• Defendant appeals from his conviction of the crime of murder, LSA-R.S. 14:30, and his sentence to life imprisonment in the Louisiana State Penitentiary.
Bills of Exceptions Nos. 16, 20, 21 and 22, reserved during the course of trial, are presented for our consideration. The remaining bills of exceptions reserved during the proceedings are abandoned.
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 16.
Bill of Exceptions No. 16 was reserved when the trial court overruled defense counsel’s objection to the introduction in evidence of a document entitled, “Autopsy Report.”
The facts attached to this bill disclose that on the evening of September 2, 1967, defendant went into the yard of the victim, Robert Collins. After a scuffle with Collins, defendant left the premises. After suffering weakness and convulsions, Collins was taken to the hospital; hospital treatment consisted of the stitching of a neck cut and the application of a bandaid thereto, and he was sent home in an ambulance. The next morning he became very ill and was again taken to the hospital where he died shortly after arrival. After his death, the Coroner wrote a document entitled “Autopsy Report”; it recites:
“Autopsy Report
Baton Rouge, Louisiana East Baton Rouge Parish
September 3, 1967_
“I, Chester A. Williams, Jr., M.D. of the Parish of East Baton Rouge, having been notified by Our Lady of Lake Hospital of the death of Robert Collins and having answered said notification, state that this was body of 42 year old Colored male Stab wound entry just superior to head left clavicle (sutured) going down through sternum and backward into left carotid at arch aorta. Massive hemorrhage into mediastium with pressure on trachea and cereberal anoxia. 12:15 P.M. 9-3-67 Stab laceration left carotid at arch of aorta
“[Sgd.] C. A. Williams “Coroner.”
*225LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 105 provides:
“In a case involving the apparent commission of a crime, the coroner shall make a written report of his investigation to the district attorney within ten days after the completion thereof. In homicide cases the coroner’s report shall certify the cause of death.
“The report shall be in addition to the procés verbal of an autopsy required by R.S. 33:156s.1
“A coroner’s report and a procés verbal of an autopsy shall be competent evidence of death and the cause thereof, but not of any other fact.”
Prior to trial, the State subpoenaed the Coroner as a witness; it did not call him during trial, but it offered in evidence the “Autopsy Report” supra. Immediately thereafter, defense counáel had an instanter subpoena directed to the Coroner; it was served on an office employee because of Dr. Williams’ (the Coroner) absence from the City of Baton Rouge. Not being able to secure the presence of the Coroner, defense counsel offered strenuous objection when the trial judge permitted the trial to progress and the “Autopsy Report” to be offered in evidence for the jury’s consideration.
In this Court defense counsel contends: *227present Code had as its source R.S. 15 :35 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 35 of the old Code provided:
*225“Under Article 105, there are two documents that ‘shall’ be prepared by the coroner, namely, a ‘coroner’s report’ and a ‘proces verbal of an autopsy’. Article 105 further provides that both the coroner’s report and the proces verbal of an autopsy shall be introduced into evidence to prove the death and the cause of death. The State failed to comply with Article 105 since it did not introduce the coroner’s report and the proces verbal.
“The language in Article 105 is clear and unambiguous. It is also clear that the intent of the drafters of the Code was that both the coroner’s report and the proces verbal must be introduced to prove the cause of death. Article 105 of the
*227“ ‘Upon the trial of the case, the proces verbal of the inquest shall be competent evidence of death and the cause therefor, but not of any other fact.’ 2
“Thus, under the old Code, only one document, namely the proces verbal was required to be introduced. If the drafters of the new Code would have intended that only one document would be required to be introduced, there [they] would have used the same language as Section 35 of the old Code. Instead, the drafters changed the language of the section and provided clearly and succinctly that a ‘coroner’s report and a proces verbal of an autopsy’ shall be competent evidence of death and the cause thereof. Furthermore, Article 105 describes both of the documents to be introduced as being separate documents. It is submitted that there would have been no need to describe both documents and to state that both shall be introduced if the drafters of the new Code intended that only one was required.
“Since the State of Louisiana failed to comply with Article 105, the Trial Court erred in allowing the introduction of the single document, whatever it may have been entitled, and such error was clearly prejudicial to the rights of the defendant.”
The Official Revision Comment (a) under Art. 105, LSA-C.Cr.P., supra, recites:
“One purpose of this article is to provide the flow of information needed by the office of the district attorney in cases of apparent homicide and other apparent crimes involving medical evidence. Under R.S. 33:1561 the coroner has a wide variety of cases to investigate. Many of the investigations are routine and do not involve the commission of crime. To require the coroner to send reports of those investigations would impose a needless administrative burden upon both the coroner and the district attorney. Hence, this article requires the submission of reports to the office of the district attorney only in cases where a crime apparently has been committed.”
