dissenting.
The majority opinion concludes that the quantity and quality of prior criminal acts on or around the public parking lot prior to Appellant’s abduction were not sufficient to impose a duty on Allright to warn its business invitees of potential crime or to take further steps to secure their safety. The majority further concludes that there is no evidence that Allright was aware or should have been aware of crime on or around its lot sufficient to impose these duties. I respectfully disagree with these conclusions.
The Existence of A Duty
While I recognize that the existence of a duty is a question of law to be decided by the court from the facts surrounding the occurrence in question, see Centeq Realty, Inc. v. Siegler, 899 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex.1995), when the facts pointing to the issue of foreseeability are in dispute, as they are in this case, the issue is to be decided by the fact finder— in this case, by the jury. See Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 526 (Tex.1990); Bennett v. Span Industries, Inc. 628 S.W.2d 470, 474 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Generally, a person has no legal duty to protect another from the criminal acts of a third person or control the conduct of another. See Siegler, 899 S.W.2d at 197. Likewise, a property owner has no duty to prevent criminal acts of third parties who are not under the property owner’s supervision or control. See Exxon Corp. v. Tidwell, 867 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex.1993). This rule, however, carries a number of exceptions, one of which arises when the unsafe condition or likelihood of danger to the invitee is reasonably foreseeable. See Nixon v. Mr. Property Management, 690 S.W.2d 546 (Tex.1985). In Nixon, the supreme court stated:
Foreseeability means that the actor, as a person of ordinary intelligence, should have anticipated the dangers that his negligent act created for others. Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. American Statesman, 552 S.W.2d 99, 103 [ (Tex.1977) ]. Usually, the criminal conduct of a third party is a superseding cause relieving the negligent actor from liability. However, the tortfea-sor’s negligence will not be excused where the criminal conduct is a foreseeable result of such negligence.
Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 549-50, citing to Castillo v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 663 S.W.2d 60 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) and Walkoviak v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 580 S.W.2d 623 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Walkoviak, a hotel patron, was injured in an attack at the adjacent hotel parking lot. He sued the hotel, claiming negligence in failing to provide adequate security against the criminal acts of others. In reversing a summary judgment on the no-duty rule, the court stated:
The proprietor of the public business establishment has the duty to exercise reasonable care to protect his patrons from intentional injuries caused by third persons if he has reason to know that such acts are likely to occur, either generally or at some particular time. Liability for injuries may arise from the failure of the proprietor to exercise reasonable care to discover that such acts by third persons are occurring, or are likely to occur, coupled with the failure to provide reasonable means to protect his patrons from the harm or to give a warning adequate to enable the patrons to avoid the harm.
Walkoviak, 580 S.W.2d at 625; see also Ronk v. Parking Concepts of Texas, Inc., 711 S.W.2d 409, 412-13 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 (1965) (owner of premises liable for injury to business invitee caused by intentional harmful act of third person where owner fails to exercise reasonable care to discover act is occurring or likely to occur or fails to give adequate warning so that invitee might avoid harm, or otherwise protect invitee from harm). This duty grows out of principle that the one with the power or control of expulsion is in the best position to protect the invitee from the dangerous characteristics associated with the property. See Exxon Corp. v. Tidwell, 867 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex.1993).
*258Foreseeability — Other Criminal Acts Are But One Consideration
Duty arises when the property owner knows or should know of a general dangerous condition connected with the property. This knowledge need not conform to the exact sequence of events that produced the harm in question. See Walker v. Harris, 924 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex.1996); Lofton v. Texas Brine Corp., 777 S.W.2d 384, 387 (Tex.1989); Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 550-51. All that is required is that the injury be of such a general character that the property owner should reasonably have anticipated it. See Carey v. Pure Distributing Corp., 133 Tex. 31, 124 S.W.2d 847 (1939); Allright, Inc. v. Pearson, 711 S.W.2d 686 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 735 S.W.2d 240 (Tex.1987).
Evidence of specific past crimes on or near the property, for example, may give rise to a fact issue on the foreseeability of criminal activity. See Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 550. Other factors may also raise a fact issue on foreseeability. Comment f under section 344 of the Restatement of Torts, Second, suggests that the landowner may:
know or have reason to know, from past experience, that there is a likelihood of conduct on the part of third persons in general which is likely to endanger the safety, of the visitor, even though he has no reason to expect it on the part of any particular individual. If the place or character of his business, or his past experience is such that he should reasonably anticipate careless or criminal conduct on the part of third persons, either generally or at some particular time, he may be under a duty to take precautions against it, and to provide a reasonably sufficient number of servants to afford a reasonable protection.
