dissenting.
This is a dispute over one townhome in Harris County, and seven lots in Montgomery County. Title to all of the property was once held by appellant, Viki Chen Lee (Viki). According to Viki, after she and appellee An Tai Lee (Andy) were common-law married, she had title to the seven lots and townhome transferred into the name of her husband Andy, apparently in accordance with Taiwanese custom. There is evidence that Andy paid no consideration for the real estate. Thereafter, the parties were ceremonially married.
In the subsequent divorce proceeding, Andy took the position that the townhome and seven lots were his separate property, having been acquired by him prior to the ceremonial marriage, and therefore they were not subject to division in the divorce proceeding. After a bench trial, the trial court found the parties had been common-law married prior to Andy’s acquisition of title to the seven lots and townhome, and therefore that the real estate was community property to be divided in the divorce proceeding. Based on a finding that Andy had been abusive toward Viki, the trial court awarded Viki full title to the seven lots and townhome.
*908The main issue in this ease is whether the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the parties were common-law married prior to the time title to the townhome and seven lots was transferred into Andy’s name. The majority holds that the evidence is legally insufficient to show the existence of a common-law marriage, and therefore that the seven lots and the townhome are the separate property of Andy, because he acquired title prior to the ceremonial marriage. The majority ignores a substantial amount of relevant evidence in reaching its conclusion. Accordingly, I dissent.
The following evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the parties were common-law married prior to the May 1992 transfer of title of the real estate into Andy’s name:1
Agreement to be married, and living together as husband and wife in Texas after agreement.
The parties met in January 1992. At that time, Andy lived in an abandoned house. Andy moved in with ViM in March 1992. They both testified that they slept together beginning in March 1992. Andy ran his business out of ViM’s house and used her telephone number in his advertisements. The cheeks Andy received from his customers were deposited into ViM’s ehecMng account. Andy testified that ViM was responsible for the accounting for the business. ViM sent money to Andy’s parents in Taiwan. When asked in 1992 about the living arrangement she had with Andy, ViM would respond, “I married.” She testified that they had agreed to be married, and they were married. In Ms responses to requests for admissions, which he confirmed during his testimony, Andy made the following statements:
— I met and married ViM Chen on October 19,1990.
— She wrote to my family in Taiwan. Through letter announced we met in 1991 and married.
— Just like, usually, family’s husband responsible to earn money, wife responsible for accounting and housing since October 1990.
On cross-examination, Andy admitted his responses should have reflected that he met ViM in 1992, not in 1990 or 1991.
ViM testified that she and Andy agreed that each would bring their separately owned property “into the marriage.” Andy agreed to transfer certain property in Taiwan to the couple, and ViM had title to the townhome and seven lots transferred to Andy, in accordance with their agreement. At the time of the transfer, ViM told her sister she was doing that “because she got a husband now.”
The evidence is legally sufficient to support the trial court’s findings that the parties (1) agreed to be married, and (2) lived together as husband and wife in Texas prior to May 10, 1992, the date the townhome and seven lots were transferred into Andy’s name. The majority opinion does not contest this. Rather, the majority holds that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the trial court’s finding regarding the third element needed to establish a common law marriage.
In Texas represented to others that they were married.
The following evidence supports the trial court’s finding that ViM and Andy, while living in Texas, represented to others that they were married:
ViM testified that in 1992 she told her friends she was married, and customers and friends called her “Mrs. Lee.” ViM’s sister testified that ViM told her around May 1992 that “she got a husband now,” and that was the reason ViM wanted to transfer title to the townhome and seven lots into Andy’s name. Mrs. Kuo and Mrs. Ting, both long-time friends of ViM in the Houston area, testified that in 1992 ViM told them she was married; Mrs. Ting specifically said ViM told her in the early part of 1992.
Andy admitted that he was an illegal alien and he did not have a social security number or a passport. ViM, although born in Taiwan, has been a United States citizen since 1977. A reasonable inference from the evi*909dence is that Andy applied for a passport in September 1993, and as part of the process he represented that Viki was his wife. Viki testified that the reason they were ceremonially married in December 1993, was that Andy wanted to make a trip to Taiwan, and in order to be admitted back into the United States he needed to prove, by a marriage certificate, that he was married to a United States citizen.
Starting in early 1992, Viki wrote all the cheeks for all the bills of Andy’s company, Sing Chun Services, which was operated out of Viki’s house where the couple lived. Andy testified that this was normal, that it was customary for the wife of the family to be responsible for accounting and housing, apparently in accordance with Taiwanese tradition. The advertisements for the business, written in Chinese or Taiwanese, listed the home phone number.
Andy also testified that a letter was written by Viki and sent from Houston to Andy’s family in Taiwan announcing that Andy and Viki met in 1992 and were married. In December 1992, Viki sent a $500 money order to Andy’s parents in Taiwan to pay for the transfer of title of Taiwan property into Andy’s name so he could transfer it into the marriage, as he had agreed to do. A reasonable inference from the evidence is that Andy was aware of, and joined in, the representations to his parents, starting in early 1992, that he and Viki were married.
The statutory requirement of “represented to others” is synonymous with the judicial requirement of “holding out to the public.” Winfield v. Renfro, 821 S.W.2d 640, 648 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied). It is well settled that “holding out” may be established by conduct and actions of the parties; spoken words are not necessary to establish representation as husband and wife. Id. The record contains substantially more than a scintilla of evidence to support the finding that both Andy and Viki represented to others, by words and actions, that they were married prior to May 1992.
Accordingly, appellant’s attacks on the legal sufficiency of the evidence should be overruled, and we should address the remaining points of error in this appeal.
. We note that a Taiwanese language interpreter was utilized during the trial.