*229The “Autopsy Report” herein was sent to the District Attorney only as evidence of the death of Robert Collins and the cause thereof. “The proof of the death or cause of death by certificate is not proof of guilt or innocence. They do not implicate the accused. It is rem ipsam evidence.” Syllabus by the Court, State v. Hopkins, 118 La. 99, 42 So. 660. See, State v. Winey, 216 La. 560, 44 So.2d 115; State v. Leming, 217 La. 257, 46 So.2d 262. A grand jury indicted the defendant herein, and a petit jury determined his guilt.
The Coroner’s testimony was not needed to prove the death of Robert Collins or the cause thereof. In State v. Hayden, 171 La. 495, 131 So. 575 (1930), this Court stated:
“There is no law to be found anywhere which declares that the corpus delicti cannot be proved otherwise than by oral testimony from the lips of witnesses, and it would be a strange doctrine to hold that the introduction of documentary evidence to prove the corpus delicti was a violation of the constitutional right of an accused to be confronted with the witnesses against him. The procés verbal, or, for that matter, any other documentary evidence, can in no sense be said to be a witness within the meaning of the constitutional article referred to.
“In view of the long line of uniform jurisprudence holding that the procés verbal of a coroner’s inquest is admissible to prove the corpus delicti, the mere physical facts of the death and cause of the death, which do not pertain to the guilt or innocence of the accused, we find no sound reason for overruling that jurisprudence and of holding under the constitutional provision the corpus delicti, the fact and cause of death, cannot be proved except by witnesses confronting the accused face to face.”
We do not find that under Art. 105, LSA-C.Cr.P., supra, the State is under a mandatory duty to produce at trial the procés verbal of the Coroner, which LSA— R.S. 33:1565, supra, -states must be sent to the Clerk of Court — not the District Attorney — for filing. Art. 105 directs that in a case such - as the instant one, the Coroner shall make a written report of his investigation to the District Attorney, and that such report shall be in addition to his procés verbal. Both the procés verbal and the “Autopsy Report” shall be competent evidence if both are offered in evidence at trial, but both are not required to be offered in evidence at trial. We therefore find that by offering only the “Autopsy Report” in evidence at the trial of the defendant, the State complied with *231Art. 105, and that the defendant suffered no prejudice.3
Bill of Exceptions No. 16 is without merit.
BILLS OF EXCEPTIONS NOS. 20 AND 21.
Bills of Exceptions Nos. 20 and 21 were reserved when the trial court denied defense counsel’s motions for directed verdicts as to the charge of murder and as to the responsive verdict of manslaughter. • At the time of reserving his bills, counsel for the defendant contended that the State had failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, that is, under the terms of Art. 778, LSA-C.Cr.P.4 Herein, counsel contends:
*233“At the conclusion of the State’s case, the defendant moved for a directed verdict on both the charge of murder and manslaughter. This motion for a directed verdict is based on a legal question and not on the facts involved in the case. Since the State failed to comply with Article 105 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure, the State failed as a matter of law to prove the cause of death of the decedent. If the cause of death has not been established, the Court must, as a matter of law, grant defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on both the charge of murder and manslaughter. Article 778, Louisiana Criminal Code of Procedure.”
We find that Bills of Exceptions Nos. 20 and 21 are without merit because of our finding with respect to Bill of Exceptions No. 16. The “Autopsy Report” .was found to be admissible in evidence under Art. 105, LSA-C.Cr.P.; therefore, once proof of the corpus delicti was submitted to the jury, the guilt or innocence of the defendant of the crime charged was a matter for the jury’s determination. In its deliberations, proof beyond a reasonable doubt was a factor exclusively for its consideration.5
Bills of Exceptions Nos. 20 and 21 are without merit.
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 22.
Bill of Exceptions No. 22 was reserved when the trial judge denied defense counsel’s motion for a continuance based on the ground of the absence of a material witness, Dr. Chester Williams, Coroner, who had been subpoenaed.
The motion for a continuance was verbal; the facts relative to its reservation are recited in our consideration of Bill of *235Exceptions No. 16, supra. Herein, defense counsel contends:
“ * * * The failure of the Court to allow a short recess or continuance of this case to allow the defendant to call the coroner as a witness was an abuse of his discretion and was prejudicial to the defendant. The Court’s attention is directed to page 280 of the record which shows that it was 3:15 P.M. when the motion for a continuance was made. Since Court had been in session almost an entire day, it would not have caused any hardship or unreasonable delay to recess Court until the next morning to allow the Coroner to testify. Article 707-708 Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure.”
Our disposition of Bill of Exceptions No. 16 applies to the instant bill. The Coroner’s testimony was not required to prove death or the cause thereof. Confrontation was not mandatory. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in not granting a continuance or a short recess during trial. Cf. Arts. 707, 708, 709, LSA-C.Cr.P.
Bill of Exceptions No. 22 is without merit.
For the reasons assigned, the conviction and sentence are affirmed.
