This appeal from a summary judgment concerns a controversy between appellant, the divorced wife of a deceased fireman, and appellee, the widow of the fireman, over death benefits payable from the City of Dallas Pension Plan. The widow contends that she is entitled to the fireman’s death benefits under Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat.Ann. art. 6243a § 10 (Vernon Supp. 1977 — 1978). The divorced wife argues, *898however, that according to Texas community property law, she is entitled to a pro rata share of the death benefits resulting from the contributions of community funds made to the pension plan during their marriage. The trial court denied the divorced wife’s community property claim and gave all of the proceeds to the widow under article 6243a section 10. We hold that although part of the contributions to the plan were made with community funds of the fireman and his ex-wife, the right of the fireman or his survivors to receive benefits under the plan depends on the provisions of the statute. Section 10 of article 6243a designates that the widow, rather than the ex-wife, receive one-half of the benefits. Consequently, the ex-wife is not entitled to a pro rata share of the death benefits even though a pro rata share of the death benefits would otherwise be considered community property. Accordingly, we affirm.
The facts are stipulated. Ralph Lack made contributions from his salary to the Pension Plan for Policemen and Firemen of the City of Dallas, Texas, from January 16, 1953, to the time of his death in December 1975. Additionally, the City of Dallas made contributions to the pension plan on his behalf during his employment. On August 19, 1954, Ralph Lack married appellant Margaret Lack. They were divorced on February 11, 1965, but no mention was made of the pension plan in the divorce decree. Subsequent to October 26, 1970, Ralph Lack entered into a common law marriage with appellee Nora Lack, and she was his lawful wife when he died in the line of duty in December 1975.
Appellant Margaret Lack sued the Pension Fund and appellee Nora Lack to establish her community property interest in the death benefits. Appellant claims that she has a community interest in the death benefits because during her marriage to Ralph Lack, community funds in the form of salary deductions from his paycheck were paid into the pension fund, as well as contributions made on his behalf by the city as part of his compensation. She argues that at the time of her divorce, she possessed a community property interest in any future payments from the pension fund, regardless of whether the form of the payments were pension benefits or death benefits.
In support of her position, appellant cites Tex.Fam.Code Ann. § 5.01 (Vernon 1975), and Texas Supreme Court decisions such as Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1976), and Taggart v. Taggart, 552 S.W.2d 422 (Tex.1977), which hold that on division of property at divorce, benefits flowing from pension plans are community property to the extent of contributions made during marriage. The ex-wife contends that death benefits are likewise community property since there is no real distinction between pension benefits and death benefits because they are computed alike and emanate from the same source. Appellant claims, therefore, that the conversion of pension benefits into death benefits, as a result of Ralph Lack’s death, does not deprive her of her community property interest in death benefit payments from the pension fund. In support of this position, she also cites Simmons v. Simmons, 568 S.W.2d 169 (Tex.Civ. App.—Dallas 1978, writ dism’d), and Herring v. Blakeley, 385 S.W.2d 843 (Tex.1976). In Simmons, this court held that disability benefits based upon contractual rights that accrued during marriage and payable to the husband after divorce were community property. According to appellant, the death benefits here are no different from the disability benefits in Simmons because both are contractual forms of compensation paid by the employer for job related injuries. Appellant’s reliance on Herring stems from language in that decision which stated that “[cjommunity rights may exist in interests that cannot be reduced to possession, such as remainder or reversion rights.” 385 S.W.2d at 847. The death benefits, appellant urges, are similar to remainder rights earned by Ralph Lack. She claims that her interest in the death benefits is one-half of the total of the number of months she was married to Ralph Lack divided by the total number of months in which he made contributions to the pension plan times the dollar amount of each monthly death benefit if, as, and when it is paid.
*899Conversely, the widow argues that pension or disability benefits are not in issue here but only death benefits. She asserts that article 6243a section 101 expressly mandates that death benefits are payable only to the widow, and that the statute makes no provision for ex-wives. Tex.Rev. Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6243a § 10 (Vernon Supp. 1977-1978) reads as follows:
In case of the death before or after retirement of any member of the fire department, police department, or fire alarm operators’ department of any city or town within the provisions of this Act, from disease contracted or injury received and who at the time of his death or retirement was a member of either of said departments and a contributor to the said fund, leaving a widow, child or children under seventeen (17) years of age, the widow and such child or children shall be entitled to receive from the said fund an amount not to exceed one-half (½) of the base pay per month as defined in Section IB hereof, plus one-half (½) of the service money granted to members under the provisions of any state law or any city charter of any city within the provisions of this Act; one-half (½) of the widow’s amount in the aggregate shall go to the children under seventeen (17) years of age, and the balance of one-half (½) for the widow.
Upon the remarriage of the widow, either statutory or common, law, or the marriage of any child granted such pension, the pension shall cease. [Emphasis added.]
