ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
In three points, appellants challenge the opinion of the Court in this cause. They assert we erred in holding (1) that the executive right to the Keaton and Young one-half mineral interest passed to the Shoafs by warranty deed because that executive right is not such an interest that passes under such a deed absent reservation or exception; (2) that the acceptance of the delay rentals and execution of the ratification and rental division orders by Keaton and Young were sufficient to revive the Stringer lease covering that interest because that lease had expired and Day & Co., Inc. had leased the Keaton and Young interest, without notice of the ratification, before recordation of the ratification; and (3) that Bobby G. Day was not a bona fide purchaser without notice because Texland did not plead that issue as a basis of summary judgment relief.
For the reasons previously set out in our original opinion, we continue to believe our holding with relation to the matters set out in appellants’ first two contentions is correct and overrule those contentions. With relation to appellants’ third contention, they correctly point out that in order to be entitled to a summary judgment, a prevailing party must establish a right thereto as a matter of law and that it is entitled to the judgment by reason of the matters set out in summary judgment pleadings. Durham v. Cannan Communications, Inc., 645 S.W.2d 845, 852 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1982, writ dism’d); Clear Creek Basin Authority v. City of Houston, 573 S.W.2d 839, 841 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1978), rev’d on other grounds, 589 S.W.2d 671 (Tex.1979). In appellee’s supplemental motion and response, it specifically alleged that Keaton and Young ratified the original oil and gas lease in favor of Stringer, that the Stringer lease was therefore valid, and that Day & Co., Inc.’s lease to Bobby G. Day and subsequent extensions of that lease were invalid because they violated a fiduciary duty owed Keaton and Young. This pleading is sufficient to raise the issue at summary judgment as to whether Bobby G. Day was entitled to the benefit of Tex.Prop.Code Ann. § 13.001(a) (Vernon 1984). In order to claim that benefit, an entity must be denominated as a “purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice” or an “innocent purchaser.” The requisites for those classifications, as we have noted, are the payment of valuable consideration, absence of notice, and good faith. Strong v. Strong, 128 Tex. 470, 98 S.W.2d 346, 347 (1936); Houston Oil Co. of Texas v. Hayden, 104 Tex. 175, 135 S.W. 1149, 1152 (1911). The uncontroverted summary judgment record sufficiently establishes that appellants were not entitled to the benefit of section 13.001(a). Appellants’ motion for rehearing is overruled.