concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the principal opinion to the extent that it affirms the trial court’s judgment as to Dan Wilburn. I cannot join the principal opinion to the extent that it stands for the proposition that a party has no responsibility to exercise diligence in obtaining legal representation. As to the reversal of the trial court’s judgment refusing to set aside Karen Wilburn’s default, I respectfully dissent.
Because the Wilburns failed properly to present their arguments to this Court, the judgment of the trial court is reviewable only for plain error. Rule 84.13(c) states: “Plain errors affecting substantial rights may be considered on appeal ... when the court finds that manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has resulted therefrom.” Rule 84.13(c) contemplates granting relief when the result below is plainly unjust. Even assuming that the trial court’s finding that *585both Wilburns were in default when they retained an attorney is wholly unsupported by evidence, the issue before this Court is whether the trial court’s judgment subjects Mrs. Wilburn to a manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice.
Mrs. Wilburn was served on April 27. Rule 55.25(a) specifies that an answer is due within thirty days. Mrs. Wilburn’s answer was due on May 29 because the thirtieth day was during a holiday weekend. Rule 44.01(a). Rule 74.05(a) provides, in pertinent part: ‘When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules, ... a judgment may be entered against the defaulting party.” These rules are not ambiguous or imprecise. They clearly instruct parties as to the time limits for filing and the consequences of failure to comply.
Evidence of Mrs. Wilburn’s activities before the expiration of the answer period is clearly relevant to her state of mind. Such evidence is helpful to show whether she intentionally or recklessly failed to answer on time. One acts recklessly if he or she does so “with indifference to consequences.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1270 (6th ed. 1990); see also In re Marriage of Williams, 847 S.W.2d 896, 900 (Mo.App.1998) (reckless, in default judgment context, means “lacking in caution” or “deliberately courting danger”).
The trial court found that Mrs. Wilburn had been involved in prior litigation. Mrs. Wilburn retained counsel only on the day her answer was due. Mrs. Wilburn does not dispute that she failed to answer within the time allowed by the rules of this Court. Reviewing the trial court’s judgment under the plain error standard, it cannot fairly be said that an experienced litigant who fails to exercise reasonable diligence in retaining counsel, retains counsel only on the afternoon of the last day of the answer period, fails to seek additional time in which to answer, and fails to file a timely answer suffers a manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice when a default judgment entered against her is not set aside. Nothing in the rules or decisions of this Court indicates that it is unjust to make a party bear the consequences of a default.
The trial court’s judgment as to Mrs. Wilburn should be affirmed.