. “The parish coroner, or any person acting in that capacity and conducting a post mortem examination, shall within thirty days furnish the proces verbal of the proceedings of the post mortem examination, to the clerk of the parish court for filing. Where the facilities permit, all such records may be kept in the coroner’s office. The clerk, except in Orleans Parish, shall keep a suitable book which shall be known as the book of autopsies, to be opened to the public at any time during office hours for inspection, in which shall be inscribed the proces verbals of the proceedings of the post mortem examinations. Noneompliance by the clerk shall subject him to a fine of not less than twenty-five dollars, collectible by the district attorney or the attorney representing the parish, by suit before any justice of the peace of the parish, and when collected shall be paid over to the parish school fund, less the cost of prosecuting the fine. For each proces verbal recorded, the clerk shall receive from the parish treasury the sum of two dollars and fifty cents, 'payable upon his own warrant.” LSA-R.S. 33 :1565.
. LSA-R.S. 15:35, source of Art. 105 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, provided, in part:
“ * * * The coroner shall also within thirty days from the inquest return to the district court the procés verbal of the inquest, the written evidence and all recognizance and examination by him taken, and may commit to the parish jail any witness who refuses to recognize in such manner as he shall direct. Upon the trial of the case the procés verbal of the inquest shall be competent evidence of death and the cause thereof, but not of any other fact. If no inquest was hold, the coroner may certify the fact of a death and the cause therefor, and said certificate shall be competent evidence of these facts, but not of any other fact.”
. The record shows that the following colloquy took place in connection with the reservation of Bill of Exceptions No. 16:
“MR. ROY: May it please the Court, at this time the State would like to offer the report and proces verbal of the coroner with reference to the death and cause thereof. I’d like to ask permission to substitute a copy for it. It’s the original.
“THE COURT: All right.
“MR. WHALEN: We have an objection to this document. We ask that the jury be retired while we argue it.
“THE COURT: All right, retire the jury, Mr. Sheriff.
“(Jury retired to the jury room.)
“MR. WHALEN: We object to this, Your Honor, as not being an official document, not qualifying under the provisions of Article 105 as to what may be admitted to prove death. Further * * *
“THE COURT: Is that 15:105?
“MR. WHALEN: No, sir, that’s 105 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, of the new Code. Particularly, in that, that Code specifies there shall be a proces verbal of an autopsy and a coroner’s report,-and that the two shall be competent evidence. Wo have here a piece of paper that says autopsy report, doesn’t say it’s a proces verbal and doesn’t say it’s a coroner’s report, does not identify the signer if it does identify him as the coroner. Of course, Your Honor can take judicial notice of his signature. That is not our objection. Our objection is that this is neither a coroner’s report nor a proces verbal. It attempts to be both, but the law specifies the two shall be separate.
“MR. ROY: Well, Your Honor, I have some other documents I’ll be happy to submit. I was just trying — there are some facts in one of them that I don’t think should go before the jury, but * * *
“MR. WHALEN: We further object, Your Honor, on the grounds that this is hearsay and does not subject the doctor to cross-examination. It is an officer of the State or Parish exparte his testimony not subject to cross-examination as admitted against the defendant.”
. “In a jury trial the court may direct a verdict of not guilty of one or more of the offenses charged, on its own motion or on that of a defendant, after the close of the state’s evidence or of all the evidence, if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.
“In a trial by the judge alone the court shall enter a judgment of acquittal on one or more of the offenses charged, on its own motion or on that of a defendant, after the close of the state’s evidence or of all the evidence, if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.
“If the court denies a defendant’s motion for a directed verdict or judgment of acquittal at the close of the state’s case, the defendant may offer his evidence in defense.” LSA-C.Cr.P., Art. 778.
(The first paragraph of this Article has been declared unconstitutional in State v. Hudson, 253 La. 992, 221 So.2d 484, 499.)
. “This legislative enactment [Art. 77S, LSA-C.Cr.P.] is repugnant to the constitutional guarantee that, ‘The jury in all criminal eases shall be the judges of the law and of the facts on the question of guilt or innocence, having been charged ■ as to the law applicable to the ease by the presiding judge.’ La.Const. art. ’ XIX, Sec. 9 (1921) ; State v. Gatlin, 241 La. 321, 129 So.2d 4 (1961); State v. Broussard, 217 La. 90, 46 So.2d 48 (1950). Questions of guilt or innocence can only be decided by the jury under the plain language of the Constitution. Judges must decide only those fact questions which do not relate directly to guilt or innocence. State v. Hayes, 162 La. 917, 111 So. 327 (1927).
“The right to trial by jury in a capital case is as old as the State itself. La. Const. art. VI, Sec. IS (1812). Power to determine guilt or innocence in capital cases has not been vested in judges by the Constitution; instead the people have reserved that power to juries. When the death penalty is involved the guarantee of the Constitution is twofold: The accused is assured a jury trial in his contention for acquittal, and the State is assured a jury trial in its contention for a conviction. In these trials the jury is the repository of the standard of justice in the community.” State v. Hudson, 253 La. 992, 221 So.2d 484, 499. See, State v. Douglas, 256 La. 186, 235 So.2d 563.