appeals panel review for both.” 19 S.W.3d at 403. Again, the revisions were intended to be and were, in fact, non-substantive. Cf. Fleming Foods of Texas, Inc. v. Rylander, 6 S.W.3d 278 (Tex.1999). But more importantly, changes made when the Act was codified, non-substantive or otherwise, did not “tie” section 410.255 to an appeals panel decision. There is no mention in section 410.255 of an appeals panel decision. Nor is there any “tying,” express or otherwise, between section 410.251 (the exhaustion of remedies section that includes a reference to an appeals panel review) and sections 410.255 and 410.301. Just the opposite is true.
Notably, section 410.301(a) expressly refers to an appeals panel decision while section 410.255 does not. Compare Tex. Lab.Code § 410.301(a) (“Judicial review of a final decision of a commission appeals panel regarding compensability or eligibility for or the amount of income or death benefits shall be conducted as provided by this subchapter.” (emphasis added)) ivith id. § 410.255 (“For all issues other than those covered under Section 410.301(a), judicial review shall be conducted in the manner provided for judicial review of a contested case under Subchapter G.”) This difference is a recognition in the Code provisions themselves that an appeals panel decision is not a prerequisite for judicial review of issues covered by section ^10.255. Moreover, why was a reference to an appeals panel necessary in section 410.301(a) if, as the Court says, section 410.251 already required a decision from an appeals panel before there could be judicial review under either section 410.255or section 410.031? The Court does not or cannot say.
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The Court recognizes that section 410.255appears, on its face, to grant a right to judicial review. But the Court declines to give the section that effect. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. I would hold that the district court had jurisdiction of the appeals by the providers of medical benefits.
. The Court’s reliance on Carrizales v. Texas Dept, of Protective and Regulatory Servs., 5 S.W.3d 922 (Tex.App.—Austin 1999, pet. filed), is misplaced. Carrizales is distinguishable from this case because the plaintiff in Carrizales never informed the trial court of his inherent right to judicial review, but instead asserted that jurisdictional basis for the first time on appeal. Id. at 925.
. Parties to a medical benefits dispute under Texas Labor Code section 413.031 other than an insurance carrier may also have a right to judicial review if they have a legitimate claim of entitlement to money or benefits that is created by "by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.” Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 163, 118 S.Ct. 1925, 141 L.Ed.2d 174 (1998) (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972)); see also Mallette v. Arlington County Employee's Supplemental Retirement Sys. II, 91 F.3d 630, 635 (4 th Cir.1996); Daniels v. Woodbury County, 742 F.2d 1128, 1132 (8 th Cir.1984); Griffeth v. Detrich, 603 F.2d 118, 121 (9 th Cir.1979); Soeken v. Herman, 35 F.Supp.2d 99, 105 (D.D.C.1999); Last v. MSI Const. Co., 305 S.C. 349, 409 S.E.2d 334, 336 (1991); Barron v. Board of Trustees of the Policemen s Pension & Relief Fund, 176 W.Va. 480, 345 S.E.2d 779, 782 (1985).
. Section 413.031 provides in pertinent part: § 413.031. Medical Dispute Resolution
(a) A party, including a health care provider, is entitled to a review of a medical service provided or for which authorization of payment is sought if a health care provider is:
(1) denied payment or paid a reduced amount for the medical service rendered;
(2) denied authorization for the payment for the service requested or performed if authorization is required by the medical policies of the commission; or
(3) ordered by the division to refund a payment received for a medical service rendered.
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(c) A review of a medical service under this section shall be provided by a health care provider professional review organization if requested by the health care practitioner or if ordered by the commission.
(d) A party to a medical dispute that remains unresolved after a review of the medical service under this section is entitled to a hearing. The hearing shall be conducted by the State Office of Administrative Hearings within 90 days of receipt of a request for a hearing- in the manner provided for a contested case under Chapter 2001, Government Code (the administrative procedure law).
Tex. Lab.Code § 413.043.
. Section 410.301(a) is contained in subchap-ter G of the Act entitled "Judicial Review of Issues Regarding Compensability or Income or Death Benefits” and provides: "Judicial review of a final decision of a commission appeals panel regarding compensability or eligibility for or the amount of income or death benefits shall be conducted as provided by this subchapter.” Tex. Lab.Code § 410.301(a).
. The 1993 revisions reflect that they were intended to be non-substantive:
§ 1.001. Purpose of Code
(a) This code is enacted as a part of the state’s continuing statutory revision program, begun by the Texas Legislative Council in 1963 as directed by the legislature in the law codified as Section 323.007, Government Code. The program contemplates a topic-by-topic revision of the state's general and permanent statute law without substantive change.
(b) Consistent with the objectives of the statutory revision program, the purpose of this code is to make the law encompassed by this code more accessible and understandable, by:
(1) rearranging the statutes into a more logical order;
(2) employing a format and numbering system designed to facilitate citation of the law and to accommodate future expansion of the law;
(3) eliminating repealed, duplicative, unconstitutional, expired, executed, and other ineffective provisions; and
(4) restating the law in modern American English to the greatest extent possible.
Tex. Labor Code § 1.001(a).