concurring and dissenting.
I concur in the majority’s analysis of the various “Items.” I respectfully dissent to the majority’s disposition. I do not argue that Judge Lowery’s actions are in any manner justifiable or do not constitute misconduct. My quarrel with the majority is two-fold: failing to remand to the Commission and ordering that Judge Lowery be forever barred from holding any judicial office in the future.
THE REMAND
Tex. Const, art. V, § 1 — a(8) states, in pertinent part:
If, after formal hearing, or after considering the record and report of a Master, the Commission finds good cause therefor, it shall issue an order of public censure or it shall recommend to a re*664view tribunal the removal or retirement ... of the person....
Rule 10(m), Rules for Removal or Retirement of Judges, states:
If, after hearing, upon considering the record and report of the special master, the commission finds good cause therefore, by affirmative vote of six of its members, it shall recommend to the review tribunal the removal, or retirement, as the case may be; or in the alternative, the commission may dismiss the case or publicly order a censure, reprimand, warning, or admonition. Six votes are required for a recommendation of removal or retirement.
Tex. Const, art. V, § l-a(9) states, in pertinent part:
The review tribunal shall review the record of the proceedings on the law and the facts.... [I]t shall order public censure, retirement or removal, as it finds just and proper, or wholly reject the recommendation....
It is the Commission’s recommendation, based upon six votes of its members, for removal that triggers the review tribunal process. In this case the commission adopted the conclusions and recommendations of the Special Master in regards to five “Items.” Thus the Commission’s recommendation for removal was based upon all of these items. The majority has found item one, the Grupe incident, was improperly considered and item five, the “persistent conduct,” is not supported by the evidence. Therefore, only three items should have been considered by the Commission in the underlying proceedings. Query, what would the Commission have recommended if they had only considered items two, three and four? In other words, would six members of the Commission have voted to recommend removal if they had only considered the three remaining items? The only way to answer these questions is to remand the proceedings to the Commission.
I have no quarrel with the majority’s authority to make a de novo determination of an appropriate disposition. However, must the tribunal do so, or is remand an alternative? I believe it is. The tribunal is allowed to “wholly reject the recommendation.” But must that rejection always be an “acquittal” or can it be a remand? There has been no interpretation of the term “reject” or the workings of the constitutional provision and accompanying rule. Although remand is not an enumerated option, I believe it is contained within the tribunal’s authority to “reject” the recommendation. A remand to determine if the Commission would recommend removal in light of the tribunal’s striking items one and five from consideration is consistent with the scheme established by the voters and the Supreme Court. For it is only through the Commission that a tribunal can consider a recommendation for removal and then order a removal. Were we sitting in our regular court of appeals mode, I believe we would most certainly conclution of an “improper judgment”, see Tex.R.App.P. 44.1, and reversal would be required. Therefore, while remand is not explicitly an option available to the tribunal, I believe it is an option. Consequently, I would remand the matter back to the Commission to reconsider its recommendations in light of items one and five being stricken.
THE BAR FROM FOREVER HOLDING JUDICIAL OFFICE
The majority has correctly determined there is no legal impediment to either the Commission’s recommendation of prohibition or the tribunal’s order of prohibition. The majority also acknowledges “we are not directed by clear constitutional or statutory mandate as to the factors we should consider in reaching our decision, nor do we have the benefit of accumulated judicial interpretations.” The majority then goes on to review the actions of Judge Lowery to justify the order forever barring him from holding judicial office. While the *665majority discussed the general issue of disenfranchising the voters, they do not weigh this disenfranchisement in the instant case. Consequently, this tribunal, in a well-intended desire to appropriately punish Judge Lowery should not rush to “disenfranchise” the voters of Precinct 2 in Dallas County by deciding who is and is not eligible for office1 and who they cannot elect as a judge in the future.
If there are no guidelines or directions as to what are the proper factors to consider in making this decision, perhaps Judge Lowery’s misconduct should be measured against that of others who have received a range of sanctions from reprimands to removal and prohibition from holding future judicial office. See and compare, In re Bell, 894 S.W.2d 119, 131 (Tex.Spec.Ct.Rev.1995) (two violations of canons in contempt proceeding; public admonition upheld); In re Thoma, 878 S.W.2d 477, 483, 513 (Tex.Rev.Trib.1994, no appeal) (conspiring to extort money from a party in an action over which he exercised authority, engaging in ex parte communications with criminal defendants in numerous cases, and conducting ex parte proceedings in numerous eases; removal and prohibition from holding future judicial office upheld); In re Sheppard, 815 S.W.2d 917, 921 (Tex.Spec.Ct.Rev.1991) (shouting match with store personnel; public reprimand upheld); In the Matter of Davila, 631 S.W.2d 723, 725-26 (Tex. 1982) (twenty-six acts of nepotism, leaving the scene of an accident; removal and prohibition from holding future judicial office not upheld). While Judge Lowery’s action in asking Judge Forman to falsify the report to the commission is egregious and can not be justified, this conduct falls between the conduct of Judge Davila and Judge Thoma. Therefore, if a remand is not an option, I would affirm the commission’s recommendation to remove Judge Lowery from office, but would leave it to the wisdom of future voters whether Judge Lowery’s past actions and future actions, “disqualify” him from further judicial service
JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF REMOVAL
This cause came on to be heard on the record of the proceedings below. The Review Tribunal1 concludes the underlying fact issues contained in Item 1 of the Notice of Formal Proceedings may not be revisited since sanctions had previously been imposed by the State Commission on Judicial Conduct. It further finds insufficient evidence to support the findings of the Special Master, adopted by the Commission, with regard to the allegations contained in Item 5. Accordingly, Items 1 and 5 are stricken. The Review Tribunal upholds the findings of the Special Master, adopted by the Commission, that Respondent’s conduct as enumerated in Items 2, 3 and 4 was willful and that sanctions are appropriate.
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED by the Review Tribunal that the recommendation of the Commission be affirmed and that Respondent be removed as Justice of the Peace, Precinct 2, Place 2, Irving, Dallas County, Texas,
It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that Respondent be forever barred from holding judicial office, and that this decision be certified below for *666observance.2
It appearing that no costs are due this Review Tribunal by reason of the appeal herein, no further order is made with respect thereto.
IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 13TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 1998.
/s/ Ann Crawford McClure
Ann Crawford McClure Presiding Justice
. See Tex.Elec.Code Ann. § 141.001 (Vernon 1986).
. The Review Tribunal was composed of Justice Ann Crawford McClure, Eighth District Court of Appeals, El Paso, designated Presiding Justice; Justice Donald Ross, Sixth District Court of Appeals, Texarkana; Justice Bob Dickenson, Eleventh District Court of Appeals, Eastland; Justice Woodie Jones, Third District Court of Appeals, Austin; Justice Don Burgess, Ninth District Court of Appeals, Beaumont; Justice Bill Vance, Tenth District Court of Appeals, Waco; and Justice Roby Hadden, Twelfth District Court of Appeals, Tyler.
. The Clerk of the Court is hereby directed to forward a certified copy of the foregoing Judgment and Order of Removal to the Texas Secretary of State as well as to the County Clerk of Dallas County, Texas for observance.