(concurring). I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the 180-day period, MCL 780.131; MSA 28.969(1), was tolled while defendant sought relief from the trial court’s denial of his motion to set aside the convictions for kidnapping and felony-firearm. However, I would reach the result for reasons other than the possible bar posed by "the same transaction test” for double jeopardy. People v White, 390 Mich 245, 258; 212 NW2d 222 (1973).
The prosecutor must take good-faith action within the 180-day period to ready the case for trial. People v Hill, 402 Mich 272, 281; 262 NW2d 641 (1978); People v Hendershot, 357 Mich 300; 98 NW2d 568 (1959). In this case, if the prosecutor had proceeded with the armed robbery charge, the result would have been a severance of the charges, with an eventual second trial on the other two charges had they been reversed on appeal. I do not believe that the prosecutor was required to proceed to trial in these circumstances, since the delay resulted from defendant’s appeal. "[T]he defendant cannot defeat the jurisdiction of the court by delaying his trial.” People v Farmer, 127 Mich App 472, 477; 339 NW2d 218 (1983). A prosecutor does not act in less than good faith when he declines to squander judicial resources by proceeding with separate trials pending a defendant’s appeal.
Therefore, I would not address the possible application of the same-transaction test as a bar to a subsequent trial on the kidnapping and felony-firearm charges.