I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the summary judgment and remand for further proceedings so that this Court could render a decision on this important constitutional issue with the benefit of a more fully developed factual record.
This case involves an appeal of a grant of summary judgment in favor of SLU. Therefore, in reviewing the judgment, this Court must draw all factual inferences against SLU. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-America Marine Supply Corp., *730854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993). The majority opinion does not follow this mandate. Instead, the majority identifies a series of facts and draws inferences in favor of SLU even though the inferences drawn are subject to reasonable dispute given the record in this case. This approach is the opposite of what this Court’s summary judgment case law requires.
The majority notes the fact that SLU is controlled by an independent board of trustees and that, when suit was filed, only nine of the forty-two SLU trustees were Jesuits. From this fact, the majority infers that SLU is subject to independent, secular governance and is not controlled by a religious creed. However, this inference begs the question as to whether the board, independent as it may be, nonetheless operates a sectarian institution. Americans United, 538 S.W.2d 711, 725 (Mo. banc 1976) (Seiler, J., dissenting). This inference is also inconsistent with the manner in which the majority dealt with the fact that SLU is currently led by a Jesuit president.1 The majority notes that SLU’s president is a Jesuit but concludes that the “focus is whether the school itself, not the person in charge of it, is controlled by a religious creed.” It is inconsistent to infer that the religious affiliation, or lack thereof, of the board of trustees indicates secular independence while the religious affiliation of SLU’s Jesuit president is irrelevant. The personal religious affiliation of university leadership is either relevant or it is not. It would certainly seem that religious affiliation is relevant; therefore, consistency and this Court’s summary judgment case law demands that the inferences from such affiliation be drawn against SLU. Consequently, if the fact that a majority of the trustees are not Jesuits indicates that the university is not controlled by a religious creed, then the fact that SLU’s president is a Jesuit indicates the opposite conclusion.
The majority also infers that SLU’s bylaws, which provide that the university will be publicly identified as a Catholic and Jesuit university and shall be governed and operated in accordance with that identity, demonstrate only an aspiration to Jesuit ideals and not the kind of control contemplated in Missouri’s establishment clause. The majority avoids drawing an inference against SLU by framing the repeated reference to religious ideals in the bylaws as mere “aspirational comments.” However, this inference overlooks the fact that the aspirations at issue are those of a particular religious creed. It is precisely those religious aspirations that, according to the language of the bylaws, guide SLU’s mission. If these religious aspirations are in practice realized, could this not support a finding that SLU is in reality controlled by a religious creed? The majority avoids this issue by relying heavily on the provision in the bylaws stating that the primary purpose of the university is the “encouragement of learning and the extension of the means of educationHowever, the numerous references to the SLU’s guiding Jesuit and Catholic religious principles contradicts the inference drawn by the majority that the university is not controlled by a religious creed. The language in the bylaws is not simply a matter of SLU’s religious affiliation or tradition; it is a matter of the university’s identity and governance. At the summary judgment stage, if the inferences truly were drawn against the SLU as the movant, then there would appear to be a genuine issue as to *731whether the bylaws indicate that the university is controlled by a religious creed.
If Missouri courts are going to be called upon to distinguish between religious affiliation and control, then the courts should make this sensitive and important decision with the benefit of all of the facts. If the facts are not adequately developed and a summary judgment is affirmed by drawing inferences in favor of the movant instead of against the movant, then the courts of this State run the risk of interjecting problematic concepts into Missouri’s establishment clause jurisprudence. The majority opinion does just that.
As discussed above, the majority opinion concludes that the bylaws reflect only religious aspiration and, therefore, that SLU’s mission is education and not the indoctrination or propagation of faith. The implication is that the benchmark for proving a violation of Missouri’s establishment clause violation is a showing of efforts at indoctrination or propagation of faith. The majority cites no Missouri case law for this proposition and there is no obvious reason why an institution could not be controlled by a religious creed even if proselytism is not a primary purpose. Indeed, not all religious creeds advocate the propagation of the faith or engage in efforts at indoctrination. It is, therefore, entirely possible that an institution can be controlled by a religious creed absent any showing of any effort whatsoever at indoctrination or propagation of the faith. Moreover, even if the religious creed at issue does advocate proselytism, it does not follow that proof of such efforts is required to establish a violation of Missouri’s establishment clause. A violation of Missouri’s clause can be proven upon a showing of less church-state involvement than is required to establish a violation of the federal establishment clause. Even under the higher quantum of proof required to establish a violation of the federal clause, it is not necessary to show efforts at indoctrination. Therefore, proving a violation of Missouri’s establishment clause cannot require a showing of efforts at indoctrination because it requires less of a showing of church-state involvement than is required under the federal clause. If proving a violation of the federal establishment clause does not depend upon a showing of efforts at indoctrination, then it is certain that Missouri’s more restrictive clause does not require such a showing.
A genuine issue that will prevent summary judgment exists where the record shows two plausible but contradictory accounts of the essential facts and the genuine issue is real, not merely argumentative, imaginary, or frivolous. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp., 854 S.W.2d at 382. The facts cited by the trial court and now by this Court are not sufficient to support summary judgment. As explained above, there are plausible, contradictory accounts of the essential facts of this case that render inappropriate the summary judgment entered on behalf of SLU. Thus, I agree with Judge Mooney of the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, who, in his separate opinion concurring with that court’s decision to transfer the appeal to this Court, wrote as follows:
Law is written in black and white, but life is lived in shades of gray. If indeed it were credibly established at trial that Saint Louis University, despite its governing documents, is no longer controlled by the Catholic creed, it might build its arena with public funds. I hope our Supreme Court orders a trial on the merits of that interesting question.
I would reverse and remand for a trial on the merits.
. At oral argument, counsel for SLU indicated that the university has always had a Jesuit president.