The Ronk opinion, on which the majority so heavily relies, acknowledges that “[w]hile prior similar incidents are helpful to determine foreseeability, they are not required to establish it. Other circumstances may also place the landowner on notice of a dangerous condition.” Ronk, 711 S.W.2d at 417. A rule which directs the court to rely solely on “sufficient prior acts” would automatically bar relief to victims of first-time crimes on a particular site. See id.
Ronk is an appeal of a summary judgment — the case never went to a jury. The Fort Worth court of appeals, however, went to considerable lengths to acknowledge that the issue of foreseeability should be determined by a jury whenever a fact issue is raised. See id.; see also Parking, Inc. v. Dalrymple, 375 S.W.2d 758, 763 (Tex.App—San Antonio 1964, no writ). The opinion distinguishes Allright, Inc. v. Pearson, where the jury heard extensive expert testimony on the foreseeability of an attack in a parking garage from a security consultant who discussed the standard of care required for a multi-story enclosed parking garage. See Ronk, 711 S.W.2d at 417; Allright, Inc. v. Pearson, 711 S.W.2d at 692 (Allright factually distinguished from Ronk because jury heard expert witness testify on foreseeability). Although Ronk provided evidence of seventeen criminal incidents reported on or near the site in question within a two-year period prior to the assault, the lack of expert testimony on the issue of foreseeability caused the court to affirm the summary judgment. See Holder v. Mellon Mortg. Co., 954 S.W.2d 786, 797 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ) Ronk, 711 S.W.2d at 416-19. Here, the majority disregards expert testimony because the underlying crime incident reports upon which the expert relied were not offered as evidence.
The case at bar more closely resembles every case the Ronk court distinguished. Like Isaacs, the parking lot was located in a high crime area, the lot was devoid of security, and plaintiffs expert testified that “parking lots, by their very nature, create an especial temptation and opportunity for criminal conduct.” See Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 38 Cal.3d 112, 211 Cal.Rptr. 356, 695 P.2d 653 (1985). As in Walkoviak, the head of the defendant’s security system had made no conscious effort to review the history of criminal acts in the area adjacent to the hotel, yet police had been called to the hotel due to robberies on two previous occasions. See Walkoviak v. Hilton Hotels Corp. 580 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston *259[14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (summary judgment in favor of hotel reversed). See also Pearson, supra.
Legal Sufficiency
In reviewing a “no evidence” point, we consider only the evidence and inferences that tend to support the finding, disregarding all evidence and inferences to the contrary. Vannerson v. Vannerson, 857 S.W.2d 659, 666 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied). Under this test, there must be some evidence to support the jury finding, either directly or inferentially. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Alexander, 868 S.W.2d 322, 327 (Tex.1993). If there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the finding, the no evidence challenge must fail. Stafford v. Stafford, 726 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Tex.1987). Evidence that a reviewing court may have discounted if serving as a jury cannot be judicially erased from the record. Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Reyna, 865 S.W.2d 925, 928 (Tex.1993); America’s Favorite Chicken Co. v. Samaras, 929 S.W.2d 617, 628 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1996, writ denied). In other words, we may not find the evidence legally insufficient unless we are persuaded that a “vital fact may not reasonably be inferred from the meager facts proved in the particular case.” Texas Dep’t of Mental Health v. Petty, 817 S.W.2d 707, 717 (Tex.App.—Austin 1991), aff'd, 848 S.W.2d 680 (Tex.1992) (quoting Calvert, “No Evidence” and “Insufficient Evidence” Points of Error, 38 Tex. L. Rev. 361, 365 (1960)).