Appellee insists that the above provision that pension rights cease on remarriage supports her contention that only unmarried widows and not ex-wives are entitled to receive death benefits because the legislature’s sole purpose in creating death benefits was to provide financial assistance for a deceased employee’s widow, as long as she remains single, and for his minor children, so long as they remain minors.
Since the Dallas pension plan tracks the statutory distribution scheme contained in article 6243a section 10, our question is whether the language of this statute precludes the ex-wife from recovering a pro rata part of these proceeds as her community property. We hold that since the pension rights in question are wholly statutory, the legislature could designate the beneficiaries to whom death benefits are payable, and it has done so by limiting such benefits to widows so long as they remain unmarried and to children so long as they remain unmarried and are under eighteen years of age. Under the clear language of article 6243a section 10, if no survivor qualifies as a statutory beneficiary, then no benefits are payable, and if a survivor qualifies but subsequently marries, the benefits cease. Any inchoate interest of a spouse of a participant never ripens into a community property interest until occurrence of the contingency on which that interest depends. In this case, that contingency has not occurred and can never occur, insofar as any interest of appellant is concerned. Since the right to death benefits can never be established until the death of the participant, such benefits are not property acquired during the marriage, and, therefore, are not community property. The legislature’s control over these benefits was approved in City of Dallas v. Trammell, 129 Tex. 150, 101 S.W.2d 1009, 1013 (1937). In Trammell, our supreme court held that the right of a pensioner to receive monthly payments from a statutory pension fund, after retirement and after his rights in the fund had accrued, was subordinate to the right of the legislature to abolish the pension system or to diminish the accrued benefits of a pensioner under the plan. It logically follows that if the share of a participant in a statutory pension plan may be reduced or divested by the legislature, the legislature may also divest the inchoate contingent interest of an ex-wife. See Cook v. Employees Retirement System of Texas, 514 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1974, writ ref’d n. r. e.) (children over eighteen years of age but under twenty-one *900could be divested of their right to benefits when the age of majority was reduced to eighteen).
The rationale of City of Dallas v. Trammell was that an employee who elected to participate in a statutory pension plan did so “in contemplation of the reserved right of the Legislature to amend or to repeal the laws on which the pension systems are founded.” 101 S.W.2d at 1012. This particular language, as well as the holding in Trammell, was quoted with approval by our supreme court in Board of Managers of the Harris County Hospital District v. Pension Board of the Pension System for the City of Houston, 449 S.W.2d 33, 37 (Tex.1969). In accordance with these decisions, we hold that whatever inchoate community interest the spouse may have in the retirement fund, that interest is contingent on her surviving the participant as his widow; consequently, she has no claim to death benefits after divorce.
Our holding here is limited to death benefits under a pension plan authorized by article 6243a. We express no opinion with respect to the question of whether the ex-wife would have been entitled to a share in the pension benefits if her ex-husband had retired rather than died. Nor do we determine whether a spouse’s contingent interest in the fund may be considered in a division of the community estate on divorce.2 Furthermore, our holding here should not be construed as extending to death benefits under private pension plans. See Lee v. Lee, 112 Tex. 392, 247 S.W. 828, 832-33 (1923). See also Grost v. Grost, 561 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1977, writ dism’d) (death benefits under a private pension plan divisible upon divorce).
The same conclusion on the question of the spouse’s interest in an employee’s state authorized pension plan has been reached by the Supreme Court of California. Benson v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal.2d 355, 361-62, 33 Cal.Rptr. 257, 260, 384 P.2d 649, 652 (1963). In Benson, the court held that the wife’s interest in a widow’s pension in a municipal pension plan may never vest in her in the absence of the happening of the contingency upon which payment of the widow’s pension depends. See also Waite v. Waite, 6 Cal.3d 461, 99 Cal.Rptr. 325, 492 P.2d 13 (1972), overruled on other grounds. In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal.3d 838, 126 Cal.Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 561 (1976). Benson and Waite have been criticized by both courts and commentators. In In re Marriage of Peterson, 41 Cal.App.3d 642, 655, 115 Cal.Rptr. 184, 194 (Ct.App.1974), overruled on other grounds, In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal.3d 838, 126 Cal.Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 561 (1976), an intermediate court stated that Benson is not fair to ex-wives. Also, Reppy, Community And Separate Interests In Pensions and Social Security Benefits After Marriage of Brown and Erisa, 25 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 417, 443-82 (1978), contains an exhaustive and illuminating study of the California terminable interest rule announced in Benson and Waite. Notwithstanding these criticisms, we conclude that our solution of the problem is the only one consistent with Texas statutes and decisions.
Affirmed.
. Article 6243a § 10 was enacted pursuant to Tex.Const. art. Ill, sec. 51 — f.
. See Collide v. Collide, 546 S.W.2d 708 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1977, writ dism’d) (pen-si on benefits from statutory pension plan divisible upon divorce).