OPINION
TIJERINA, Justice.This appeal concerns a trial court order modifying the managing conservator provisions of a 1982 divorce decree. The trial court, without jury, held appellant in contempt for denying appellee access to the child, and granted the motion to modify naming appellee as the managing conservator. Findings of fact and conclusions of law were filed.
The prior divorce decree named appellant as the managing conservator. Appellee, as the possessory conservator, was awarded possession of the child on alternating Sundays and every Wednesday evening. The record reflects that the trial court previously held appellant in contempt for refusal to allow the father to exercise his visitation rights; however, punishment was postponed. On appeal, appellant contends that there is no evidence or insufficient evidence *86to support the motion for modification or the contempt order. We reverse the judgment of the trial court in part, and affirm in part.
TEX.FAM.CODE ANN. § 14.08(c) (Vernon Supp.1984) provides that a trial court may order modification of child custody after a hearing if (1) the circumstances of the child, managing conservator, posses-sory conservator, or other party affected by the decree have materially and substantially changed since the entry of the order or decree to be modified; and (2) the retention of the present managing conservator would be injurious to the child’s welfare; and (3) the appointment of a new managing conservator would be a positive improvement for the child.1 See Gibbs v. Greenwood, 651 S.W.2d 377, 379 (Tex.App.—Austin 1983, no writ). The burden is on the movant to establish the latter two elements by a preponderance of the evidence. Oglesby v. Silcott, 620 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1981, no writ); see In the Interest of Soliz, 671 S.W.2d 644, 647 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).
The trial court has wide discretion in determining child custody matters when it is the trier of fact and its decision will not be overturned absent a showing of a clear abuse of discretion. Hamann v. Morentin, 660 S.W.2d 645, 646 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1983, no writ); Dunker v. Dunker, 659 S.W.2d 106, 108 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no writ); In the Matter of the Marriage of Stockett, 570 S.W.2d 151, 153 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1978, no writ).
In considering a no evidence contention, we consider only the evidence favorable to the verdict and disregard all evidence to the contrary. Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex.1965); Files v.
Thomasson, 578 S.W.2d 883, 884 (Tex.Civ. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ). But when determining the sufficiency of the evidence we consider all the evidence to determine if the findings are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660, 661 (1951); Queton v. Queton, 622 S.W.2d 648, 650 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.). While findings of fact and conclusions of law ordinarily are binding on an appellate court, they are not binding when the statement of facts comprises a part of the record and the evidence is legally or factually insufficient to support them. Bobbitt v. Electronic Data Systems, 652 S.W.2d 620, 622 (Tex.App.— Dallas 1983, no writ); Armstrong v. Armstrong, 601 S.W.2d 724, 727 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1980, writ ref d n.r.e.).
The fact that the father has been denied his visitation rights, or has remarried, moved into a house, or his new wife is pregnant “are neither material nor substantial [changes] absent a showing of a relationship of such developments to the welfare of the children.” Armstrong v. Armstrong, supra, Files v. Thomasson, supra, at 884-85.2 As in Files, the father in our case presented evidence mainly supporting the contention that he was denied his visitation rights.
The evidence concerning a material and substantial change is that the child is no longer breast or bottle fed (she is now 4 years old); the child no longer needs to wear diapers; the mother is no longer employed; the father is remarried; the father has moved into an apartment; and the father’s new wife is pregnant. The evidence tending to show that maintenance of the present managing conservator would be in*87jurious to the welfare of the child is that the father has been denied visitation with the child, and as a result, he is unable to have a relationship with the child and teach her his morals and principles. The father stated his belief that his lack of visitation will damage the child’s emotional well-being, but also stated she has been “very cheerful, very happy go lucky,” and that she is very healthy. To show that the appointment of a new managing conservator would be a positive improvement for the child, the father stated he believed his appointment would be in the child’s best interest and the child could form a relationship with both mother and father. No evidence was presented concerning the living conditions of the child when living with her mother. See Armstrong v. Armstrong, supra, at 727.
While there is some evidence of change, we hold it is insufficient to establish a material and substantial change. Further, the evidence is insufficient to show that maintenance of the status quo, the mother as the managing conservator, will be injurious to the child’s welfare, or that substituting the father as managing conservator will be a positive improvement for the child. See Dalton v. Doherty, 670 S.W.2d 422, 424 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1984, no writ); Gaona v. Gaona, 627 S.W.2d 821, 823-24 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1982, no writ).
The mother also raises no evidence and insufficient evidence points regarding the trial court’s finding of contempt. The evidence is conflicting as to whether she denied the father visitation rights. The judge, as the trier of fact, had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and to determine their credibility. Buffalo Savings & Loan Association v. Trumix Concrete Co., 641 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1982, no writ); National Resort Communities, Inc. v. Holleman, 594 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
The evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s modification of managing conservator from the mother to the father; therefore, the trial court abused its discretion, and in this respect the judgment is reversed and rendered. The evidence is sufficient to support the finding that the mother is in contempt and in this respect judgment is affirmed.
. This section was amended effective September 1, 1983. The major change pertinent to this case is putting the three elements in the conjunctive.
. Note: In O. v. P., 560 S.W.2d 122, 126 (Tex.Civ. App. — Fort Worth 1977, no writ), the Fort Worth Court of Appeals overruled sufficiency of the evidence questions concerning a material and substantial change when the evidence showed the mother "violated [the father’s] visitation rights on several occasions since the granting of their divorce,” but reversed because the evidence was insufficient to support the holding that retention of the present managing conservator would be injurious to the welfare of the child.