Plaintiff appeals as of right a lower court order granting a motion by defendant for summary judgment. We reverse.
The sole issue in this appeal is whether an employer may fire an employee on account of absences from work that were due to a work-related injury for which the employee is entitled to compensation benefits. The few pertinent facts of this case are summarized in the dissenting opinion.
For purposes of determining the propriety of a motion for summary judgment, a trial judge must accept as true all of the nonmovant’s factual allegations as well as any reasonable inferences that could be drawn therefrom. Szydlowski v General Motors Corp, 59 Mich App 180; 229 NW2d 365 (1975).
It would be anomalous for this Court to hold that an employee may not be fired in retaliation for the filing of a workers’ compensation claim, Sventko v The Kroger Co, 69 Mich App 644; 245 NW2d 151 (1976), and then to hold, as the dissent would, that an employer may fire the employee nonetheless because of his absence from work due to the injury for which he is receiving such compensation. The effect of the dissenting opinion in this case would be to create a substantial "loophole” through which this Court’s opinion in Sventko may be vitiated.
Permitting an employer to fire an employee for absences due to a compensable claim under the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act would have *778a chilling effect on the filing of such claims. Public policy, therefore, dictates the opposite result. Inasmuch as it is the policy of this state that injured employees be fully compensated for their work-related injuries, the firing of such employees on account of their absence from work while recovering from their injuries does violate the established public policy of this state.
The lower court order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant is reversed and this case is remanded for trial.