Justice, concurring and dissenting.
I concur with the majority’s finding of contemptuous conduct, but I disagree with the punishment assessed, for the reasons set forth below.
The litigation underlying the instant contempt proceeding involves a long and bitter dispute arising out of a judgment obtained by Juan Lopez Butrón and Luis Enrique Cortinas Villarreal (collectively “Butrón”), against Mark A Cantu in excess of $1,000,000 in May 1993. See Butron v. Cantu, 960 S.W.2d 91 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1997, n.w.h.); Cantu v. Butron, 921 S.W.2d 344 (TexApp.—Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied); Cantu v. Butron, 905 S.W.2d 718 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1995, writ denied).
*492Immediately after Butrón obtained the underlying judgment against Cantu, Butrón sought to garnish Cantu’s property in Hidal-go County, Texas.1 Cantu responded by filing a lawsuit for wrongful garnishment in Hidalgo County. Subsequently, Cantu timely gave his notice of appeal from the May 1993 judgment and filed a supersedeas bond. We affirmed the May 1993 judgment, the Supreme Court of Texas denied writ of error, and our mandate issued on February 19, 1997. Cantu, 921 S.W.2d 344. The history of the litigation is more fully set out in the majority’s opinion.
My attention is drawn to the proceedings below which occurred on March 10, 1997, following the issuance of the mandate, and I believe their significance has been thus far overlooked. In those proceedings, Cantu was attempting to enjoin Butrón from executing upon the judgment. At that point, the accrual of post-judgment interest had caused the underlying judgment to swell beyond the amount of the supersedeas bond.
Significantly, Butron’s counsel agreed to forebear execution, pending appellate resolution of the bill of review proceeding from the 138th District Court, provided that Cantu obtain an increased bond amount (in order to cover the growing judgment). Butron’s counsel stated that “if I have a supersedeas bond in the full amount of the judgment, I will agree not to pursue the mandate, but as the court heard, we’re $250,000 short on the supersedeas bond.” Butron’s counsel and Cantu’s counsel then agreed upon the deadline for posting the increased bond amount. Butron’s counsel stated: ‘Tour Honor, if they agree to post the bond by noon on Wednesday, I will agree not to pursue execution.”
The record reflects that Cantu has abided the terms of the foregoing agreement by obtaining the further issuance of irrevocable credits from International Bank of Commerce (“IBC”), in order to secure the super-sedeas obligation of Universal Surety of America (“Universal”), which was increased in accordance with the accrual of post-judgment interest on the underlying judgment. Butron’s judgment, therefore, remains fully secured.
Despite the foregoing agreement to forebear in execution of Butron’s judgment, Universal demanded payment pursuant to the credits issued by IBC. IBC honored its letter of credit obligations, and wired the funds to Universal. Universal then instituted inter-pleader proceedings. Universal’s presentment to, and demand for payment from, IBC, despite the agreement to forebear in execution, caused Cantu’s subsequent attempts to protect himself through extraordinary writs.
Cantu, as IBC’s letter of credit customer,2 was not free to alter the terms of the irrevocable credits of which Universal was the beneficiary.3 Tex. Bus. & Comm.Code Ann. § 5.106(b) (Vernon 1994). IBC, as the letter of credit issuer,4 was required to honor Universal’s demand for payment. Tex. Bus. & Comm.Code Ann. § 5.114(a) (Vernon 1994 & Supp.1997) (setting forth issuer’s “duty and privilege” to honor the credit); see also Tex. Bus. & Comm.Code Ann. § 5.115 (Vernon 1994) (regarding beneficiary’s remedy for improper dishonor). IBC’s liability to Universal upon Universal’s demand for payment was independent of that of Cantu. See Tex. Bus. & Comm.Code Ann. § 5.114, cmt. 1. (Vernon 1994 & Supp.1997). Further, the payment by IBC to Universal rendered Cantu immediately liable to IBC. Tex. Bus. & Comm. Code Ann. § 5.114(c) (Vernon 1994 & Supp. 1997).
Cantu was thus unable to prevent the payment to Universal by IBC, despite the non-execution agreement. Cantu, however, sought to prevent dissipation of the funds tendered to Universal. Because the judgment creditors are Mexican nationals, attachment was an available remedy for Cantu. See Tex. Crv. PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. *493§ 61.002(1), (5) (Vernon 1997). Pre-judgment attachment may, pursuant to statute, issue to secure an unliquidated debt, or one allegedly arising from tortious conduct. Tex. Civ. Phac. & Rem.Code Ann. §§ 61.004,61.005 (Vernon 1997). Of course, Cantu would not have been in a position to pursue these remedies, had the non-execution agreement been honored.
The majority appears to place a higher degree of obligation on Cantu to obey the court’s orders simply because he is an attorney. I would suggest that all persons, regardless of their occupations, are equally obligated to obey the orders of the court. We should treat each complaint alleging violation of the court’s orders on a case-by-case basis and treat all contemnors equally, regardless of their station in life. While mindful of the public’s perception of the judicial system, I am also mindful of our obligation to rule fairly and impartially on the merits of each case and not to merely appease the roar of the crowd.
In this case it appears that Butrón drew first blood by seeking to garnish Cantu’s bank accounts before the ink on the underlying judgment was dry. Later, after agreeing not to execute on the judgment if Cantu provided an adequate supersedeas bond, Bu-trón nevertheless made demand on the surety for payment. Cantu’s reaction was to seek the protection of the courts.
I agree, however, that Cantu was required to obey the September 26, 1997 order which enjoined him from taking any further action to impede the collection of the final judgment rendered by the 138th District Court of Cameron County, Texas, even if the order was improvidently granted. I also agree that Cantu violated the order by the actions he took subsequent to the order. I disagree, however, that Cantu should be confined for his conduct. Cantu had a right to rely on Butron’s agreement not to execute pending determination of the bill of review, especially since the judgment was fully protected. In determining what punishment to assess, I would also evaluate the conduct of the complainant as well as the contemnor. In this ease, it appears that Cantu merely reacted to Butron’s provocations. In my opinion, these circumstances mitigate in favor of conditional suspension of the sentence imposed. For these reasons, I dissent from the punishment assessed by the majority.
YANEZ, J., joins in the concurring and dissenting opinion.
FEDERICO G. HINOJOSA, J., not participating.
. Under the circumstances, it is apparent that Butrón did not avail himself of post-judgment discovery techniques.
. See Tex. Bus. & Comm.Code Ann. § 5.103(a)(7) (Vernon 1994 & Supp.1997).
. See Tex Bus. & Comm.Code Ann. § 5.103(a)(4) (Vernon 1994 & Supp.1997).
. See Tex Bus & Comm.Code Ann. § 5.103(a)(3) (Vernon 1994 & Supp.1997).