The majority concludes that there was no evidence that Allright was aware or could have become aware so that the abduction of appellee was foreseeable.1 My review of the record, however, reveals that Dr. Norman R. Bottom, a certified security consultant and the author of the only book on the subject of parking lot and garage security, testified extensively as to Allright’s existing knowledge of the inherent dangers of parking lot crime. For example, Allright, as a member of the National Parking Association had access to such information industry-wide going back to at least 1978. Allright’s internal document, known as the city manager’s manual, noted in particular the potential danger to property and human life on outside parking lots. Dr. Bottom testified that Allright’s city manager’s manual clearly showed that Allright had actual knowledge prior to 1988 that then-operation would put customers at risk. As a member of the International Parking Association, Allright had been advised to beware of the danger to customers, especially female customers, in both parking lots and garages. For a company who should be concerned about such risk to its customers, Allright could also have gone to the San Antonio Police Department and asked about the crime rates on or near their parking lot locations and sought advice on crime prevention, but did not do it. Allright could have conducted a security survey of the site, looked at crime patterns in the area, hired a security guard, installed closed circuit TV, put up warning signs, posted the property against trespassers, limited access, and trained its employees to pay close attention to the most vulnerable of its customers — the elderly, handicapped, and women. Dr. Bottom also testified that Allright could have provided written instructions to its parking lot attendants on what to do in such situations, and that Allright could have installed a telephone on the premises. Allright had not done any of these things at the time this abduction occurred.
The jury also heard testimony from Jorge Campos, the parking lot employee on site on the day of the abduction. Campos had been told to call the police and the office if he saw a crime in progress — however, Allright did not provide a telephone for this purpose. He admitted that part of his duty in 1988 was to see that a woman got into her car and off the lot safely without being attacked.
The jury also heard testimony from Anton Mihalee, a San Antonio police officer qualified as an expert on crime and foreseeability, *260regarding prior violent crimes on or near the lot and the fact that this lot was a dangerous place. AlMght’s expert, Merly Douglas Moore, testified that this lot was a model of safety, clearly putting the above-stated facts into dispute. Moore further testified, however, that a woman returning to her car at a public parking lot was a very vulnerable person. He admitted on cross-examination that he had previously testified in a Houston case that the majority of assaults or abductions in public places occur in a public lot or an open parking area. Such conflicting testimony could easily have lead the jury to find plaintiffs expert more persuasive.
The majority appears to focus on the fact that plaintiffs experts’ opinions were based in part on their review of crime incident reports in the vicinity of the parking lot and that these reports were not offered into evidence. Texas Rule of Evidence 703 addresses the types of “facts or data” upon which the expert’s opinion can be based.2 As the Texas Supreme Court explained,
Broken down into its components, the rule contemplates three sources of the “facts or data” that might underlie.the expert’s testimony: (1) first-hand knowledge; (2) hypothetical questions based on admitted evidence, and (3) inadmissible data, if of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject. See Fed. R. Evid. 703 Advisory Committee’s Note; Sutton, Commentary on Expert Testimony, in Texas Rules of Evidence Handbook 847 (2d ed.1993).
E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., Inc. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 562 (Tex.1995). It is not essential that the crime reports themselves be admitted into evidence for the expert to review them and base an opinion in part on them.
Conclusion
As this court clearly noted more than thirty years ago,
Foreseeability is an indispensable element of tort liability.... For a result to be legally foreseeable, however, it is not required that the particular accident complained of should have been foreseen. All that is required is that the injury be of such a general character as might reasonably have been anticipated; and that the injured party should be so situated with relation to the wrongful act that injury to him or to one similarly situated might reasonably have been foreseen.... The issue of foreseeability is submitted to the jury as a part of the definition of ‘proximate cause.’
Parking, Inc. v. Dalrymple, 375 S.W.2d 758 at 763 (citations omitted). In this case, the jury heard conflicting evidence and made a decision that what occurred was or should have been foreseeable and that, considering all the surrounding circumstances, Allright had a duty to protect its invitee from harm. Because it took no steps to protect her, the jury held Allright liable for the harm that ensued. I would find the evidence of foreseeability sufficient to support the jury verdict. For these reasons, I believe the majority’s decision to reverse and render a take-nothing judgment is in error.
. By contrast, when reviewing a challenge to the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we consider, weigh, and examine all of the evidence that supports and is contrary to the finding. Vannerson, 857 S.W.2d at 666. We will set aside the finding only if the evidence is so weak or the finding so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that the finding is manifestly erroneous or unjust. Id. I respectfully suggest that the majority has relied upon the wrong standard because it found the evidence of foreseeability weak when based on an expert opinion.
. The rule in effect at the time stated: "The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or reviewed by the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.”