dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority above; as I believe that the underlying action was in active litigation prior to Ms. Wilkerson’s death and was, therefore, “pending” by virtue of the revival statute of KRS 395.278. Accordingly, KRS 304.36-085 automatically stayed the revival limitations period of KRS 395.278 when the original insurer became insolvent and provided an additional six months within which the plaintiffs successor, here, Charles Wilkerson, could revive the medical malpractice action. Thus, Appellees’ action was improperly dismissed.
The law regards that as done which ought to have been done; and, if it is finally held liable, those persons who would have gotten the fund if the claim had been paid off when the right attached are not affected by the fact that they did not survive the final result of the litigation.
Thomas’ Adm’r v. Maysville Gas Co., 112 Ky. 569, 23 Ky. L. Rptr. 1879, 66 S.W. 398, 400(1902).
The majority is of the opinion that the death of a plaintiff in a lawsuit serves as an absolute abatement to that suit’s status as a proceeding until revival is effectuated. However, I cannot join in this conclusion, as it appears to me that this is the very quandary which the revival statute was instituted to address. Certainly, it is entirely reasonable to conclude that the impetus for the enactment of KRS 395.278 was to eliminate the archaic and overly-harsh presumption that a proceeding died with its plaintiff, or actio personalis mori-tur cum persona. It stands to reason, then, that the General Assembly, as a matter of policy, intended to address the resulting injustice in allowing a tortfeasor to avoid liability for his or her wrongdoing simply by virtue of the death of the opposing party.
While the revival statute does not affect an automatic personal succession of a decedent’s representative to a lawsuit, it does, through a legal reality of statutory creation, permit the lawsuit itself — absent a personal holder of the lawsuit — to survive as a live action in its stead. And although this may be contrary to the common law notions which the majority endorses, the law is replete with examples wherein staid principles of common law *930are altered by statutory introduction. See, e.g. KRS 381.216 (wait and see statute instituted a more practical approach to the much maligned legal fiction of the rule against perpetuities stating, “[i]n determining whether an interest would violate the rule against perpetuities the period of perpetuities shall be measured by actual rather than possible events”). The present instance is inherently analogous in that it operates to insert a more fundamental level of practicality to what is otherwise an abstract and purely legal construction which leads to unjust results.
Thus, I would find that KRS 395.278 operates to maintain an action’s status as a live proceeding so long as it is revived within the limitations period of that statute; or simply put, the revival statute allows what would otherwise be a dead action to exist as a five and pending proceeding until the applicable limitations period expires.
Contrary to the majority’s reasoning, KRS 304.36-085 should be construed to suspend the running of the one year limitations period of KRS 395.278 upon a reciprocal’s insolvency. The mandatory language of KRS 304.36-085 conveys definite meaning. Accordingly, because the revival statute maintains a suit’s status as a live and pending proceeding, it therefore falls automatically within the ambit of KRS 304.36-085. The force of the stay controls over the limitations period of the revival statute. There is no discretionary language in the statute which would otherwise indicate that a separate motion or some other action is required to render the stay enforceable. Thus, because the statute plainly operates to institute a mandatory stay for a minimum of six months, it is difficult to assert that the statute somehow does not mean what it says: stay means stay.
Moreover, this Court has historically construed statutes in such a manner as to save a claim. See Dollar General Stores, Ltd. v. Smith, 237 S.W.3d 162, 164-165 (Ky.2007) (interpreting the jurisdiction savings statute, KRS 413.270, as applicable to venue under the premise that the statute should be interpreted broadly to achieve its remedial purpose of saving claims); see also Lemmons v. Ransom, 670 S.W.2d 478, 479 (Ky.1984) (extending the savings statute, KRS 413.170, as applicable to tort liability actions). If the legislature meant something other than the plain reading of the statute, then it is well within the scope of their authority to change the statute. However, I do not think that this Court should stretch to ascribe a meaning to such language which is both contrary to logic and to its clear intent.
The majority concludes that the revival statute must be strictly construed and is not subject to enlargement. See Daniel v. Fourth & Market, Inc., 445 S.W.2d 699, 701 (Ky.1968) (strictly construing former KRS 395.277). While it may be a correct statement as to the current status of the law in this state to say that the limitations period may not be enlarged, it is not an accurate assessment of the nature of this case. Appellant, here, does not request that the limitations period be enlarged, but rather that the limitations period be tolled by virtue of the stay provision of KRS 304.36-085.
Further, Daniel, upon which the majority heavily leans, is distinguishable from the present instance. In Daniel, the principal issue before the Court centered on whether the limitations period of the revival statute, under former KRS 395.277, was a matter of procedure — as opposed to a matter of substance — and therefore subject to discretionary enlargement, pursuant to the Court’s rule-making authority *931and CR 6.02. 445 S.W.2d at 700-701. The Court ruled that the limitations period was not subject to discretionary enlargement under CR 6.02, but did, however, recognize that under CR 25.01 the Court may intervene upon equitable considerations. Id. at 701.
Thus, while the limitations period of KRS 395.278 is not subject to discretionary enlargement or enforcement, revival beyond the expiration of the limitations period is not without precedent in the Commonwealth. Indeed, CR 25.01(1) recognizes that if motion for revival is not made within the limitations period, the action “may” be dismissed as to the deceased party. And while we noted again in Hammons v. Tremco, Inc., 887 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Ky.1994), that this language did not signify discretionary dismissal, we reiterated, however, that it does provide for exceptions to dismissal when rights have been lost, such as by waiver, estoppel, or consent. See also Snyder v. Snyder, 769 S.W.2d 70 (Ky.App.1989).
In Harris v. Jackson, 192 S.W.3d 297, 307 (Ky.2006), this Court held that a party could be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations defense of KRS 395.278 to the party’s revival action when the party’s attorney failed to disclose that the party had died during the pendency of the lawsuit. In Harris, we reasoned that the death of the insured party (and thus, under the doctrine of virtual representation, the insurer) changed the identity of the defendant and therefore changed the procedures necessary to finish the lawsuit. Id. at 306. As such, we concluded that estoppel was applicable to KRS 395.278 to avoid resulting injustice, and held that the insurer was estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense against the Appellee’s claim of revivor, despite the fact that such claim was made after the one year limitations period had passed.
The present instance, though somewhat factually dissimilar from the preceding, is analogous. Although there was no affirmative misrepresentation or omission by any party here, we are presented with a situation where, by virtue of the insolvency and ordered liquidation of the original insurer and the death of the original plaintiff, circumstances were brought into existence necessitating additional considerations of timeliness. Because insolvency changed the identity of the insurer, KIGA became the substituted party. Accordingly, KRS 304.36-085 became applicable, effectuating a stay upon the original limitations period. Here, we should acknowledge that KRS 304.36-085 suspends the running of the revival limitations period similar to the manner in which we have recognized the effect of other provisions — such as CR 25.01(1) — upon the running of the statute.
In the present instance, KRS 304.36-085 automatically tolled, by virtue of its mandatory language, the revival limitations period of KRS 395.278 and provided, at minimum, an additional six months within which the suit could be revived. I find no reason why KRS 304.36-085 should not be construed to affect a stay upon the revival limitations period. Therefore, I would affirm the Court of Appeals.
CUNNINGHAM, J., joins this dissent.