dissenting. This case presents a clear-cut issue of whether an act, which specifically applies to only three cities, violates Amendment 14 of the Arkansas Constitution. We have a well-settled standard for reviewing challenges to acts or statutes as violative of Amendment 14; nevertheless, it seems to me that the majority has stepped away from this precedent in its decision today. Although the majority acknowledges that Act 219 is special and local legislation because it applies only to the cities of Bentonville, Rogers, and Siloam Springs, it is in the interpretation and application of our Amendment 14 rational-basis analysis where the majority goes astray. For that reason, I must respectfully dissent.
I do not dispute that constitutionality is presumed or that the party challenging the act or statute has the burden of showing that it is unconstitutional; however, the majority has erroneously held that “a challenger must prove that there was no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose at the time the legislation was passed.” In so holding, the majority has relied upon the standard enunciated in the first appeal, City of Siloam Springs v. Benton County, 350 Ark. 152, 85 S.W.3d 504 (2002). Although I adhere to the principles of stare decisis, I cannot stand by and blindly follow this case law, which I now have to admit is flawed because it erroneously interpreted our Amendment 14 jurisprudence. My review of this court’s Amendment 14 jurisprudence reveals that when an act of the General Assembly applies to only a portion of the state, it is only constitutional if the reason for limiting the act to one area is rationally related to the purposes of that act. See Wilson v. Weiss, 368 Ark. 300, 245 S.W.3d 144 (2006); Weiss v. Geisbauer, 363 Ark. 508, 215 S.W.3d 628 (2005); Boyd v. Weiss, 333 Ark. 684, 971 S.W.2d 237 (1998); McCutchen v. Huckabee, 328 Ark. 202, 943 S.W.2d 225 (1997); Phillips v. Giddings, 278 Ark. 368, 646 S.W.2d 1 (1983). Moreover, although there may be a legitimate purpose for passing the act, it is the classification, or the decision to apply the act to only one area of the state, that must be rational. See McCutchen, 328 Ark. 202, 943 S.W.2d 225; Phillips, 278 Ark. 368, 646 S.W.2d 1. Despite this precedence, as in City of Siloam Springs, the majority has centered its analysis on whether Act 219 was rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective under “any reasonably conceivable state of facts.” This focus ignores that in a situation such as this, what we review is whether the decision to apply the act to only one area of the state was rational. See Geisbauer, 363 Ark. 508, 215 S.W.3d 628.
It is clear to me that there is no rational reason for this distinction. Flere, the 90% apportionment to Bentonville, Rogers, and Siloam Springs was for the purpose of constructing and maintaining streets, alleys, bridges, and culverts in such cities. Without a doubt, there is a legitimate government objective in providing road tax revenues to help maintain roadways in this state. However, as Benton County has shown, there was not a rational basis for this “special treatment” because these three cities are not materially different in needs and requirements than other cities.1 It is true that Act 219 could have been adopted on any number oflegitimate reasons, such as (1) the preferred cities are the three most populous cities in the county, (2) these three cities have more cars traveling their roads, and (3) these three cities have business and industry. But to be frank, I can think of many counties where these reasons could also have been advanced and where the three major cities in those counties also meet this criteria. So, why are the three most populous cities in Benton County apportioned more road tax revenue but not the three most populous cities in Pulaski County? What makes the presence of business and industry in Bentonville, Rogers, and Siloam Springs any different than the similar presence in Jacksonville, Little Rock, and North Little Rock? Quite simply, I cannot think of any reason rationally related to the purpose of Act 219, or any other legitimate purpose for that matter, for specifically singling out these three cities for the extra apportionment of revenue. Act 219 of 1963 arbitrarily singles out Bentonville, Rogers, and Siloam Springs for special treatment, and this is a clear violation of Amendment 14. For that reason, I would reverse and direct the circuit court to enter judgment on behalf of Benton County.
In focusing on the lack of “1963 evidence” as a basis for its conclusion that Benton County failed to rebut the presumption of constitutionality, the majority ignores the context of the County’s arguments and disregards established precedent that we have the power to hypothesize, as well as consider facts of which we may take judicial notice in our analysis. See Wilson, 368 Ark. 300, 245 S.W.3d 144; McCutchen, 328 Ark. 202, 943 S.W.2d 225.