concurring specialty-
I do not agree that the “clearly erroneous” standards do not apply in this case. The judgment still should be reversed because, when applying Rule 52(a), NDRCivP, it is apparent that Finding of Fact No. XV, which is crucial to the judgment, was obviously “induced by an erroneous view of the law.” See, e.g., Stee v. “L” Monte Industries, Inc., 247 N.W.2d 641, 644 (N.D.1976).
There is a grey area between conclusory findings and conclusions of law. Eszlinger v. Wetzel, 326 N.W.2d 215, 217 (N.D.1982); Voth v. Voth, 305 N.W.2d 656 (N.D.1981); Backhaus v. Renschler, 304 N.W.2d 87 (N.D.1981); Steckler v. Miller & Holmes, 303 N.W .2d 560 (N.D.1981). In some situations the distinction may be one of semantics. When, on appeal, the trial court decision is “confirmed,” little concern is expressed about the “concisely stated” reasons written by the justices as required by Article VI, § 6, North Dakota Constitution. Every opinion becomes a part of precedent, however, and in the case of Rule 52(a), we have created such a variety of “gloss” that the language of the rule itself has become all but meaningless.
Rule 52(a) requires the trial court to “find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon” in “all actions tried upon the facts” by the court. [Emphasis supplied.] Except for a short period of time in territorial days under Laws of Dakota, 1862, Civil Procedure, Art. Ill, Ch. VIII, § 277, when trial judges were explicitly not required to make “a finding” except when requested, trial judges have been required “in giving the decision the facts found and the conclusions must be separately stated.” See Revised Codes, Territory of Dakota, 1877, Code of Civil Procedure, Art. VI, Ch. 12, § 267 (apparently approved January 7,1863). We have not since been without a statute or rule imposing this requirement upon trial judges.
The only significant variable that my research has disclosed is that from the enactment of the Newman Act in 1893 (Ch. 82, S.L.1893, variously numbered in the codified laws over the years) until the repeal of § 28-27-32, NDCC in 1971 (Ch. 311, § 2, S.L.1971), this court was directed to try questions of fact anew on appeal. Rule 52(a), which had been adopted in 1957, was amended after the repeal of the Newman Act, by adding: “Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses.”
We have often said either that we follow federal court interpretations of Rule 52 because we adopted the rule from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or that federal court interpretations are “highly persuasive.” In Re Estate of Elmer, 210 N.W.2d 815, 820 (N.D.1973). Little attention has been afforded to the precedent established by our own court in cases such *434as Chief Justice Bartholomew’s enlightening opinion in Jasper v. Hazen, 4 N.D. 1, 58 N.W. 454 (1894). We could make more adequate use of this court’s own precedent, particularly the early decisions, if the full text were added to the publisher’s data bank.
The changes in the statutes and the rules have had little, if any, effect on the opinions produced by this court. We appear to be impelled to find ways to rephrase the rule to make it appear that we are not trying fact issues de novo in some cases, and to make it appear, in other cases, that we really give deference to trial court determinations, even though we really wouldn’t have made that determination if we had been the trial judge.