(concurring in part; dissenting in part).
I
Defendant was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. MCL 750.520b(1)(f); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(f) provides that:
"Sec. 520b. (1) A person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree if he or she engages in Sexual penetration with another person and if any of the following circumstances exists:
"(f) The actor causes personal injury to the victim and force or coercion is used to accomplish sexual penetration.”
"Personal injury” is defined in MCL 750.520a(f); MSA 28.788(1)(f) as:
"bodily injury, disfigurement, mental anguish, chronic pain, pregnancy, disease, or loss or impairment of a sexual or reproductive organ.”
In People v Gorney, 99 Mich App 199, 207; 297 *257NW2d 648 (1980), cited by the majority, this Court held that the prosecution must show that the complainant suffered "extreme” or "serious” mental anguish in order to support a conviction under a "personal injury-mental anguish” theory. In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence of extreme mental anguish under the Gorney standard. Although there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction of first-degree criminal sexual conduct on two independent grounds, it is impossible to tell from the general verdict which ground was relied upon by the jury. Generally, where a jury may have based its decision on an insupportable theory, its verdict must be set aside. See, e.g., People v Flinnon, 78 Mich App 380, 386; 260 NW2d 106 (1977). Therefore, I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding on Issue I.
The majority insists that there was sufficient evidence of extreme mental anguish under the Gorney standard. Undoubtedly, complainant experienced considerable mental distress as a result of the assault. However, complainant’s reaction to the assault was comparable to the mental anguish, outrage, and humiliation typically experienced by any rape victim. In order to support a conviction of first-degree criminal sexual conduct under a "mental anguish” theory, the prosecution must show substantially greater mental suffering by the complainant than the distress experienced by most such victims. In Gorney, supra, 207, this Court listed two possible factors which would justify a conviction under a "mental anguish” theory: (1) "the need by the victim for psychiatric care”; or (2) "interference with the victim’s ability to conduct a normal life, such as absence from the workplace”. Since the prosecution failed to demonstrate that *258the instant complainant experienced the degree of mental anguish regarded as necessary by the Gorney Court, I would reverse.
II
As I noted in People v Washington, 84 Mich App 750, 756; 270 NW2d 511 (1978), the admissibility of third-party identification testimony is limited to testimony by a third party as to the circumstances surrounding another person’s prior identification; a third party may not testify that another person previously identified the accused. See People v Poe, 388 Mich 611; 202 NW2d 320 (1972), People v Londe, 230 Mich 484; 203 NW 93 (1925), cf. People v Sanford, 402 Mich 460; 265 NW2d 1 (1978) (dictum). However, I agree with the majority that, under the circumstances of this case, the third-party identification testimony was merely cumulative. Since I believe that the trial court’s failure to exclude this testimony was harmless error, I concur in the result reached by the majority on Issue III.
Ill
The trial court ordered defendant’s alibi witness, Janice Gwinn, to submit to a police interview against her will. To make matters worse, the prosecutor attempted to establish through closing argument and cross-examination of Janice Gwinn that her failure to submit voluntarily to a police interview indicated that she was unworthy of belief.
First of all, the trial court’s interview order was clearly beyond its authority. As defendant correctly points out, no statute, rule, or appellate court decision requires a defense witness to volun*259teer evidence to the state in advance of trial. See People v Kraai, 92 Mich App 398; 285 NW2d 309 (1979). Moreover, such a discovery order is unfair unless the defense is provided with a corresponding opportunity to compel prosecution witnesses to submit to interviews. Any evidence obtained as the result of such an involuntary interview should be excluded.
It was also improper for the prosecution to argue that Janice Gwinn’s failure to submit willingly to a police interview rendered her unworthy of belief. As this Court pointed out in Kraai, supra, 411, the prosecution must not attempt to discredit alibi witnesses by attacking such witnesses’ failure to report information to the police. Manifestly, the trial court’s improper discovery order, compounded by the prosecution’s impermissible closing argument, necessitate a reversal; therefore, I must respectfully dissent from the majority holding on Issue VI.
IV
During a discussion in chambers, in response to a prosecutorial contention that convicted felons would have a greater interest in not telling the truth and not being convicted than nonfelons, the trial court stated:
"Why would that be true here? If he’s convicted, I’m going to sentence him to two life terms. After you get wet, can the water make you any wetter?”
Although the trial court well may have been speaking hypothetically, it is also possible that this statement reflected a sentence determination prior to examination of a current presentencing report. Such a predetermination effectively may deny a *260defendant his right to consideration of a presentence report; see People v Triplett, 407 Mich 510; 287 NW2d 165 (1980). Certainly, such commentary by the trial judge should be carefully avoided. However, since defendant, after conviction, failed to request sentencing before a different judge, I concur in the result reached by the majority.
I join sections II, IV, V, and VII of the majority opinion.