concurring.
I agree with the dissent that the Court’s solution is problematic. During the process that will determine if new counsel will receive disqualified counsel’s work product, neither the former client who disqualified opposing counsel nor new counsel will have access to the work product. Neither will know or have any means of learning the extent to which it contains confidences or embodies legal theories based on confidences. How, then, can the former client or new counsel discern and then communicate to a judge what should and what should not be turned over by disqualified counsel? And, as the dissent points out, the Court’s process may often lead the trial court to rely heavily on disqualified counsel who undertook to represent a client when they knew or should have known that it was improper to do so. The Court’s procedures permit too great a risk that the former Ghent’s confidences will be used against it. However, the dissent’s solution may result in unnecessarily duplicating a substantial amount of work at great cost. I would chart a middle ground.
The work product of disqualified counsel should typically fall into one of three gen*521eral classifications: work product that is (1) likely to be tainted, (2) unlikely to be tainted, and (3) perhaps tainted. The first category of work product would include disqualified counsel’s notes, outlines, notebooks, memoranda, status reports, confidential communications, and work done by a consulting expert or jury consultant. These materials are likely to be tainted in a case such as this, i.e., when counsel has been disqualified because (1) its representation of a party was substantially related to its prior representation of another party and (2) it questioned the validity of work performed during that prior representation. I would hold that these types of work product and all core work product within the meaning of rule 192.5(b)(1)1 cannot be transferred to new counsel. It would be virtually impossible for a court to sift through work that contains or is based on an attorney’s mental impressions or legal theories to determine which were derived from the prior representation of an adverse party.
The second category of work product would include materials such as deposition summaries, document indices, and databases of document and deposition information. It is unlikely that these types of work product would be tainted, and generally, they would not contain core work product. If the client whose counsel was disqualified desires to transfer these materials to new counsel, it should be required to provide the opposing party an opportunity to view the materials to ensure that they do not reveal any confidences or legal theories derived from the prior representation of the opposing party by disqualified counsel. If there are objectionable materials, they could be redacted or withheld from new counsel, and an appropriate protective order could be entered if necessary. This procedure is analogous to situations contemplated by rule 192.5(b)(2) when a party seeks to discover work product other than core work product because that party is in “substantial need of the materials in the preparation of [its] case and is ... unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the material by other means.” Tex.R. Civ. P. 192.5(b)(2)
Giving the client whose counsel has been disqualified the option of producing work product to the party whose confidences are in jeopardy allows the client who must retain new counsel to make a considered decision about whether it desires its new counsel to prepare the case without the benefit of work that has already been done. The client whose counsel has been disqualified could weigh any cost savings against the damage that might be done if its own confidences in the work product were revealed. A measure of protection could be afforded this client by limiting the opposing party to only a review of the material. The opposing party would not be permitted to copy or to use this work product, but only to identify any specific items that it contended were tainted.
The third category, materials that are perhaps tainted, would include legal research. If a client whose counsel has been disqualified desires to transfer research to new counsel, disqualified counsel should be required to provide a detailed list of all issues that have been briefed. The opposing party could then make a determination of what issues might involve tainted matters and seek an in camera inspection if necessary. This would focus and narrow the issues for a trial court.
The Court’s procedures are impractical and unworkable. The trial court cannot simply assume from looking at inventories prepared by disqualified counsel that the actual documents or other materials do not contain the opposing party’s confidences or *522that thoughts or theories reflected in the work product are not based on those confidences. The trial court must either review all of the work product or rely on evidence from disqualified counsel. Neither alternative is acceptable.
In camera inspection of work product will in some cases entail the review of hundreds of documents, hundreds of pages of deposition summaries, and extensive databases. The sheer volume of material in those cases will make it unlikely that the work product will receive meaningful review, particularly when the party whose confidences are at risk has no means of knowing what the work product contains and thus cannot assist the trial court in recognizing confidential information.
When disqualified counsel asserts that work product does not contain tainted matters, the client who disqualified that counsel will be required to take that assertion at face value or attempt to counter it without having any means of doing so other than surmise and suspicion. In resolving the dispute, the trial court must rely heavily on the integrity of disqualified counsel, who will be the only one who knows and understands what confidences the work product actually contains.
The client is afforded little protection under the Court’s procedures. I therefore cannot support the Court’s solution.
. Rule 192.5(b)(1) defines core work product:
(1) Protection of Core Work Product— Attorney Mental Processes. Core work product — the work product of an attorney or an attorney’s representative that contains the attorney’s or the attorney’s representative’s mental impressions, opinions, conclusions, or legal theories — is not discoverable.
Tex.R. Civ. P. 192.5(b)(1).